Thapa v. St. Cloud Orthopedic Assocs.

1

Anuj Thapa, Plaintiff, v. St. Cloud Orthopedic Associates, Ltd., Defendant.

No. 19-cv-2568 (TNL)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

October 26, 2023

Brandon E. Thompson and Rachel Louise Barrett, Ciresi Conlin LLP, 225 South Sixth Street, Suite 4600, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Plaintiff); and

Troy Booher, Zimmerman Booher, Felt Building, Suite 400, 341 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111; Steven R. Schwegman Michelle Draewell, and Chad A. Staul, Quinlivan & Hughes PA, P.O. Box 1008, St. Cloud, MN 56302; John M. Bjorkman, Pat O'Neill, III,, Larson King, LLP, 30 East Seventh Street Suite 2800, St. Paul, MN 55101; and James F. Dunn, The Law Office of James F. Dunn, P.A., 860 Blue Gentian Road, Suite 180, Eagan, MN 55121 (for Defendant).

ORDER

Tony N. Leung United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In January 2017, Plaintiff Anuj Thapa was a 19-year-old, first-year college student at St. Cloud State University in St. Cloud, Minnesota. On January 14, 2017, Plaintiff fractured his left tibia and fibula while playing soccer. Plaintiff was taken to St. Cloud Hospital and underwent surgery to treat those injuries. Dr. Chad Holien, an orthopedic surgeon, performed the surgery, and William Paschke, a certified physician's assistant, assisted in treating Plaintiff. Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital the following night.

Plaintiff returned to St. Cloud Hospital six days later complaining of pain. Dr. Matthew Hwang, an orthopedic surgeon, took Plaintiff into surgery. Dr. Hwang discovered that Plaintiff had experienced acute compartment syndrome. Acute compartment syndrome is a condition that, if untreated, can cause severe tissue damage and tissue death, resulting in the loss of body function. Plaintiff has since undergone a dozen surgeries and spent 54 days in the hospital. Plaintiff now walks with a limp and continues to experience pain in his left leg.

In September 2019, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendant St. Cloud Orthopedic Associates, Ltd., asserting claims of medical malpractice. The claims were tried before a jury in May 2022. The jury found that Defendant was negligent in its care and treatment of Plaintiff. The jury awarded Plaintiff $10 million in past pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, and emotional distress, and $493,073.22 in past medical expenses. The jury also awarded Plaintiff $100 million in future pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, and emotional distress, and $758,486 in future medical expenses, for a total award of $111,251,559.22.

This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, or Alternatively, Remittitur, ECF No. 183. A hearing on the motion was held on February 25, 2023. ECF No. 223. The most recent stay of this case, ECF No. 231, was effectively lifted on October 1, 2023, based on the parties' joint request. ECF No. 232. Attorneys Brandon E. Thompson and Rachel Louise Barrett appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Attorneys Troy Booher, Steven R. Schwegman, James F. Dunn, Pat O'Neill, III, and Michelle Draewell appeared on behalf of Defendant.

For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for New Trial, or Alternatively, Remittitur is denied, except that the Court will conditionally grant a new trial on the amount of non-economic damages and offer Plaintiff the option of remitting the award from $110 million to $10 million.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant moves for a new trial, alleging evidentiary errors and attorney misconduct at trial entitle it to a new trial on liability and damages. ECF No. 183; Def.'s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 184 at 10. Defendant also contends it is entitled to a new trial on liability and damages because the jury's verdict is “shockingly excessive and tainted by passion and prejudice.” Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 15. In the alternative, Defendant argues that it is entitled to a new trial on damages or, at a minimum, a substantial remittitur. Id. at 31.

A. Alleged Evidentiary Errors

Defendant moves for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Under Rule 59(a), the Court may “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues-and to any part . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). As the Eighth Circuit has explained:

[A] trial court may not grant a new trial simply because the trial court would have found a verdict different from the one the jury found. This is certainly a necessary condition to granting a motion for new trial, but it is not a sufficient one. Rather, the trial court must believe . . . that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to amount to a miscarriage of justice.

Butler v. French, 83 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1996). In other words, the Court should grant a new trial when “the verdict is so contrary to the preponderance of the evidence as to imply that the jury failed to consider all the evidence, or acted under some mistake.”

In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 700 F.3d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Evidentiary errors warrant a new trial only when “the cumulative effect of the errors is to substantially influence the jury's verdict.” Williams v. Cty. of Kansas, 223 F.3d 749, 755 (8th Cir. 2000). District courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial. Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 656 (8th Cir. 1995).

Defendant cites five evidentiary errors which “allowed the unfair presentation of evidence and contributed to the excessive verdict.” Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 2. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments below.

1. Dr. Quinn's Testimony

First, Defendant argues that the Court erred by admitting expert testimony from Dr. Robert Quinn. Id. At trial, Plaintiff's counsel elicited the following testimony from Dr. Quinn, which, according to Defendant, implied that Defendant was responsible or liable for the oversight and direction of St. Cloud Hospital nurses:

Well, I think the way the system operates, once we write the discharge order, we made a determination that the patient is fine to go home and then once that train starts going, it's pretty hard to reel it back in. Everybody is then focused....I'm just talking in general in any hospital system, it's not fault of the system, it's just that . . . when the order is given to be discharged, then the system therefore assumes that the doctor has cleared the patient to do so and then every effort is made to discharge the patient as ordered.

Id. at 2-3. According to Defendant, this testimony “confused the jury with respect to [Defendant's] role in evaluating and assessing whether [Plaintiff] met the parameters for discharge.” Id. at 3.

Defendant, however, did not make this argument at trial. If evidence is introduced at trial without objection, the Court reviews for plain error. Spencer v. Young, 495 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2007). “Plain error review is narrow and confined to the exceptional case where error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The verdict should be reversed only if the error prejudices the substantial rights of a party and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.” Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, the Court is not persuaded that Dr. Quinn “implied [Defendant] was responsible or liable for the oversight and direction of St. Cloud Hospital nursing staff,” see Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 2, or that such testimony seriously affected the fairness of the trial.

2. Dr. Anderson's Testimony

Defendant next contends that the Court erred by admitting certain expert testimony from Plaintiff's treating provider, Dr. Sarah Anderson. Id. at 3. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C), Plaintiff disclosed that Dr. Anderson would testify at trial “consistent with her medical records and physical examinations” of Plaintiff, her “recommendations for care in the future,” and “her opinions on the way [Plaintiff]'s compartment syndrome likely developed.” Id. at 3-4. According to Defendant, at trial, Dr. Anderson testified outside the scope of her treatment of Plaintiff, including about “certain patients” who could be at a higher risk for compartment syndrome generally; overarching compartment syndrome risk factors; opinions regarding the types of training doctors receive to monitor patients at risk for compartment syndrome; and the practice of “sequential exams.” Id. at 4. Because Dr. Anderson was not disclosed as a standard of care expert and did not submit a written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), Defendant argues that any opinion outside the scope of Dr. Anderson's treatment of Plaintiff was inadmissible. Id. at 3-4.

Before trial, making the same argument it makes here, Defendant sought a ruling from the Court to limit Dr. Anderson's testimony. See ECF Nos. 141, 142. The Court denied Defendant's request. A review of the record confirms that the Court's ruling was appropriate.

Plaintiff disclosed properly that Dr. Anderson would serve as an expert under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that parties make certain disclosures regarding their experts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2). These expert disclosures are broken into two categories relevant to the present matter: experts who must provide a written report containing certain information, see Fed.R.Civ.P 26(a)(2)(B), and experts who are subject to less demanding disclosure requirements and need not produce these written reports, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C). Experts who must disclose written reports are those “retained or specially employed to provide expert...