The Frontier Group v. Northwest Drafting & Design

493 F.Supp.2d 291

THE FRONTIER GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. NORTHWEST DRAFTING & DESIGN, INC. et al., Defendants.

No. 3:05CV01741(DJS).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

June 29, 2007.

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David Lee Weiss, Cohen & Acampora, East Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Charles F. Brower, Brower, Organschi & D'Andrea, LLP, Torrington, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SQUATRITO, District Judge.

The Plaintiff, the Frontier Group, Inc. ("the Plaintiff'), commenced this action against Northwest Drafting & Design, Inc., Mark E. Robinson, Sr. ("Robinson"),¹ and Martial Grondin ("the Defendant") in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Litchfield at Litchfield. In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the ownership rights the Plaintiff had in certain architectural plans, drawings and specifications ("the Plans") by converting those rights to his own benefit, to the exclusion of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant's conversion and use of the Plans to construct a single family residence was a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110b et seq. ("CUTPA").

On November 14, 2005, the Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, in which the Defendant claimed that this court had original jurisdiction over this case because the Plaintiffs action is, in fact, a civil action for copyright infringement. (See dkt. # 1.) The Plaintiff subsequently moved to remand this case to the Connecticut Superior Court, maintaining that the Complaint set forth only state law claims, not federal copyright claims. (See dkt. # 10.) The Defendant opposed the motion to remand, maintaining that the Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by federal copyright law. (See dkt. # 12.) The court, agreeing with the reasons set forth in the Defendant's opposition, denied the motion to remand. (See dkt. # 14.) Now pending is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 19) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 19) is GRANTED.

I. FACTS

The background facts in this case are relatively brief. In March and April 2003, the Plaintiff prepared and created the Plans. Pursuant to a construction contract, dated April 15, 2003, between the Plaintiff and Wayne and Barbara Shields ("the Shields"), the Plans were to be used for the construction of a single family residence owned by the Shields and located at Lot 26, West Hyerdale Drive, Goshen, Connecticut ("the Property"). Under the terms of the construction contract, the Plaintiff retained all rights of ownership over the Plans, and all copies of the Plans were to be returned to the Plaintiff upon termination or completion of the construction of the Property.

In June 2004, the Shields transferred ownership of the Property to the Defendant. At the time of this transfer, the Plaintiff had performed construction on the Property pursuant to the construction contract and in accordance with the Plans, including site work, grading, foundation excavation, and the pouring of concrete footings and foundation walls. The Plaintiff claims that, in June or July 2004, the Defendant acquired possession of the Plans from the Shields without the consent or authorization of the Plaintiff; failed or refused to return the Plans to the Plaintiff; and used the Plans to prepare a new set of architectural plans for the purposes of obtaining a building permit and completing construction for a single family residence located in the area of the Property where the Plaintiff had already constructed the foundation and footings. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had actual notice of the Plaintiff's ownership interest in the Plans as set forth in the construction contract, yet nevertheless provided the Plans to Northwest Drafting & Design, Inc. for the purposes of preparing the new set of plans.

In his affidavit, the Defendant admits that he did purchase the Property from the Shields. (See dkt. # 22 ¶ 2.) The Defendant asserts that, as an inducement for him to buy the lot, the Shields agreed to hire Robinson, a construction draftsman, to draw a set of plans that would comport with the footings already poured by the Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 3.) The Defendant further states that he worked with Robinson to create a set of construction plans, which were used, with subsequent modifications, to construct a dwelling on the Property. (See id. ¶ 4.)

In addition, the Defendant has submitted the affidavit of James Hiltz ("Hiltz"), who states that he acted as the real estate broker for the sale of the Property from the Shields to the Defendant. (See dkt. # 23 ¶ 2.) According to Hiltz, the Shields and the Plaintiff had a dispute over the construction on the Property, which resulted in the Shields' desire to sell the lot. (See id. ¶ 3.) Hiltz asserts that he was aware of the Plans created by the Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 4.) Hiltz further asserts that after the Shields had agreed to sell the Property to the Defendant, he and Wayne Shields took the Defendant to meet Robinson, who was then shown the Plans. (See id. ¶ 5.) According to Hiltz, Robinson, although having seen the Plans, was asked to draw a new set of plans for the Defendant "so that [the Defendant] could build a house on the existing foundation and there would be no issue about [the Defendant] using [the Plans]." (See id.)

II. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant converted the Plaintiff's ownership and possession rights in the Plans, and that the Defendant violated CUTPA. The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff's action is, in reality, a copyright infringement case, as the Plaintiff's claims are preempted by federal copyright law. The court denied the Plaintiffs motion to remand, which argued that the Plaintiffs claims are not copyright claims, but claims brought pursuant to Connecticut law. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff still argues that its claims are not preempted by federal law and that this is not a copyright case. The court shall first address the issue of preemption, and then whether the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" Am. Int'l Group v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir.1975)).

A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine "`if evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The Court must view all inferences and ambiguities in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Id.

B. ANALYSIS

Although the court denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand, which asserted that the Plaintiffs claims were not preempted by copyright law, the Plaintiff still argues that its claims are not preempted, and that Connecticut, not federal, law applies to this case. The court sees how the Plaintiff might have misunderstood the court's intended result in denying the motion to remand, as the court did not provide its own analysis, but rather adopted the reasoning of the Defendant. In order to clarify any ambiguities caused by the court's previous order, and in the interests of fairness and justice, the court shall set forth why the Plaintiffs claims are preempted by the Copyright Act.

1. Applicability of "Complete Preemption" Doctrine to the Copyright Act

The Plaintiff, in both the memorandum in support of its motion to remand and the memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, asserts that, as it has alleged violations of Connecticut law only, the "well-pleaded complaint rule" saves its claims from being preempted by federal law. "The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). "The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Id.

"A case aris[es] under federal law ... if a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2131, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Generally, a complaint that pleads only state law causes of action may not be removed to federal court even where Congress has chosen to regulate the entire field of law in the area in question." Marcus v. AT & T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir.1998). Thus, "[p]reemption does not necessarily...