Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. Archambault

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TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, Appellant v. WAYNE A. ARCHAMBAULT, Appellee

No. 01-21-00140-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, First District

July 28, 2022

On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 18-DCV-254150

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Countiss.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sarah Beth Landau Justice

The Texas Workforce Commission determined that Wayne A Archambault was not entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Archambault appealed that ruling to a trial court which reversed the TWC's decision. The TWC appealed the trial court's ruling to this Court. We reverse and render judgment for the TWC, because the TWC's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

I. Background

Wayne A. Archambault was employed by Memorial Hermann as the Director of Security from 2015 to 2018. On February 18, 2018, a hospital janitor, working for a contract company called EVS, allegedly came to work with a gun and offered to pay $150 to anyone who would kill their manager. EVS immediately suspended the janitor, no gun was found, and EVS fired him four days later. Memorial Hermann claims that its policy requires that a threat assessment be conducted immediately for a potential threat to human life and that senior security leadership be informed immediately. The threat assessment involves performing a background check on the person who made the threat and assessing the potential for any ongoing risk of violence to the organization. EVS reported the incident to Memorial Hermann security the day after the janitor was fired. That same day, Archambault conducted an internal investigation, notified Memorial Hermann's security officers, and deactivated the janitor's security access badge. On February 26, 2018, three days after Archambault learned of the incident, he informed Memorial Hermann's Regional Vice President. Archambault was terminated the next day for failing to follow company policies.

After Archambault's termination, he applied to the TWC for unemployment benefits, but his initial claim was denied because he was terminated for misconduct based on a violation of company rules and policies. Archambault appealed the initial decision to the Appeal Tribunal. See Tex. Lab. Code § 212.102. The Appeal Tribunal upheld the decision that Archambault was terminated for misconduct, so he appealed the decision to the Commission Appeals. See Tex. Lab. Code § 212.151(2). The Commission affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision and adopted its findings of facts and conclusions of law. Archambault then appealed to the Fort Bend County District Court. See Tex. Lab. Code § 212.201(a). The trial court granted Archambault's second motion for summary judgment, denied the TWC's amended motion for summary judgment, and denied the TWC's motion for new trial.

II. Applicable Law

A. Standard of Review

"The trial court reviews a TWC decision de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision." Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d 263, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)); Tex. Lab. Code § 212.202(a). Any evidence that existed at the time of the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal can be heard by the trial court. See Firemen's and Policemen's Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984); G.E. Am. Comm'n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (explaining the "substantial evidence de novo" standard of review). Determining whether the TWC's decision was supported by substantial evidence is a question of law. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 266.

The TWC's decision is presumed valid, so the party seeking to set it aside must show it was not supported by substantial evidence. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831; Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998). A TWC decision cannot be set aside just because the trial court would reach a different conclusion. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831. The trial court may do so only if the TWC's decision was made "without regard to the law or the facts and therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Id.

The summary judgment rule provides a method for a court to resolve a case that involves only a question of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review the summary judgment evidence presented by both parties and determine all questions presented. See Comm'rs Ct. of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997). "We review the trial court's judgment by comparing the TWC decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law." Kaup v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 456 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Prods., L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied)).

We must decide whether the evidence presented to the trial court provided substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision. Kaup, 456 S.W.3d at 295.

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Evidence that only creates a mere surmise or suspicion that the fact exists is less than a scintilla. Regal Fin. Co., Ltd. v. Tex Star Motors, Inc., 355 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tex. 2010). If substantial evidence exists that supports the TWC's decision, then that decision must be upheld. See City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 267. When reviewing an agency's decision, we must look at the evidence presented to the trial court and not the agency record by itself. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831; Nuernberg v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 858 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1993) (agency record documents may be introduced at trial but are subject to the rules of evidence). A court reviewing the TWC's decision does not substitute its findings for that of the agency; the reviewing court does not weigh the evidence. Kaup, 456 S.W.3d at 295; City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 267. And we review whether the TWC applied the correct legal standard to reach its decision. See Kaup, 456 S.W.3d at 295 (if the decision was made without regard to the law or facts, it is subject to reversal). We render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 81.

B. Misconduct

A person is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits "if the individual was discharged for misconduct connected with the individual's last work." Tex. Lab. Code § 207.044(a). Misconduct is defined as "mismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect that jeopardizes the life or property of another, intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance, intentional violation of a law, or violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly work and the safety of employees." Tex. Lab. Code § 201.012(a). "The statutory definition of 'misconduct' requires only that the employee violate a rule or policy adopted to ensure orderly work or safety." Kaup, 456 S.W.3d at 295 (quoting Murray v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 337 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.)). Mismanagement requires intent, "or such a degree of carelessness as to evidence a disregard of the consequences, whether manifested through action or inaction." Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831.

III. Analysis

The TWC argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Archambault because there was substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision that Archambault was terminated for misconduct, disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code § 207.044(a). By granting summary judgment for Archambault, the trial court necessarily held that there was no substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision. Here, because the TWC's decision is presumed valid, Archambault must show it was not supported by substantial evidence. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831.

A. Was there substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision?

1. The TWC affidavit

Archambault argues that the affidavit from the TWC did not exist at the time of the TWC's decision, so it cannot be considered as evidence. The reviewing court must ask whether evidence before the trial court shows facts that existed at the time of the TWC's decision that reasonably support that decision. Collingsworth, 988 S.W.2d at 708. The TWC submitted the affidavit as evidence of the policy, requiring Archambault to immediately conduct a threat assessment and notify senior security leadership, and that Archambault should have been aware of it. While Archambault denies that the policy identified within the affidavit ever existed, this argument assumes that because the affidavit did not exist at the time of the TWC's decision it should not be considered.

Archambault relies on Kaup for the proposition that the reviewing court does not weigh the evidence but asks instead whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts that existed at the time of the TWC's decision that reasonably support that decision. Kaup, 456 S.W.3d at 294 (quoting Collingsworth, 988 S.W.2d at 708). This proposition is correct, but Archambault's application of it is not. We look at whether the facts in the affidavit existed at the time of the TWC's decision, not whether the affidavit itself existed then. Collingsworth, 988 S.W.2d at 708; see Angelis v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 14-19-00367-CV, 2020 WL 3240951, at *3 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). The affidavit states that threat assessment protocols were adopted by Memorial Hermann, the protocols were conveyed during meetings with Archambault, and Archambault received...