Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp.

GARRETT TELFAIR and TRAVIS TELFAIR, plaintiffs,

v.FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, defendant.

CASE NO. 12-CIV-80436-HURLEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Dated: March 28, 2013

OPINION ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs Garrett and Travis Telfair sue their former employer, Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx"), alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 1) and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. (Count 2), and religious discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat., § 760.01 et seq.¹

FedEx has moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) failure to establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment based on race for lack of evidence of adequate, similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably; (2) failure to establish a prima facie claim for hostile racial environment for lack of evidence of racially charged commentary or harassment inthe workplace; (3) failure to establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment based on religion for lack of evidence of similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably; and (4) failure to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination/failure to accommodate for lack of evidence of a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement, or alternatively, for failure to raise genuine issue of material fact on the reasonableness of the employer's proffered accommodation to the plaintiffs' asserted religious beliefs.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that the plaintiff has offered no evidence to support an essential element of his case, or present affirmative evidence that plaintiff will be unable to prove one or more essential elements of the case at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). If the movant successfully negates an essential element of the plaintiff's case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.

Thus, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of any material facts exists, and the non-moving party fails to present evidence on an essential element of claim showing that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Unsupported speculation does not create a genuine issue of material fact, Cordoba v. Dillard's Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005), and "bare and self-serving" allegations made without personal knowledge are inadequate to survive summary judgment. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Insurance, 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11thCir. 2000).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is obligated to construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. I.C. System, Inc., 629 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2011). If conflicts arise between the facts developed by the parties, the court must credit the non-moving party's version. Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759 (11th Cir. 2006). For example, if the non-moving party presents an affidavit describing material, external facts based on first hand personal knowledge - and not subjective belief - the court is required to credit those statements and allow the jury to be the arbiter of any conflicts in the evidence. Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006)(even if district court "believes that the evidence presented by one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of credibility choices"). On the other hand, the court is not required to credit an account which is "inherently incredible and could not support reasonable inferences sufficient to create an issue of fact," Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Riley v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 104 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 1997), for example, where an accurate video recording completely and clearly contradicts a party's testimony. Id.

With these standards in mind, the court reviews the plaintiffs' evidence in this case in the light most favorable to their position.

II. Facts²

1. FedEx hired plaintiff Travis Telfair as a courier on November 28, 1991, and hired his brother, plaintiff Garrett Telfair, as a courier on November 22, 1995. Both plaintiffs are African-American and both are Jehovah's Witnesses belonging to the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, Lake Park Congregation.³

2. At work, the plaintiffs reported to Matthew Lemke (operations manager), who in turn reported to Joe Mauceri (senior manager). Both Lemke and Mauceri were aware of plaintiffs' religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses at all material times during the course of their employment.

3. Neither plaintiff was ever disciplined, suspended or terminated for performance or conduct-related infractions.

4. No racially derogatory or questionable comments were ever made by supervisors or fellow employees at the FedEx workplace, and no questionable or disrespectful comments were ever made by supervisors or fellow employees about any employee's religious beliefs.

5. When first hired, Garrett Telfair worked as a part-time courier on a Tuesday through Saturday shift, and continued on this schedule for about five years. In 2001 or 2002, Garrett moved to a Monday through Friday schedule on which he remained up through the spring of 2009. Travis Telfair similarly began working at FedEx as a part-time courier on a Tuesday through Saturday shift. After approximately five years, Travis moved to a full time position for about three years, and then back to a part-time morning position on a Monday through Friday shift up through the spring of2009.

6. During the course of plaintiffs' employment at FedEx, management accommodated their request to take off one Friday each year to attend the annual Jehovah's Witnesses' district convention. FedEx similarly accommodated the requests of Jewish employees for time off to observe recurring, specific religious holidays such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.

7. At time of initial hire, FedEx advised both plaintiffs that their work hours would be assigned on an as-needed basis depending on the company's business needs which fluctuated with customer demand. FedEx also gave plaintiffs a copy of the FedEx Employee handbook, which recited, under "schedules," "Because of the nature of our business, the hours, shifts and days of your work week must remain flexible; work requirements and schedules may vary according to location and job duties."

8. FedEx unilaterally promulgated a seniority system which controlled staffing assignments. Under this system, "redeployments," or shift changes, were always directed on the basis of seniority, with affected employees given the option of selecting from available positions within the reassigned pool, or taking a 90-day unpaid personal leave of absence in order to explore other employment opportunities within the FedEx organization. Employees opting for the latter were treated as "voluntary resignations" by FedEx if they failed to secure alternative placement within the organization before expiration of the designated leave period.

9. In late February, 2009, FedEx sent written official "Notification of Redeployment - Shift Change" to five part-time morning couriers -- Garrett Telfair, Travis Telfair, Darla Campbell, Holly Herman and James Kennedy - notifying them of removal from their Monday through Friday morning shift and reassignment to a Tuesday through Saturday morning shift. The notificationcontained advice of their option to take a 90-day unpaid personal leave of absence in lieu of redeployment in order to explore and secure other open positions for which they were qualified within the FedEx organization. Two other Caucasian part-time morning couriers working out of the same FedEx Palm Beach Airport location as the plaintiffs, Michelle Hodges and Gary Casper, were not selected for redeployment. Both had greater seniority than either plaintiff.

10. The plaintiffs' immediate supervisor, Matthew Lemke, spoke privately with both plaintiffs before FedEx issued official notification of the redeployment, and explained that the changes were prompted by a decrease in consumer delivery demand on Mondays. Both plaintiffs advised Lemke at that time that they were unable to work on Saturdays due to their religious obligations.

11. Lemke suggested that both plaintiffs submit a formal, written request for a "religious accommodation" pursuant to FedEx policy. Both submitted the request, asking for all fifty-two Saturdays of the year off as a religious accommodation.

12. On March 3, 2009, FedEx issued its response indicating it was unable to make the requested accommodation and directing both to report to their new assignments effective March 10, 2009.

13. In this same time frame, Senior Manager Mauceri offered both plaintiffs a "material handler" position at the same work location involving a Monday through Friday shift; both declined the offer, explaining in their affidavits submitted in opposition to summary judgment that the material handler spot was an entry level position which would have resulted in a $5 per hour reduction in their hourly wages.

14. Plaintiffs did not accept the redeployment. The other three redeployed couriers - Darla Campbell, James Kennedy and Holly Herman - did accept. After doing so, Kennedy and Herman...