Tekula v. Bayport-Blue Point School Dist.

295 F.Supp.2d 224

Charles F. TEKULA, Jr.,Plaintiff, v. BAYPORT-BLUE POINT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Richard Curtis, Gerald M. Doroski, Defendants.

No. 02-CV-5146(ADS)(ARL).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

December 15, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles F. Tekula, Jr., Moriches, NY, pro se.

Cooper, Sapir & Cohen, P.C., Melville, NY (David M. Cohen, of counsel) for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND DECISION OF ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

This action arises out of claims by the pro se plaintiff Charles F. Tekula ("Tekula" or the "plaintiff") against his former employer the Bayport Blue-Point School District ("School District"), the Superintendent of the School District Richard Curtis ("Curtis"), and the Plant Facilities Director for the School District Gerald M. Doroski ("Doroski"), (collectively, the "defendants"). The plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2(e) et seq. and the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law ("NYSHRL"), § 290 et seq., alleging that the defendants terminated his employment and retaliated against him for opposing discrimination in the workplace. The amended complaint also contains claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently before the Court is a motion by the defendants to dismiss the federal causes of action and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ("Fed. R. Civ.P."). Also before the Court is the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the defendants and their attorneys pursuant to Rule 11.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The facts are taken from the amended complaint filed on January 2, 2003 unless otherwise noted. On September 21, 1999, the School District hired the plaintiff as its head custodian based upon a civil service promotional test. At the time of his hiring, the plaintiff was also employed on a full-time basis by the Suffolk County Community College ("SCCC"). With the permission of Doroski, the plaintiff maintained both positions concurrently. The plaintiff alleges that from the date of his hiring until December, 1999 his work record with the School District was "exemplary" and his attendance record was "impeccable." Am. Compl. ¶ 7.

Tekula alleges that in December, 1999 Curtis communicated with Fritzi Rohl ("Rohl"), the Human Resources Director at SCCC. These alleged conversations were in regards to the plaintiff's activities on behalf of minorities and other protected class employees at SCCC. Following this communication, the plaintiff alleges that Curtis requested that he resign from his position with SCCC or that his employment with the School District would be terminated though it is not clear from the amended complaint if Tekula did, in fact, resign. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that after this communication, Doroski repeatedly entered "false and derogatory" information into his permanent personnel file. Am. Compl. ¶ 9.

In January, 2000, Doroski and Susan Bergman ("Bergman"), the Principal of the Sylvan Avenue Elementary School, requested that the plaintiff give a written warning to Jose Toledo ("Toledo"), a night custodian for the School District. Toledo is a "dark skinned Hispanic" who spoke English "with a very heavy accent." Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Toledo worked under the plaintiff's direct supervision. The proposed warning was based on teachers' complaints that Toledo cleaned the classrooms before the teachers left for the day and, in the process, attempted to engage the teachers in conversation. The plaintiff informed Doroski and Bergman that giving such a warning to Toledo would be a mistake because he believed that these complaints were based upon the fact that Toledo spoke with an accent that required an increased level of attention to understand.

The plaintiff alleges that in response to his expression of this opinion, Doroski placed a written memorandum in his permanent personnel file which falsely characterized the incident to make him appear "incompetent and insubordinate." Am. Compl. ¶ 8.

On or about January 26, 2000, Doroski gave the plaintiff a letter that was written by Curtis that informed Tekula that his employment with the School District would be terminated as of February 4, 2000. The plaintiff claims that his termination was in retaliation "for his activities on behalf of protected class employees," Am. Compl. ¶ 10, and because he "opposed discriminatory practices in the workplace." Am. Compl. ¶ 3.

B. Procedural Background

On March 18, 2000, Tekula filed a complaint of discrimination with the New York State Division of Human Rights (the "NYSDHR") who also accepted that complaint on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). In particular, that complaint alleged (1) that Tekula was terminated because of his refusal "to carry out instructions that would be discriminatory against an employee," and (2) that the defendants retaliated against Tekula because he had a complaint pending with the NYSDHR against a previous employer.

By letter dated, June 21, 2002, the EEOC issued a letter (the "right-to-sue letter") to Tekula advising him of his right to pursue the action by filing a private suit within 90 days from its receipt. The plaintiff alleges that he received this letter on June 28, 2002. On September 23, 2002, within 90 days from the date he received this letter, Tekula commenced this action by filing the complaint with the Court. However, Tekula failed to serve the complaint on the defendants. Rather, on January 2, 2003, Tekula filed an amended complaint with the Court. On January 6, 2003, the plaintiff served the amended complaint on the defendants.

The defendants now move to dismiss the federal causes of action and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In support of their motion, they argue that (1) the plaintiff's Title VII claims are barred by the 90 day statute of limitations; (2) there is no individual liability under Title VII; (3) the plaintiff's Section 1981 and 1983 claims are legally insufficient; and (4) the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time barred.

Also before the Court is the plaintiff's "Motion for Sanctions" against the defendants and their counsel. The plaintiff claims that "none of the arguments made or legal authorities relied on by [the] defendants could be reasonably construed to lead to the legal conclusions they assert, nor can defendants counsel claim to have made the inquiry into the facts and the law required by Rule 11." Plfs. Mot. for Sanctions at 2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should dismiss the complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his complaint which would entitle him to relief. King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir.1999); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.1996). The Court must liberally construe the claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.1999); Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995).

In addition, the Court must liberally interpret the complaint of a pro se plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir.1986). Nevertheless, pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

B. Title VII

1. The Statute of Limitations

As stated above, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's Title VII claims are time barred. In particular, the defendants claim that the plaintiff's Title VII claims are untimely because the amended complaint, which was the only complaint served on the defendants, was filed with the Court after the 90 day statute of limitations expired.

It is well established that a claim brought under Title VII must be commenced within 90 days of a grievant's receipt of a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Center, 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996); Ocasio v. Fashion Institute of Tech., 86 F.Supp.2d 371, 375 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Rule 3 of the Fed. R. of Civ. P. provides that a "civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court." (emphasis added). Upon filing the complaint, the statute of limitations is tolled, Wilson v. Diocese of the New York Episcopal Church, 96 Civ. 2400, 1998 WL 82921, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.1998), and the complaint must be served on the defendants within 120 of its filing. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4(m). Specifically, Rule 4(m) provides in part:

If service of the summons and the complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice ...

Here, rather than serving the original complaint, Tekula filed and served the amended complaint within 120 days from the date his original complaint was filed. "While it is true that the filing of an amended complaint does not extend the 120 day period, so long as the amended complaint is filed and served within 120 days of filing the original complaint and does not add any causes of action barred by the statute of limitations, it does not matter that it is the...