The Indep. Order of Foresters v. Ellis-Batchelor

THE INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS, Plaintiff v. RHONDA ELLIS-BATCHELOR, LINWOOD BATCHELOR, STEVEN BATCHELOR, and SHARON BOND, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-10619

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

October 29, 2021

Mark A. Goldsmith United States District Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT ELLIS-BATCHELOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No 52) AND DENY STEVEN BATCHELOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 55)

DAVID R. GRAND, United States Magistrate Judge.

This interpleader action has a complicated procedural history. In short, this case concerns a dispute over who is the rightful beneficiary of life insurance proceeds (the “Benefit Proceeds”) which plaintiff The Independent Order of Foresters (“Foresters”) has deposited into the Court. With Foresters having been dismissed from the action following its deposit of the Benefit Proceeds, the only remaining parties are three of the original four defendants each of whom has asserted a right to the Benefit Proceeds (1) Rhonda Ellis-Batchelor (“Ellis-Batchelor”) (2) Steven Batchelor; and (3) Sharon Bond.^[1]

On July 26, 2021, Ellis-Batchelor filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that “there is no genuine issue in dispute that [she] is the rightful beneficiary of the policy and is entitled to the [Benefit] Proceeds.” (ECF No. 52-1, PageID.352). On August 9, 2021, Steven Batchelor also filed a motion for summary judgment, though his unorthodox filing presents no cogent argument or evidence whatsoever, and instead, as discussed below, asserts a handful of mostly speculative statements that have little relation to the salient issues in this case. (ECF No. 55). On August 15, 2021, Ellis-Batchelor filed a response to Steven Batchelor's motion. (ECF No. 59). Sharon Bond did not file a response to either motion.

The Court finds that oral argument will not aid it in resolving the motions, and declines to hold a hearing. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ellis-Batchelor's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 52) be GRANTED, Steven Batchelor's motion for summary judgment be DENIED (ECF No. 55), and that the Clerk of Court be directed to pay the net Benefit Proceeds to Ellis-Batchelor.

I. REPORT

A. Background

In 2008, Foresters issued a $96, 000 life insurance policy (the “Policy”) to William Howard Batchelor (“William Batchelor”), who, at the time, resided in North Carolina. William Batchelor initially named his then-wife, Denise Batchelor, as the Policy's primary beneficiary, but later changed the beneficiary two times; in 2011 to Steven Batchelor and Sharon Bond, his nephew and niece, and in 2013 to Ellis-Batchelor, his then-wife. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6; No. 1-2, PageID.32; No. 1-3; No. 1-4). William Batchelor was murdered on October 30, 2015, in Suffolk, Virginia. On November 10, 2015, Ellis-Batchelor submitted to Foresters a Statement of Claim for Death Benefits under the Policy. Thereafter, Foresters received competing Statements of Claim for the Benefit Proceeds from Sharon Bond and Steven Batchelor.

Bond and Steven Batchelor have alleged in this case that Ellis-Batchelor was involved in Batchelor's murder and therefore cannot be entitled to receive the Policy benefits under the North Carolina “slayer statute, ” which renders a beneficiary ineligible to receive life insurance benefits if she willfully and unlawfully killed the insured decedent. See NC Gen Stat § 31A-11. According to Foresters, it requested but did not receive confirmation from the Suffolk Police that Ellis-Batchelor was cleared from the investigation. Faced with the competing claims and uncertainty surrounding the murder investigation, Foresters filed the instant interpleader action on March 7, 2020. On January 13, 2021, the Court granted Foresters' motion for leave to deposit the life insurance Benefit Proceeds into the Court, and, after Foresters deposited the net Benefit Proceeds of $100, 477.80^[2], dismissed Foresters from the case.

Following a series of procedural rulings, the only remaining defendants laying claim to the Benefit Proceeds are Ellis-Batchelor, Steven Batchelor, and Sharon Bond. On July 26, 2021, Ellis-Batchelor filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that “there is no genuine issue in dispute that [she] is the rightful beneficiary of the policy and is entitled to the proceeds.” (ECF. No. 52). Steven Batchelor did not file a response to Ellis-Batchelor's motion, but instead, on August 9, 2021, filed his own motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 55). On August 15, 2021, Ellis-Batchelor filed a response to Steven Batchelor's motion. (ECF No. 59). Bond did not file a response to either motion.

B. Applicable Legal Standards

Pursuant to Rule 56, The Court will grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the Court assumes the truth of the non-moving party's evidence and construes all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and must identify portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex v. Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.'” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In response to a summary judgment motion, the opposing party may not rest on its pleading, nor “‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact' but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558 (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989)). Indeed, “[t]he failure to present any evidence to counter a well-supported motion for summary judgment alone is grounds for granting the motion.'” Id. (quoting Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir. 2009)). “Conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts are insufficient to establish a factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment.” Id. at 560 (citing Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004)).

A moving party with the burden of proof (typically, although as this case demonstrates, not always, the plaintiff) faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). As set forth above, the moving party without the burden of proof needs only show that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. “But where the moving party has the burden - [typically] the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense - his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. U.S., 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is “inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Harris v. Kowalski, 2006 WL 1313863, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 12, 2006) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)).

A review of Ellis-Batchelor's and Steven Batchelor's summary judgment motions and this case's unique nature and procedural posture make clear that Ellis-Batchelor is the one presently seeking affirmative relief, and that at trial Steven Batchelor would bear the burden of proving the North Carolina “slayer” statute's applicability. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(3)(d) (“The burden of proof in the civil action is on the party seeking to establish that the killing was willful and unlawful for the purposes of this Article.”). Therefore Ellis-Batchelor bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a material question of fact as to the relief she seeks and “that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party” on the present record Calderone, 799 F.2d at 259, while Steven Batchelor must raise a material question of fact as to the slayer statute's applicability. In considering these burdens, the Court notes that “[t]he moving party's burden cannot be enhanced to require his proof of a negative . . .” See Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling P'ship v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir. 1986). While this principle usually applies in the context of a defendant moving for summary judgment - because it is typically the plaintiff who bears the ultimate burden of proof, see Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001), the same is true where the plaintiff seeks summary judgment and the defendant bears the ultimate burden. See Barnes v. Nw. Repossession, LLC, 210 F.Supp.3d 954, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Because [Defendant] bears the burden of proof at trial, Plaintiff ‘is not required to prove a negative in order to make a prima facie showing for summary judgment.'”) (citation omitted). See also Grady v. Becker, 907 F.Supp.2d 975, 982 (D. Minn. 20...