The People v. Garcia

1

2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE M. GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-21-0488

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

July 8, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 13-CF-654 Honorable Daniel B. Shanes, Judge, Presiding.

Thomas C. Brandstrader, of Highwood, for appellant.

Eric F. Rinehart, State's Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and David S. Friedland, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

JORGENSEN, JUSTICE.

¶ 1 Defendant, Jose M. Garcia, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) for relief from his first degree murder conviction (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the shooting death of Gabriel Gonzalez. Defendant's petition claimed that the trial court imposed a de facto life sentence that was unconstitutional based on his youth and developmental status at the time of the offense. We previously issued an opinion reversing the summary dismissal and remanding the cause with directions for the trial court to docket the petition for further proceedings. People v Garcia, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶ 23 (Garcia I). We relied heavily on (1) People v. Holman 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, which announced procedural requirements applicable under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) when sentencing a juvenile to a natural or de facto life sentence, and (2) case law suggesting analogous constraints, under the proportionate penalties clause of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), on the imposition of life sentences on young adults possessing certain developmental and character traits associated with juveniles. Garcia I, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶¶ 13-15. In doing so, we were careful to note that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021), undermined Holman's reasoning. Garcia I, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶ 20. We concluded, however, that Holman remained controlling precedent. Id. Our supreme court subsequently recognized that, in light of Jones, Holman no longer accurately reflected eighth amendment law. People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 41. Thereafter, the State petitioned in this case for leave to appeal to our supreme court. The supreme court denied the State's petition but ordered us to vacate the judgment in our original opinion and reconsider the matter in light of Wilson. People v. Garcia, No. 128815 (Ill. Jan. 24, 2024). We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing "the effect of [Wilson], on the issue of whether defendant's sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution."^[1] People v. Garcia, No. 2-21-0488 (Feb. 29, 2024) (unpublished minute order). Having reconsidered our decision in light of Wilson, we vacate the summary dismissal of defendant's petition and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant's conviction followed a February 2014 jury trial where the evidence established that defendant fatally shot the victim outside a liquor store on March 10, 2013. The shooting was evidently connected to a gang-related dispute. Defendant, born on December 21, 1994, was 18 years old at the time of the offense. The trial court sentenced defendant in April 2014 to an aggregate 62-year prison term: 37 years for the murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2012)) plus a mandatory 25-year add-on sentence because defendant personally fired the shot that caused Gonzalez's death (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)). The sentence for murder was 17 years longer than the statutory minimum 20-year sentence. Id. § 5-4.5-20(a)(1).

¶ 4 According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), defendant had an extensive juvenile delinquency history, including adjudications for defacing school property, aggravated assault, criminal trespass to residence, consumption of alcohol by a minor, and resisting/obstructing an officer. Defendant (1) had spent time in juvenile correctional facilities, (2) had learning disabilities and received special education services, and (3) had a history of misbehavior in school. Although he did not finish high school, he earned a graduate equivalency degree (GED) while incarcerated. He became a gang member at 17 after being released from juvenile detention, although he may have had some form of prior gang affiliation. Defendant reported mental health issues, including depression and anger management problems. Defendant lived with both of his parents. His parents argued, but there was no physical abuse between them. However, defendant got into physical altercations with his father on several occasions. The PSI reflected that, in 2008, defendant received a "Psycho-Educational/Emotional [E]valuation," which revealed that he had a borderline intelligence quotient, suffered mild symptoms of depression, was prone to angry outbursts, had an impulsive nature, was fearful of social rejection, and was easily provoked.

¶ 5 After hearing other evidence in aggravation and mitigation, which we need not recount here, the trial court imposed the aggregate 62-year prison sentence. The court stated that it had considered the PSI and all evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The court noted defendant's history of delinquency and gang involvement. The court acknowledged that another individual started the argument that led to the shooting but stressed that defendant took the conflict to a new level by bringing a gun and shooting the victim. The court also observed that defendant fired multiple shots, only one of which struck the victim; the missed shots endangered others nearby. The court mentioned defendant's problems in school but remarked that, by earning a GED in jail, defendant had shown that he could "make a choice that is productive and healthy." The court emphasized that the crime was gang-related and stressed the need to impose a sentence that would deter others from committing similar crimes. The court concluded by noting that defendant's actions showed that he did not value human life. Defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence. In denying the motion, the court specifically noted that, in imposing his sentence, it had considered defendant's young age and potential for rehabilitation.

¶ 6 In April 2021, defendant, through counsel, filed his petition under the Act, claiming that his sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated the eighth amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny. As discussed below, Miller placed limitations on the imposition of life sentences without parole for offenses committed by those under 18. Id. at 479. Although defendant was 18 years old when he killed the victim here, he cited People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, and People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, for the proposition that a young adult may pursue an eighth amendment challenge under Miller to a life sentence without parole.

¶ 7 Along with his petition, defendant submitted a 38-page report from James Garbarino, Ph.D., a developmental psychologist. In his report, Garbarino stressed that he was not offering a clinical diagnosis of defendant. Rather he was providing "an analysis of his development[al] pathway from infancy to adolescence." Garbarino explained that the immaturity of the adolescent brain extends into early adulthood and includes the frontal lobes, which "play a crucial role in making good decisions, controlling impulses, focusing attention for planning, and managing emotions." According to Garbarino, the maturation process involves the brain's white matter, gray matter, and neurotransmitters, all of which "are compromised in an individual under the age of 25." In addition, social conditions affect the development of white matter, so certain youths "suffer both from the general limitations of unformed brains and the disadvantaged functioning that arises from their adverse childhood experiences." (Emphasis in original.) Garbarino added that "the hormonal conditions of such youths contribute to impaired brain function (relative to adults) in matters of assessing and taking risks, emotional intensity, and dealing with peers (including social rejection)." Based not on a clinical assessment but only on a review of documents concerning defendant's social history, Garbarino concluded:

"[Defendant] appears to be the embodiment of the developmental issues that constitute the focal points of the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama ***. As an 18[-]year[-]old youth, he demonstrated immaturity of thought and emotional control, impetuous and impulsive action, and failure to appreciate the full consequences of his criminal behavior. He came out of a family and home environment that was toxic and developmentally damaging because of abuse and abandonment. He lived in community settings that exacerbated rather than compensated for the traumatic features of his home life. And, perhaps most importantly, the possibility of rehabilitation was present at the time of his crime and sentencing."

The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We begin by summarizing the relevant principles governing proceedings under the Act. Our supreme court has stated as follows:

"The Act [citation] provides a remedy for incarcerated defendants who have suffered a substantial violation of their constitutional

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