Tex-Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne

492 S.W.3d 430

Tex–Fin, Inc., and Texas Workforce Commission, Appellants

v.Gustavo E. Ducharne, Appellee

NO. 14–15–00267–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed April 26, 2016

Anthony Aterno, Austin, TX, Michael C. Falick, Houston, TX, for appellant.

Andrew Reed, G. Scott Fiddler, Houston, TX, for appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Donovan, and Brown.

OPINION

Marc W. Brown, Justice

The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) dismissed Gustavo E. Ducharne's wage claim filed against his former employer, Tex–Fin, Inc., under the Texas Payday Act. Ducharne sought review of this decision in district court. All of the parties filed motions for summary judgment regarding whether the TWC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The trial court granted Ducharne's motion for summary judgment in part and remanded the case to the TWC for further proceedings to determine the amount of wages due to Ducharne. On appeal, both Tex–Fin and the TWC argue that the trial court erred when it granted Ducharne's motion because, under a proper substantial evidence review, the TWC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Tex–Fin contends the trial court erred by not ordering a general remand, and the TWC argues the court erred by remanding at all. We reverse the portion of the trial court's judgment remanding the case to the TWC for further proceedings to determine the amount of wages due to Ducharne, affirm the remainder of the judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Tex–Fin is a Houston-based company that manufactures and sells finned pipe and tubes for the heat transfer industry. Ducharne began working for Tex–Fin in 2004 on a salary basis as a sales representative for Latin America. On June 11, 2008, Ducharne signed a written agreement with Tex–Fin, effective January 2008. Sales manager Sean Hall signed the agreement on behalf of Tex–Fin.

The agreement provided Ducharne with a “salary package,” including, among other items: salary in the amount of $75,400.00; a “Fin Tube Sales Bonus” based on .5% of total Latin American and international sales in which Ducharne participated; and an “Air Cooler, Shell & Tube, & Air Cooler Replacement Tube Bundles Sales Bonus” based on .5% of total Latin American and international sales in which Ducharne participated. The agreement provided that Ducharne was “responsible for” “Total Fin–Tube sales” of “$4 million @ 20% Margin.” The agreement also stated: “Total sales for Air Coolers, Shell & Tube, & Air Cooler Replacement Tube Bundles $6 million @ 20% Margin.” The agreement provided “examples” of the calculation of each sales bonus:

Example Fin Tube Sales: $4 million x .5% = $20,000.00 based on 20% margins.

...

Example Air Cooler, Shell & Tube, & Replacement Bundles Sales: $6 million x .5% = $30,000.00 based on 20% margins.

Tex–Fin paid Ducharne a sales bonus in December 2008.

On April 22, 2009, Tex–Fin terminated Ducharne essentially for insubordination. According to Ducharne, at the time of his termination, he had generated over $4.5 million in eligible sales for fiscal year 2009. On May 4, 2009, Ducharne sent Sean an email requesting payment for commissions accrued between October 2008 and April 2009, including relating to pending orders, and for severance. That same day, Trey Hall, IT Manager for Tex–Fin, responded because Sean was in the hospital. In his response, Trey stated: “Commissions are calculated and paid in December and commissions are only paid on collected invoices. Commissions are not paid on outstanding invoices or pending orders and commissions will not be paid early.” Trey also stated that Tex–Fin did not owe Ducharne any severance pay.

In August 2009, Ducharne filed a Texas Payday Act claim against Tex–Fin with the TWC, for unpaid commissions and unpaid severance. The TWC's assigned investigator initially determined that Ducharne was not entitled to unpaid bonuses or unpaid severance pay and dismissed his wage claim. Ducharne appealed this decision to the TWC's appeal tribunal, which held a telephonic hearing. Sean and Ducharne participated in the hearing. The tribunal affirmed the dismissal of Ducharne's wage claim.

In making its ruling, the tribunal cited sections 61.001(7)¹ and 61.015 of the Payday Act, and TWC rule 821.26. The tribunal issued these relevant conclusions:

• Ducharne is not entitled to any unpaid wages from Tex–Fin under the Texas Payday Law.

• “Although [Ducharne] seeks payment of commissions, ... [Tex–Fin] truly had an agreement with [Ducharne] for payment of bonus pay for his sales.”

• “The evidence established that the bonus program was an annual program, calculated on sales made in the fiscal year and paid in December.”

• “[T]here is no evidence that [Tex–Fin] ever intended to pay the bonus based on a partial year of work or to pay the bonus before the due date in December.”

• “The evidence indicates that [Ducharne] is not entitled to bonus or commission pay.”

• “The monies claimed are not due under the Texas Payday Law and the Texas Payday Rules.”

Ducharne appealed this decision to the TWC, which affirmed the dismissal of his wage claim in a 2–to–1 decision.

Ducharne timely filed a petition in district court against Tex–Fin and the TWC for judicial review of that portion of the TWC's decision dismissing his claim for unpaid bonuses. See Tex. Lab.Code § 61.062 (West 2015).² All parties filed motions for traditional summary judgment. The trial court granted in part Ducharne's motion for summary judgment and denied Tex–Fin's and the TWC's motions for summary judgment, reversing and setting aside the decision of the TWC. The trial court ordered the case remanded to the TWC for a determination of the amount of wages due to Ducharne. Tex–Fin and the TWC filed motions for new trial, which the trial court denied.

Tex–Fin and the TWC now appeal. They argue the same first issue—that the trial court failed to review the TWC's decision by trial de novo with the substantial evidence rule being the standard of review and erred in granting Ducharne summary judgment. As its second issue, Tex–Fin asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the TWC on remand to determine an amount of wages owed to Ducharne instead of remanding the entire case. As its second issue, the TWC contends the trial court erred in remanding to the TWC because it is the trial court that should determine the amount of wages due.

II. Analysis

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, we consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal from the trial court's “final summary judgment.” “[T]he general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.” Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2000).

[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.... An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled “final”, or because the word “final” appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs.... Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.

To determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties, it may ... be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the case.... [I]f the record reveals the existence of parties or claims not mentioned in the order, the order is not final.

Id. at 205–06. Whether a judicial decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. Id. at 195 ; Philips v. McNease, 467 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

First, the language in the trial court's judgment supports that it is final. The order in question is entitled “FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” “While a particular title is not dispositive nor is particular language required, it is an indication of the intent of the trial court in issuing the Order.” Futch v. Reliant Sources, Inc., 351 S.W.3d 929, 932–33 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (title “FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT” is language that indicates finality). The order goes on to deny Tex–Fin's motion for summary judgment, deny the TWC's motion for summary judgment, and grant “in part” Ducharne's cross-motion for summary judgment. However, directly following the “in part” language, there is a handwritten superscript asterisk, which indicates and corresponds with a typed rider on a second page. The record indicates this second page was stapled to first page of the court's order. The rider states that the TWC's decision denying and dismissing Ducharne's wage claim is reversed and set aside. It then recites: “Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the case be REMANDED to the [TWC] for further proceedings to determine the amount [sic] wages due to Plaintiff Gustavo Ducharne in light of the Court's ruling. This is the final judgment; it disposes of all claims and parties, and is appealable.” This last sentence essentially tracks the type of “clear and unequivocal” finality language that the Supreme Court of Texas approved in Lehmann. See 39 S.W.3d at 206 (“A statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable’, would leave no doubt about the court's intention.”); see also In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 248–49 (Tex.2010) (per curiam) (concluding language—“All relief not expressly granted herein is denied. This judgment disposes of all parties and all claims in this cause of action and is therefore FINAL.”—was “clear enough” to indicate finality under Lehmann despite not...