Teel v. Palmer

ANTOINE TEEL, Petitioner,

v.CARMEN PALMER, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:08-CV-13172

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: August 2, 2011

HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

I. Introduction

Michigan prisoner Antoine Teel, through counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his Wayne County Circuit Court convictions for assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of 10 to 30 years imprisonment and two years imprisonment.

In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel, the non-disclosure of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court's admission of evidence and limitations on cross-examination, the sufficiency of the evidence, and separation of powers. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied. Having reviewed the record and considered the matter, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims and denies the petition. The Court also denies in part andgrants in part a certificate of appealability.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting of Alexis Coleman, his brother's mother-in-law, outside of her residence in Detroit, Michigan on December 18, 2004. The Michigan Court of Appeals provided a factual overview of the case, which is presumed correct on habeas review, see Monroe v. Smith, 197 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd. 41 F. App'x 730 (6th Cir. 2002), as follows:

Defendant's convictions arise from the shooting of Alexis Coleman. The victim had a daughter named Lillian who married Ricky Teel, defendant's brother, in June 2004. On December 7, 2004, there was a fire in the house in which the couple resided, and Lillian died as a result of injuries suffered in the fire. Ricky Teel also was burned in the fire and suffered injuries when he fell from the second floor bathroom window. The other occupants of the home, Lillian's children and her sister, survived the fire. The victim blamed Ricky Teel for the death of her daughter Lillian and asserted that he had a financial stake in her death because of an inheritance and a life insurance policy. She testified that she openly stated this belief at Lillian's funeral and questioned the fire department about the cause of the fire.

On the day of the fire, the victim went to the hospital where she visited Ricky Teel in his hospital room. As she was leaving the room, she encountered defendant and mentioned how much he resembled Ricky. On December 18, 2004, the victim attended Lillian's funeral, and she saw defendant at the funeral. Later that evening, the victim was at home when Cheryl Meredith advised her that there were men in a vehicle out front asking for "Alexis." Family and friends commonly knew the victim as "Lex." After a short time period, the victim left her home and approached the vehicle. She testified that defendant was in the driver's seat, and he lifted a gun from his side and shot her in the face. The victim fell to the ground, and the vehicle drove off. When medical personnel and police arrived on the scene, the victim reportedly told police that she did not know the name of the shooter, but knew him as "her daughter's husband's brother." At that time, the victim believed that she was going to die because of the heavy blood flow from her face and had difficulty speaking because the bullet had landed in front of her vocal chords in her throat.

There were inconsistencies in the victim's statements, and the inconsistencies were presented to the jury. At various stages, the victim identified the color of thevehicle as green, purple, or turquoise. Additionally, one statement identified defendant's other brother, Curtis, as the passenger in the vehicle. Although the victim was not expressly questioned about her drug use at the time of the shooting, she was asked whether she suffered from any "impairment," and she denied the assertion. Ultimately, defendant was convicted as charged.

People v. Teel, Nos. 264588, 273860, 2007 WL 1828332, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2007) (unpublished).

Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial and evidentiary hearing with the trial court, which was denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a second motion for new trial asserting that trial counsel was ineffective, that the prosecution withheld evidence, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and that his rights to a jury trial were violated through the use of mandatory sentencing. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, trial counsel, the prosecutor, the victim, and several witnesses testified, including Cheryl Meredith and Jerrell Beaver. The defense also presented the victim's medical records which indicated that she had a history of drug use, that she had cocaine in her system after the shooting, and that she made conflicting statements about the shooting while hospitalized. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that trial counsel was effective, that the prosecution did not intentionally suppress favorable evidence, that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct, and that Petitioner's sentence was valid. The trial court nonetheless granted the motion for new trial finding that the victim's testimony had been significantly impeached and was not credible. People v. Teel, No. 05-001274 (Wayne Co. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2006) (unpublished).

The prosecution and Petitioner both filed appeals with the Michigan Court of Appeals. The prosecution claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.Petitioner argued that a new trial was warranted and raised claims concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel, the non-disclosure of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and the trial court's admission of certain evidence and limitations on cross-examination. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial, denied relief on Petitioner's claims, and affirmed his convictions. Id. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Teel, 480 Mich. 957, 741 N.W.2d 348 (2007).

Petitioner thereafter instituted this federal habeas action, raising the following claims as grounds for relief:

I. He was denied the effective assistance of counsel where:

A. Counsel, without having reviewed the complainant's medical records, waived their production yet those records contained impeaching and exculpatory information.

B. Counsel failed to obtain a copy of the Final Arson Report and so entered into an unfavorable stipulation in regard to the arson investigation.

C. Counsel failed to interview the only other witness to see the perpetrators and that witness' description of the perpetrators did not match Petitioner.

D. Counsel failed to support the credibility of an alibi witness and the defendant by showing why they testified that they thought that Lillian's mother was dead.

E. Counsel failed to ask for a continuance after he was surprised by the new evidence offered by the prosecution concerning Jerrell Beaver and also failed to ask for a continuance once he was given the arson report.

F. Counsel failed to offer testimony that defendant at one time owned a greenish silver colored Taurus.

G. Counsel failed to attack the prosecution's theory of the case in his closing argument.

II. The prosecution failed to give the defense evidence that it was constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady.

III. The following misconduct by the prosecutor denied him a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

A. The prosecutor assumed facts not in evidence which vouched for and bolstered the prosecution's case, improperly attacked the credibility of the alibi defense, and commented on defendant's right to counsel and to the effective assistance of counsel.

B. The prosecution's argument denigrated defense counsel to the detriment of defendant's right to be presumed innocent.

C. The prosecution diluted the burden of proof in its opening and closing argument.

IV. His constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated by the following evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge:

A. The trial court permitted irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay as to how the fire got started and to problems Ricky and Lillian were allegedly having which unfairly prejudiced the jury against anyone related to Ricky Teel.

B. He was denied the right to confront and cross examine the witness when the trial judge sustained the prosecutor's objection to the defense's questions about the origin of the $2000.

C. The Court erred in denying the defense the right to cross-examine the officer in charge of the case about the results of this arson investigation where the complainant testified to the fire and to her suspicions that Ricky Teel set the fire.

V. Established constitutional principles require that a defendant whose conviction rests on incredible and completely illogical testimony be granted a new trial.

VI. Section 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the United States Constitution.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because theclaims have not been fully exhausted, are barred by procedural default, and/or lack merit.

III. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., governs this case because Petitioner filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:

An

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