Teel v. Lozada

99 F.4th 1273

Dudley TEEL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Susan Teel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deputy Sheriff Jonathan LOZADA, in his individual capacity, Defendant-Appellee,Sheriff Eric Flowers, in his officialcapacity as the Sheriff of Indian River County, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-11106

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Filed: April 18, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-14367-DMM

Todd Norbraten, Morgan & Morgan, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Guy Bennett Rubin, Rubin & Rubin, Stuart, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Summer M. Barranco, Richard A. Giuffreda, Purdy Jolly Giuffreda Barranco & Jisa, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before Jordan, Lagoa, and Marcus, Circuit Judges.

Lagoa, Circuit Judge:

Dr. Dudley Teel, Susan Teel's husband and the personal representative of Susan Teel's estate ("Estate"), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in Defendants' favor. This appeal stems from the events that led to Susan Teel's death after her attempted suicide at her home.

Dr. Teel—acting on behalf of Mrs. Teel's Estate—sued Deputy Jonathan Lozada and the Sheriff of Indian River County and alleged two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: one for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and another under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).¹ The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but we reversed in part and vacated in part in an earlier appeal. Teel v. Lozada, 826 F. App'x 880 (11th Cir. 2020) ("Teel I"). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment as to the Estate's Monell claim, but the excessive force claim proceeded to trial. At trial, the jury found that Deputy Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Estate now appeals the grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim, two of the district court's jury instructions, and one of the district court's evidentiary rulings.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm as to all issues.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2017, Susan Teel attempted suicide by cutting her wrists with a kitchen knife. Shortly after the attempt, her husband, Dr. Teel, discovered his wife getting out of their bathtub, which was filled with blood and water. Dr. Teel said that he was going to call 911, but Mrs. Teel responded, "No, you are not." "Yes, I am," he said. "I am not going. . . . [Y]ou are not calling 911," she insisted. As Dr. Teel tried to call 911, Mrs. Teel repeatedly batted at the phone to prevent him from calling for help. Dr. Teel told his wife that he was going to text their daughter, Sara Gordon, who, in turn, called 911.

Deputies Lozada and Samuel Earman both responded to the 911 call, but Deputy Lozada arrived first. While Dr. Teel was with his wife, he heard Deputy Lozada knock on the front door. When Dr. Teel opened the door, Deputy Lozada observed blood on Dr. Teel's shirt. Dr. Teel informed Deputy Lozada that his wife had been drinking, may have taken Ativan, had a knife, and had cut her wrists.

Before Deputy Lozada ascended the stairs in search of Mrs. Teel, Dr. Teel warned him to "be careful." Deputy Lozada intended to take Mrs. Teel into custody under Florida's Baker Act, see Fla. Stat. § 394.463, and felt a sense of urgency because he knew that Mrs. Teel was injured and needed assistance. Deputy Lozada also knew that he would need to secure Mrs. Teel and take the knife away from her before EMS could treat her wounds.

As Deputy Lozada proceeded up the stairway, he held his firearm in the ready position—tucking the firearm against his body with his left hand, covering it with his right hand, and pointing the muzzle down. When Deputy Lozada reached the top of the stairs, he did not see or hear anyone but noticed that the master bedroom light was on. He went to the master bedroom's doorway and observed Mrs. Teel lying face up on the bed. Because Deputy Lozada knew that Mrs. Teel was armed with a knife, he said, "Hey, Susan, sheriff's office, let me see your hands." Mrs. Teel arose, produced a thirteen-inch kitchen knife, raised the knife above her head, pointed the knife at Deputy Lozada, and said, "Fuck you, kill me." As Deputy Lozada announced over the radio that Mrs. Teel had a knife, she started walking toward him. Believing he was in grave danger, Deputy Lozada uncovered his firearm and said, "Don't come near me." Mrs. Teel kept approaching until she was within three to five feet of Deputy Lozada. Deputy Lozada fired one round and retreated, but Mrs. Teel kept coming toward him. Deputy Lozada fired again and continued walking backward, but she kept advancing. Finally, as Deputy Lozada reached the threshold of the bedroom, he fired a third shot, and Mrs. Teel collapsed. Deputy Lozada immediately radioed for EMS, but Mrs. Teel died a few minutes later.

On September 10, 2018, the Estate brought a four-count complaint against Deputy Lozada, in his individual capacity, and Sheriff Loar, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Indian River County (collectively, "Defendants").² In Count 1, the Estate brought a § 1983 claim against Deputy Lozada alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. In Count 2, the Estate brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the Sheriff is liable under Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, because he failed to properly train, discipline, and supervise Deputy Lozada. And in Counts 3 and 4, the Estate brought two state law claims for wrongful death, against the Sheriff and Lozada, respectively. Because the Estate voluntarily dismissed the state law claims, only the § 1983 claims remain relevant to this appeal.

Initially, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but we reversed in part and vacated in part in an earlier appeal. Teel I, 826 F. App'x 880. Following our remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on the Estate's Monell claim. To prove a Monell claim, "a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Before the first appeal, the district court granted summary judgment because it found that the Estate failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to whether Mrs. Teel's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force was violated. After we reversed that ruling, the Sheriff moved for reconsideration of summary judgment based on the latter two Monell elements. The district court granted the motion, finding that the Estate failed to show that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the Sheriff's Office had a custom or policy of deliberate indifference toward Fourth Amendment rights.

The Estate's excessive force claim against Deputy Lozada proceeded to trial, and the jury found that Deputy Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (DE 196.) Following the jury's verdict, the district court entered final judgment in favor of the Defendants and this timely appeal ensued.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"[W]e review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury." Caradigm USA LLC v. PruittHealth, Inc., 964 F.3d 1259, 1277 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012)). As to the phrasing of jury instructions, we review for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that district courts have "wide discretion as to the style and wording employed" in their instructions. Id.; accord Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). "If the district court errs in its jury instructions, we will 'consider the jury instructions as a whole' to determine whether the error was reversible and 'will not overturn a jury verdict because of an erroneous jury instruction unless there is also a showing of prejudice.' " Caradigm, 964 F.3d at 1277 n.12 (quoting Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2000)); accord MidlevelU, Inc. v. ACI Info. Grp., 989 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2021); Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).

If a party timely objects to the admissibility of certain evidence, we review the district court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016). But we will not reverse where an error is harmless. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. And if a party fails to timely object to the admissibility of evidence, we will deem the party's objection waived unless the district court plainly erred. Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1352 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997).

"We review a district court's decision on summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court, drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact." Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017). "We may affirm the judgment below on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether it was relied on by the district court." Statton v. Fla. Fed. Jud. Nominating Comm'n, 959 F.3d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 2020).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Estate argues that the district court committed reversible error through its jury instructions, evidentiary ruling, and summary judgment order on the Estate's Monell claim. We address these arguments in turn.

A. Jury Instructions

The Estate appeals two of the district court's jury instructions: the Graham excessive force instruction and the Baker...