Tenemille v. Town of Ramapo, 18-CV-724 (KMK)

ERNST THEODORE TENEMILLE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF RAMAPO, et al., Defendants.

No. 18-CV-724 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

June 7, 2022

Ernst Theodore Tenemille Pro Se Plaintiff

Steven C. Stern, Esq. Vernee Ciara Pelage, Esq. Sokoloff Stern LLP Counsel for Defendants

ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Background

Pro se Plaintiff Ernst Theodore Tenemille (“Plaintiff”) brought this Action against former Town of Ramapo Supervisor Christopher St. Lawrence (“St. Lawrence”), former Councilman Patrick Withers (“Withers”), Chief of Police Bradley R. Weidel (“Weidel”), Chief of Staff Thomas Cokeley (“Cokeley”), Squad Lieutenant Daniel Hyman (“Hyman”), Squad Sergeant Salomon Matos (“Matos”), Desk Sergeant Christopher Franklin (“Franklin”; collectively the “Individual Defendants”), and the Town of Ramapo (the “Town” or “Ramapo”; together with Individual Defendants, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants discriminated against and subsequently retaliated against him on the basis of his race, color, national origin, and religion, in violation of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; and New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290, et seq. (See generally Fourth Am. Compl. (“Fourth AC”) (Dkt. No. 88).) On January 13, 2022, the Court issued an Opinion & Order granting Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which dismissed all claims with prejudice save for Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims, which the Court dismissed without prejudice, as it was Plaintiff's first adjudication of these claims on the merits. (Op. & Order 33 (“2022 Op.”) (Dkt. No. 109).) In its Opinion & Order, Court also permitted Plaintiff to file a fifth amended complaint within 30 days. (Id. at 33-34.)^[1]

Thirty days after the Court issued its Opinion & Order, Plaintiff, in lieu of a fifth amended complaint, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Opinion & Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), (the “Motion”), as well as supporting papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 110-112.)^[2] On March 25, 2022, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion. (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. (“Defs.' Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 115).) Finally, on April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Pl.'s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (“Pl.'s Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 117).)

For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“Motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3, which are meant to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.” Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp, 965 F.Supp.2d 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted), aff'd, 577 Fed.Appx. 11 (2d Cir. 2014). The standard for such motions is “strict” and “should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543, 2017 WL 3443623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017) (“It is well established that the rules permitting motions for reconsideration must be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the [c]ourt.” (citation and omitted)). A movant may not “rely upon facts, issues, or arguments that were previously available but not presented to the court.” Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., 52 F.Supp.3d 522, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Therefore, “[a] motion for reconsideration is not the proper avenue for the submission of new material.” Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). “Rather, to be entitled to reconsideration, a movant must demonstrate that the [c]ourt overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion, which, had they been considered might reasonably have altered the result reached by the court.” Arthur Glick, 965 F.Supp.2d at 405 (citation omitted); Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (same). In other words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the [movant] identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Alvarez v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5464, 2017 WL 6033425, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2017) (quoting Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Indergit, 52 F.Supp.3d at 523.

B. Analysis

1. Rule 59(e)

“To invoke Rule 59(e) to alter or amend a judgment, the moving party must move ‘no later than 28 days after entry of judgment.'” Darcelin v. New York, No. 09-CV-5611, 2010 WL 723455, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)). Plaintiff filed his motion 30 days after the entry of judgment. (See Dkt.) “[T]he liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F.Supp.2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court cannot waive Congress' imposition of the 28-day time limit.^[3] The Court will nevertheless exercise its authority to “ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category . . . to avoid an unnecessary dismissal.” Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (italics omitted); see also Lora v. O'Heaney, 602 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An untimely motion for reconsideration [under Rule 59(e)] is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion.”); Munn v. APF Mgmt. Co., No. 19-CV-10791, 2021 WL 2355308, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2021) (“[S]everal courts in this Circuit have construed untimely motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or Local Civil Rule 6.3 as motions brought under Rule 60(b).” (quoting McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Mathrani, 293 F.Supp.3d 394, 397 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))). Thus, the Court will consider the instant Motion under Rule 60(b).

2. Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs relief from a final judgment or order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Id.

“Properly applied[, ] Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). “In other words[, ] it should be broadly construed to do substantial justice, yet final judgments should not be lightly reopened.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Rule 60(b) provides a mechanism for extraordinary judicial relief available only if the moving party demonstrates exceptional circumstances, and relief under the rule is discretionary.” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted); see also Mendell ex rel. Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Motions under Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and are generally granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.”). “Relief under Rule 60(b) is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he movant must adduce ‘highly convincing material' in support of the motion.” Leeber Realty LLC v. Trustco Bank, No. 17-CV-2934, 2019 WL 498253, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2019) (quoting United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1977)), aff'd, 798 Fed.Appx. 682 (2d Cir. 2019). This is, in short, a “demanding standard.” Bell v. Deutsche Bank, No. 18-CV-1593, 2021 WL 4480549, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021).

Plaintiff argues that the Court “mishandled facts” and “misevaluated” his arguments. (Pl.'s Mem. 1.) In support of this idea, Plaintiff not only reprises and reforms his arguments, (see generally id.), but he also brings forward “35 additional documents, ” (Id. at 1). Defendants assert that Plaintiff's arguments “largely rehash the same arguments he presented” and that the Motion “must be denied because [Plaintiff] does not show an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence has become available, or that there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” (Defs.' Mem. 1.) Plaintiff, in reply, makes these same arguments and asserts new ones regarding Defendants' apparent concessions as well as brand...