Temple v. Action Water Sports of Incline Vill.

1

LAURA TEMPLE, Plaintiff, v. ACTION WATER SPORTS OF INCLINE VILLAGE, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-00759-DAD-CKD

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 7, 2024

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY THIS ACTION

(DOC. NO. 23)

DALE A. DROZD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to stay this action pending final resolution of plaintiff's state court proceedings. (Doc. No. 23.) On January 5, 2024, the pending motion was taken under submission to be decided on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 26.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant defendants' motion to stay this action.

BACKGROUND

This personal injury tort action arises from a motorboating accident that allegedly occurred on August 4, 2020 when plaintiff Laura Temple was swimming in Lake Tahoe and was ran over by a boat that she and her colleagues had rented. (Doc No. 1.)

On January 27, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against the following eight named defendants: Action Water Sports of Incline Village, LLC (“AWS”) (the boat rental company); Gary Scott (a manager of AWS); David Ceruti (a manager of AWS); E.B. (an employee of AWS); Michael Goodwin (a colleague of plaintiff); Shawn Willette (a colleague of plaintiff) Zakaria Stour (a colleague of plaintiff); and Brenda Poot (a colleague of plaintiff). (Doc. No. 23-4.)^[1] In that complaint, plaintiff brought three claims: (1) a negligence claim brought against defendants AWS, Scott, Ceruti, and E.B., (“the AWS defendants”); (2) a claim brought against the AWS defendants for violating Nevada Revised Statute § 488.730, which imposes duties on persons engaged in the business of renting motorboats; and (3) a negligence claim against defendants Goodwin, Willette, Stour, and Poot. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages in her prayer for relief in that complaint. (Doc. No. 23-4 at 16.)

On October 28, 2022, defendant AWS filed a motion to transfer venue of plaintiff's state court action to either Placer County or El Dorado County on the grounds that Los Angeles County was an inappropriate forum due the fact that the incident occurred on Lake Tahoe and many witnesses reside in the Lake Tahoe area. (Doc. No. 23-5.) Plaintiff vigorously opposed that motion in a lengthy opposition brief, with over one hundred pages of declarations and exhibits. (Doc. No. 23-9.) Plaintiff also requested to be heard by that court, which thereafter held a hearing on March 23, 2023. (See Doc. No. 23-6 at 5.) After oral argument, that court granted defendant AWS's motion to transfer venue and directed the parties to meet and confer regarding which county-Placer or El Dorado-was preferable. (Id. at 9.) On April 27, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation informing the court that Placer County Superior Court was preferred. (Doc. No. 23-7.) Plaintiff's state court action was then transferred to Placer County Superior Court on May 24, 2023 (hereinafter, “the State Court Action”). (Doc. No. 23-8 at 2.)

Shortly after the Los Angeles Superior Court ruled in favor of defendant AWS on its motion to transfer venue, but before that action was transferred and received by the Placer County Superior Court, plaintiff filed an identical complaint initiating this federal action. Specifically, on April 21, 2023, nearly a month after the Los Angeles Superior Court's adverse ruling granting the transfer of venue, plaintiff filed her complaint in this federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) As with the State Court Action, in this federal action, plaintiff brings the same exact three claims against the same defendants based on the same allegations and seeks the same relief. (Compare Doc. No. 2-4 with Doc. No. 1.)

On December 22, 2023, defendant AWS, Scott, and Ceruti (hereinafter, “defendants”) filed the pending motion to stay this action, pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine, pending final resolution of plaintiff's parallel state court proceedings. (Doc. No. 23.) On January 26, 2024, plaintiff filed an opposition to the pending motion, and on February 5, 2024, defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 27, 28.)^[2]

LEGAL STANDARD

Although federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” the Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts may dismiss or stay a case “in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions . . . by state and federal courts.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817(1976). This power stems from the court's “considerations of ‘wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'” Id. (quoting KerotestMfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). The court's power to stay or dismiss a case under Colorado River, however, is “considerably . . . limited” and only applies in “exceptional” circumstances. Id. at 818.

In the Ninth Circuit, eight factors are to be considered in determining the appropriateness of a stay under Colorado River:

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and \(8) whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court.

R.R. Street & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 870 (9th Cir. 2002)). “These factors are to be applied in a pragmatic and flexible way, as part of a balancing process rather than as a ‘mechanical checklist.'” Am. Int'l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont'lIns. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1988). “The weight to be given to any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of the case. Some factors may not apply in some cases, and, in some cases, a single factor may decide whether a stay is permissible.” United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 988 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In the Ninth Circuit, particular attention is paid to the eighth factor: “In this Circuit, the narrow Colorado River doctrine requires that the pending state court proceeding resolve all issues in the federal suit.” Holder, 305 F.3d at 859. Indeed, if “there exists a substantial doubt as to whether the state court proceeding will resolve all of the disputed issues in [the federal] case, it is unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included in the Colorado River analysis.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 913 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993). “When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). In addition, courts should be “particularly reluctant to find that the actions are not parallel when the federal action is but a ‘spin-off' of more comprehensive state litigation.” Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989).

“Within the Ninth Circuit, district courts must stay, rather than dismiss, an action when they determine that they should defer to the state court proceedings under Colorado River.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Sun-Diamond Growers of CA, 912 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS

In the pending motion, defendants argue that based on consideration of the Colorado River factors, the court should stay this action and defer to the State Court Action, which has been pending since January 27, 2022. (Doc. No. 23.) Indeed defendants' motion provides analysis as to each of those factors. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 5-9.)

Plaintiff, on the other hand, does not address any of the Colorado River factors whatsoever in her opposition to defendants' motion. Rather, plaintiff advances several irrelevant arguments, devoting more than half of the argument section of her opposition brief to discussing various other abstention doctrines that have not been raised by defendants in the pending motion. (Doc. No. 27 at 13.) Plaintiff also appears to argue that because she has invoked this court's admiralty jurisdiction over this tort case, “the exclusive applicable law in this matter is federal maritime law,” perhaps suggesting that only a federal court would be able to exercise jurisdiction over this case. (Id. at 11, 13.) While it is not entirely clear that plaintiff is advancing this argument, it is clear that any such an argument plainly fails because “[f]ederal maritime jurisdiction is not, and has never been, entirely exclusive.” Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc. v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir. 1997).^[3] In short, plaintiff's opposition is largely unhelpful and fails to meaningfully address, let alone rebut, the arguments that defendants make in their motion.

Nonetheless, the court will proceed to consider the Colorado River factors in turn.

A. Which Court First Assumed Jurisdiction Over Any Property at Stake

The first factor of which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake is not relevant here because there is no property in dispute. As defendants note in their motion in both this action and in the State Court Action, plaintiff seeks damages, not recovery of possession of any...