Teegarden v. State

270 Or.App. 373

348 P.3d 273

Kurtiss TEEGARDEN, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.STATE of Oregon, acting by and through OREGON YOUTH AUTHORITY; and Sid Thompson, Defendants–Respondents.

11C20059

A152071.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted May 2, 2014.

Decided April 15, 2015.

Kevin T. Lafky, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Tonyia J. Brady and Lafky & Lafky.

Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney–in–Charge, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.

Before SERCOMBE, Presiding Judge, and HADLOCK, Judge, and TOOKEY, Judge.

Opinion

SERCOMBE, P.J.

Plaintiff, who is a former employee of the State of Oregon—specifically, Oregon Youth Authority—filed a complaint seeking damages from the state and Sid Thompson, the superintendent of MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility where plaintiff had worked (collectively, OYA).¹ After OYA moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to ORCP 21 B, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had resolved “all civil areas of dispute” by way of a settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment and, as explained below, we reverse and remand.

We state the facts as alleged in the complaint and supplemented by the terms of the settlement agreement, which was attached to OYA's answer. See Boyer v. Salomon Smith Barney, 344 Or. 583, 589 n. 3, 188 P.3d 233 (2008) (where the defendants incorporated a contract into their answer and plaintiff did not object to the trial court considering the terms of that agreement in evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the appellate court treated the terms of the agreement “as having been admitted by plaintiff, the same as if plaintiff had alleged those terms in his complaint”).

Plaintiff worked for OYA as a group life coordinator at MacLaren. In that position, plaintiff's main job duty was to supervise youth offenders in the facility. Over the course of several months in 2010, plaintiff made a number of complaints to management about staff being attacked by youth offenders, knowledge of offenders planning attacks on staff, differential treatment of offenders, staff being put physically at risk, lack of policies and rules governing the unit, and failure to provide treatment to offenders. On May 19, 2010, OYA terminated plaintiff from his position.

After plaintiff was dismissed, he pursued a grievance through his union. As part of the settlement of the grievance, OYA agreed that plaintiffs dismissal would be characterized as a resignation and that plaintiff would not have any further legal issues regarding the events leading to his termination. In return, plaintiff agreed to drop his claims and release OYA from liability. Accordingly, the parties signed a settlement agreement.

The agreement, entered into in August 2010, recites that the parties “wish to resolve this grievance on mutually satisfactory terms without further hearing or litigation of any kind.” Accordingly, OYA “agrees to revoke the Letter of Dismissal and accepts a Letter of Resignation * * * from [plaintiff], effective upon final signature of this document.” Plaintiff, for his part, “agrees not to appeal, grieve, or otherwise challenge the * * * Letter of Dismissal,” and the union “voluntarily withdraws the * * * grievance with prejudice.” The agreement contains a provision stating that it “is the sole and entire agreement between the parties. This Agreement fully supersedes any and all written or oral contracts, agreements or understandings between the parties pertaining to the subjects discussed herein.” Furthermore,

“[t]his Agreement constitutes the good faith resolution of all claims or potential claims [plaintiff] might have against the State or OYA and is not and shall not in any way be construed as an admission of any wrongful or discriminatory act or omission against [plaintiff], or that [plaintiff]'s discipline was in any way wrongful, unlawful, or contrary to the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.”

Soon after the parties entered into the settlement agreement, plaintiff was charged with official misconduct, tampering with a witness, and fourth-degree assault based on events related to his termination. Around the same time, he obtained employment at the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW). Once ODFW conducted a further background check, however, it terminated plaintiff's employment as a result of the pending criminal charges against him.

Although OYA was aware that those criminal charges would likely be brought against plaintiff, it did not disclose that information to plaintiff during settlement negotiations. Plaintiff would not have entered into the settlement if that information had been provided. OYA encouraged the prosecution, provided prosecutors and investigators access to OYA employees, and provided paid time off to employees who testified against plaintiff. After a jury trial, plaintiff was acquitted of all the criminal charges against him.

In August 2011, plaintiff filed his complaint against OYA in which he sought damages for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with a prospective economic relationship, and violations of 42 USC section 1983, along with a declaration, “pursuant to ORS 28.010 –28.020,” that “the release is invalid, and of no legal effect [.]” OYA filed an answer to the complaint and set forth a number of affirmative defenses; among other things, OYA asserted that plaintiff's claims were barred as a result of the settlement agreement. In his reply, plaintiff denied OYA's affirmative defenses. Thereafter, OYA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to ORCP 21 B on the ground that plaintiff's claims were barred “because he released all claims upon entering into a binding settlement agreement with [OYA].”² Plaintiff responded that the settlement agreement had been breached by OYA or, alternatively, that execution of the agreement was based on a misrepresentation and, therefore, could not be enforced. He also contended that, by its terms, the agreement only settled his union grievance and did not apply to the claims at issue, and pointed out to the trial court that issues of fact cannot be tried on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion and later issued a letter opinion concluding that “the Settlement Agreement resolves all civil areas of dispute between OYA and the Plaintiff.” Furthermore, the court observed that “the District Attorney was not a party to the Settlement Agreement” and “Plaintiff could not reasonably anticipate the Settlement Agreement prohibited the District Attorney from filing criminal charges against him.”

Plaintiff objected, asserting that his claims for malicious prosecution and intentional interference with a prospective economic relationship related to “conduct and facts that occurred after the execution of the settlement agreement” and that the agreement did not “release future claims when the facts that g[a]ve rise to the claims had not yet occurred.” Furthermore, plaintiff contended that the court could not dismiss his claim for declaratory relief:

“Plaintiff objects to having his sixth claim for declaratory judgment against OYA dismissed because the court has not ruled on the declaratory judgment nor has Plaintiff been able to provide evidence at hearing. Pursuant to statute and case law, if jurisdiction to render declaratory judgment is properly invoked, the court has a duty to render judgment declaring right of the respective parties litigant.”

The court held an additional hearing, but thereafter entered an order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordering that all of plaintiff's claims be dismissed with prejudice. Thus, the court concluded (1) that the settlement agreement was enforceable as a matter of law despite plaintiff's assertions that it had been induced by misrepresentation and (2) as a matter of law, the release contained in the settlement agreement precluded all of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of OYA and against plaintiff, dismissing with prejudice every claim set forth in plaintiff's complaint.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. He asserts, in part, that the motion on the pleadings should not have been granted because (1) his pleadings alleged that the settlement agreement is unenforceable as he was induced to execute the agreement by OYA's misrepresentations, (2) the settlement agreement did not release liability for future torts, and (3) the trial court could not dismiss his declaratory judgment claim. We agree with plaintiff on all of those points.

“Motions for judgment on the pleadings are not generally well-regarded by the courts, because hasty or imprudent use of the procedure can conflict with the policy of ensuring litigants a full and fair opportunity to try their claim or defense.” Thompson v. Telephone & Data Systems, Inc., 130 Or.App. 302, 309, 881 P.2d 819, adh'd to as modified on recons., 132 Or.App. 103, 888 P.2d 16 (1994). Thus, “[a] showing that the nonmoving party cannot prevail as a matter of law is the basis for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Rowlett v. Fagan, 262 Or.App. 667, 679, 327 P.3d 1, rev. allowed, 356 Or. 516, 340 P.3d 47 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judgment on the pleadings, which is authorized by ORCP 21 B, ‘is only allowable when the pleadings[,] taken together [,] affirmatively show that plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant[.]’ ” Boyer, 344 Or. at 586, 188 P.3d 233 (quoting Salem Sand v. City of Salem, 260 Or. 630, 636, 492 P.2d 271 (1971) ) (footnote omitted; brackets in Boyer). “On review of a judgment on the pleadings, an appellate court...