In this issue, we cover two decisions granting motions to strike/dismiss class claims, three decisions denying such motions, 26 decisions denying class certification or reversing grants of class certification, 22 decisions granting or upholding class certification, 10 decisions denying motions to remand or reversing remand orders pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), and 10 decisions granting motions to remand or finding no jurisdiction under CAFA that were issued during the three-month period covered by this edition.
Class Certification Decisions
- Decisions Granting/Affirming Motion to Strike or Dismiss
- Decisions Denying Motions to Strike
- Decisions Rejecting/Denying Class Certification
- Decisions Permitting/Granting Class Certification
- Other Class Action Decisions
Class Action Fairness Act Decisions
- Decisions Denying Motions to Remand/Reversing Remand Orders/Finding CACAFAurisdiction
- Decisions Granting Motions to Remand/Finding No CACAFAurisdiction
Carlisle v. Normand, No. 16-3767, 2017 WL 4918997 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2017)
In a putative class action involving an alleged therapist-patient relationship in drug court, Judge Jane Triche Milazzo of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations. The defendant (and his company) served as clinical director of the drug court and recommended the plaintiffs to the program. Under a negligence theory, the plaintiffs had sought to certify a class of individuals harmed by the defendants’ allegedly substandard treatment. Finding a therapist-patient relationship plausible, the court nonetheless dismissed the class allegations because common issues of fact or law did not predominate. Rather, the court explained that the negligence claims were “highly individual,” because they depended not only on the facts underlying the therapist-patient relationship but also the defendants’ breach of duty. Accordingly, the court struck the class allegations.
Eldridge v. Cabela’s Inc., No. 3:16-cv-536-DJH, 2017 WL 4364205 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2017)
Judge David J. Hale of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky struck class allegations regarding two “consent revocation” classes in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act case alleging that the defendant made auto-dialed or prerecorded calls without consumers’ prior express consent or after consumers had told the defendant to stop calling them. The plaintiff sought to certify two classes of consumers who had been contacted without prior consent (“no consent” classes) and two class of consumers who had been contacted after telling the defendant to stop calling them (“consent revocation” classes). The court granted the defendant’s motion to strike the two “consent revocation” classes, noting that although the parties disputed the scope of those classes, the classes could be stricken under either interpretation. If, as the defendant argued, the classes consisted of consumers who had given and then revoked their consent, the class would not satisfy the predominance or typicality requirements: Individualized inquiries into whether putative class members had revoked their consent would be necessary, and the named plaintiff was not a typical member of that class because he alleged that he had never consented to be called, so he could not have revoked that consent. If, as the plaintiff argued, the class consisted of all consumers who told the defendant to stop calling them whether or not they had previously consented, the class was a subset of the no-consent classes and redundant. The court further noted that there was a potential typicality issue with one of the no-consent classes — because the definition referred to marketing calls while the plaintiff had allegedly received debt collection calls — but accepted the plaintiff’s explanation that this was due to a drafting error and granted him leave to file an amended complaint to remedy the error.
Decisions Denying Motions to StrikeAMP Automotive, LLC v. B F T, LP, No. 17-5667, 2017 WL 5466817 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2017)
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act, makes it unlawful to use a fax machine to send unsolicited advertisements. The plaintiff in this case alleged that B F T, LP, d/b/a Great American Business Products (Great American) sent thousands of junk faxes in violation of the TCPA and various FCC regulations and sought to certify a class of all subscribers of telephone numbers to which Great American sent unsolicited promotional facsimile transmissions within four years of the complaint and without the opt-out notice required by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). Despite Great American’s contention that this definition was administratively infeasible, Judge Jay C. Zainey of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the motion to strike, reasoning that early administrative concerns can be addressed by case management orders and do not warrant striking class allegations. Judge Zainey explained that whether Great American’s faxes were solicited, complied with the TCPA or complied with FCC regulations were issues of merit, not of improper pleading. Thus, the class definition was not necessarily administratively infeasible, and Great American’s arguments were premature. Similarly, the court went on to hold that Great American’s arguments contending that the plaintiff was not part of the proposed class and that the plaintiff proposed an impermissible “fail safe” class were also merits issues, not issues of improper pleading.
Cone v. Sanitarios Lamosa S.A. de C.V., No. 4:17-CV-00001, 2017 WL 4532636 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4517973 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2017)
In a putative class action involving allegedly defective toilet tanks, Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas adopted the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson to deny the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations. Proposing five causes of action — strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, punitive damages and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act — the plaintiffs had sought to certify a class of “any and all consumers of toilet tank models #3464, #3412, #3404, #3425, #3408, and #3471 manufactured produced, designed, marketed, or distributed by the named Defendants.” The defendants argued that this description violated the threshold requirement of ascertainability, while the plaintiffs promised to clarify the proposed definition and possible subclasses when moving for class certification. Finding the description of the putative class sufficient, the court refused to strike the class allegations. The court explained that the defendants’ motion was premature, because they could object to the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification.
Riaubia v. Hyundai Motor America, No. 16-5150, 2017 WL 3602520 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017)
Judge C. Darnell Jones II of the U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s putative class action alleging that his 2014 Hyundai Sonata’s “Smart Trunk” — a feature advertised as being able to automatically open the car’s trunk — was defective in that it would often fail to open more than a few inches. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including lack of standing and failure to allege a defect. Specifically, the defendant argued that the failure of the trunk to open all the way every time was not a defect and that the plaintiff could not maintain a claim on behalf of the class because some of the class members had different vehicles (although all vehicles in the class were equipped with the Smart Trunk feature). The court disagreed. First, the court noted that the plaintiff had standing to pursue the class claims because he alleged a defect in his vehicle that was present in all of the class members’ vehicles. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that there was no defect just because the “Smart Trunk” did not open all of the way each time. Taking all of the allegations in the complaint as true, the court noted that consumers were led to believe that the smart trunk would open completely each time. Next, the court found that although the model of the vehicle differed between class members, the same mechanism — the Smart Trunk — was present in each; thus, the plaintiff had standing to pursue the claim on behalf of the class. Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and allowed the claim to proceed.
Decisions Rejecting/Denying Class CertificationPriddy v. Health Care Service Corp., 870 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2017)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Wood, C.J., Sykes, J., and Coleman, district judge sitting by designation) reversed the certification of four classes alleging violations of Illinois law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant health insurance provider violated these laws by the way it used third-party affiliates to provide various services. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant contracted with outside affiliates for various services and work and that these relationships were often not at arm’s length. The plaintiffs argued that the affiliates overcharged beneficiaries and returned the proceeds to the defendant via rebates and that this self-dealing violated the defendant’s fiduciary duties under the relevant laws. On appeal, the defendant argued that commonality and typicality were not satisfied, but the plaintiffs argued...
