Tennant v. Dist. of Columbia

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DENISE TENNANT, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-2949 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Beryl A. Howell Judge

Plaintiff Denise Tennant, a former Probation Officer in the Court Social Services Division (“CSSD”) of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, has sued her former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., alleging discrimination and retaliation based on sex and her disabilities, and interference with her FMLA rights in a five-count complaint, see Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), arguing that no genuine dispute of material facts exists. See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 32. For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case was initially described in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. See Tennant v District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-2949 (BAH), 2020 WL 4464505, at *1-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2020) (“Tennant I”). The below facts result from the parties' nearly two subsequent years of discovery.

One procedural issue complicating resolution of the pending motion requires comment at the outset. While defendant submitted a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (“SMF”), ECF No. 32-1, plaintiff's response to this document either admits or briefly disputes each statement made by defendant but without also submitting plaintiff's own version of the facts, see Pl.'s Resps. to Def.'s SMF (“Pl.'s Resp. SMF”), ECF No. 33-1. That does not satisfy the requirement of Local Rule 7(h) that “[a]n opposition to such a motion shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated.” D.D.C. LCVR 7(h)(1). Similarly, plaintiff does not satisfy that requirement in her opposition by summarizing the factual background of the case, since that summary neither qualifies as a “separate concise statement,” nor identifies which issues of fact are material, disputed, and require litigation. See id. Nonetheless, defendant submitted, in reply, a response to plaintiff's factual background summary that does what plaintiff should have-identifies the factual issues still in dispute. See generally Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SMF (“Def.'s SMF Resp.”), ECF No. 38-1. That response to plaintiff's factual retelling serves as the backdrop for the following factual and procedural descriptions.

A. Plaintiff's Employment with Defendant

Plaintiff worked as a CSSD probation officer for almost nine years, from March 29, 2010, until her December 3, 2018, termination. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 1; Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 2, ECF No. 33; Pl.'s Resp. SMF ¶ 1. In her role, from March 2014 to December 3, 2018, plaintiff was assigned to the Northeast Regional Office's Leaders of Today in Solidarity (“LOTS”) Balanced and Restorative Justice Center (“BARJ”). See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 4, Decl. of Denise Tennant (“Tennant Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 36-3. The BARJ unit serves “youths that either have juvenile criminal convictions or have demonstrated aggressive anti-social behavior” and provides them “after-school activities where they socialize, are fed and receive mentoring and instruction in academic and life-skills areas.” Id. ¶ 10. During her years of employment with defendant, including in her last performance review before her termination, plaintiff consistently received the rating of “Commendable performer.” Id. ¶ 4; see also Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 3. She never received any counseling concerning her job performance nor was placed on a performance improvement plan. See Tennant Decl. ¶ 5; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 3.

B. Plaintiff's Grievances Regarding Sexual Harassment in the Workplace

Throughout the course of her employment, plaintiff compiled several grievances that implicate defendant's policies and procedures on prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. First, in 2013, plaintiff states that she was sexually harassed by a 16-year-old whom she supervised, but when she reported the incident to her supervisors, “nothing was ever done, and it was getting a lot worse” until she was transferred out of the unit “eight or nine months after [her] request.” Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 1, Dep. of Denise Tennant (“Tennant Dep.”) at 90:2-21, ECF No. 362. Second, in 2016, plaintiff states that she was identified by the U.S. Attorney's Office as a witness to a D.C. Superior Court criminal proceeding against Anthony Brooks, a CSSD-affiliated mentor accused of sexually harassing a child. See Tennant Decl. ¶ 15. According to plaintiff, Terri Odom, the director of CSSD and one of plaintiff's supervisors, resisted plaintiff assisting in the case until “a judge for the Superior Court intervened” and she was allowed to participate. Id.

Then, starting in 2016, plaintiff perceived certain comments made by her immediate supervisor, Supervisory Probation Officer Lawrence Weaver, as sexual harassment. During a team meeting in late 2016, Weaver allegedly told plaintiff and others in the group that “in breaking up a fight between two female juveniles, one of whom had an intellectual disability, that ‘I had to slam that bitch.'” Id. ¶ 16. In another alleged incident, as CSSD staff tried to handcuff a female youth as she resisted, Weaver stated, “[Y]ou guys couldn't do that. You are a bunch of pussies.” Id.^[1]

Plaintiff's uneasiness with Weaver continued into November 2017. She claims that Weaver sat down next to her and shared his sexual history with prostitutes both before and during his marriage, much to the shock and offense of plaintiff. See id. ¶ 17; Tennant Dep. at 66:14-69:19. Plaintiff complains that Weaver's comments triggered symptoms of her post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), with which she was diagnosed in 2006. See id. at 72:874:13. Such symptoms include panic attacks and increased difficulty in focusing, memorizing information, or interacting with others. See id. at 92:16-93:16 (plaintiff describing her PTSD symptoms); Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 1. Following that conversation, plaintiff allegedly feared being alone with Weaver and avoided one-on-one interactions with him. See Tennant Decl. ¶ 18. Due to this fear, in January 2018, when Weaver requested that plaintiff accompany him to transport a child between locations, plaintiff declined his request, plus her scheduled off-duty time was within the subsequent half hour. See Tennant Dep. at 75:10-19; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 16. Weaver emailed plaintiff describing her refusal to accompany him as her “being insubordinate.” Tennant Dep. at 75:16-21; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 16.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff discussed the January 2018 incident as well as Weaver's November 2017 comments with Acting Supervisory Probation Officer Lisa McCants, one of plaintiff's other supervisors. See Tennant Dep. at 70:1-71:3; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 17. Plaintiff told McCants that Weaver's comments caused her discomfort, triggered her anxiety and panic attacks, and made her experience “extreme difficulty during [her] interactions with Weaver.” Tennant Dep. at 71:1-7; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 17. According to plaintiff, McCants allegedly responded that plaintiff was a “good, valued employee” and that she could report to McCants instead of Weaver. See also Tennant Decl. ¶ 20; Tennant Dep. at 71:7-9. Although McCants told plaintiff she would speak to Weaver about his behavior, plaintiff claims that McCants did not do so nor did she report the incident to Assistant Deputy Director of CSSD Shelia Roberson-Adams. Tennant Decl. ¶ 21.

C. A New Health Condition Causes Plaintiff's Increased Absences

Two months later, in March 2018, plaintiff informed McCants that she was diagnosed with adenomyosis, which plaintiff describes as “a physical condition that affects women and may result in heavy menstrual bleeding” with additional symptoms of “severe pain . . . making it difficult to work.” Tennant Decl. ¶ 14; see also Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 19. During one painful episode on May 5, 2018, plaintiff contacted Weaver and McCants to report being sick, consistent with CSSD practices. See Tennant Decl. ¶ 23; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 20. That same day, Robert Smith, a male probation officer with no disabilities, failed to appear for his shift without reporting sick or requesting a day off. See Tennant Dep. at 24:22-26:5, 28:2-12; Tennant Decl. ¶¶ 24-25; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 20. Two days later, plaintiff was called into a meeting with Weaver, McCants, and Roberson-Adams during which meeting Weaver “criticized” plaintiff for failing to report on May 5 and threatened to charge plaintiff with “AWOL,” presumably standing for “Absent Without Official Leave.” See Tennant Decl. ¶ 25; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 21; see generally Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 8, Transcript of May 7, 2018 Supervisory Meeting (“May 7 Meeting Tr.”), ECF No. 36-6. During this meeting, plaintiff articulated that she called out sick on May 5 because of pain from her adenomyosis, a medical condition only affecting women, and that she was being treated differently from Smith, a man who was not criticized for his absence. See May 7 Meeting Tr. at 40:2-41:12; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 21.

The next month, on June 2, 2018, plaintiff and a male co-worker probation officer Carlos Bernal, a man without any disabilities, were on duty at the BARJ. See Tennant Dep. at 22:323:7; Def.'s SMF Resp. ¶ 22. No children were present at the...