. . . If audits show misuse (e.g., inflated grants), forcing payments could violate the executive's duty to execute lawsfaithfully. . . .
I. Introduction
For forty years, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) governed judicial-executive relations, directing courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes if reasonable. Critics argued this ultimately ceded Article III's interpretive role to unelected bureaucrats, violating separation of powers. See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? The University of Chicago Press (2014). Last year, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), the Supreme Court agreed, overruling Chevron to reassert Article III's mandate that courts'not agencies'"'decide whether the law means what the agency says.'" Id. at 2261 (quoting Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015)). Chief Justice Roberts hailed this as a return to constitutional first principles, requiring courts to "exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority." Id. at 2273.
Yet, as with any seismic shift, Loper's ripple effects are proving complex. Enter State of New York v. Trump, where Chief Judge John J. McConnell Jr., U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") blocking President Trump's directive to pause federal funding to, among other recipients, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. No. 1:25-cv-00039-JJM-PAS, Dkt. 50 (D.R.I. Jan. 31, 2025) ("Decision"). Issued barely ten days into the Trump presidency, the TRO raises the specter that Loper's empowerment of courts tipped the scales too far, inviting judicial overreach into the executive's Article II sphere of constitutional prerogatives. Loper's empowerment of judicial authority, absent a countervailing restraint, risks a new imbalance: a judiciary substituting its own discretion for the executive's in areas where deference'formal or informal'might still be due. The stakes are high. If courts wield Loper as a blunt tool, the separation of powers could tilt anew, this time toward judicial fiat.
II. The Deference Pendulum: From Chevron to Loper
Chevron emerged in 1984 as a pragmatic compromise. Step one: if a statute's meaning was clear, courts enforced it; step two: if ambiguous, courts deferred to an agency's reasonable interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Built on assumptions of agency expertise and executive accountability, it empowered agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency or Food and Drug Administration to mold vague laws into actionable policy. Over decades, this fueled an administrative state, with agencies stretching statutory gaps into sweeping regulations'often beyond judicial challenge.
Critics bristled. For example, then-appellate Judge Neil Gorsuch called Chevron a "judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty," noting that "[t]ransferring the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due process . . . and equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the political branches intruded on judicial functions." Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152, (10th Cir. 2016). By 2024, the Supreme Court had heard enough. In Loper, a 6-3 majority struck Chevron down, holding it violated the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") mandate that courts'not agencies'interpret laws. Loper, 144 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
Chief Justice Roberts anchored the ruling in first principles. Chevron's deference, he wrote, bred instability'agencies could reinterpret laws with each administration'"leaving those attempting to plan around agency action in an eternal fog of uncertainty." Id. at 2272. Courts must now decide legal questions de novo, using statutory text, structure, and legislative history in place of agency gloss on statutory ambiguities. Id. at 2273. The goal was clear: curb executive overreach resulting from agency rulemaking. Yet Loper's silence on broader executive discretion and action'beyond statutory construction'left a void. If courts no longer defer to agency statutory interpretation, what of the President's broader execution of Article II powers? That question looms large in early 2025.
III. State of New York v. Trump: A Post-Loper Test Case
On January 20, 2025, President Trump's second term kicked off with an OMB directive pausing all federal disbursements to ensure that the spending aligns with "Presidential priorities." Decision at 3-4. Twenty-two states and D.C. sued, alleging violations of the APA, separation of powers, as well as the Spending and Presentment clauses of the Constitution. Id. On January 31, Judge McConnell granted the states' requested TRO, ordering funds disbursed according to Congress's budget while finding the pause likely unlawful. Id. at 11-12.
A. Judge McConnell's RationaleJudge McConnell applied the four TRO factors: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. Id. at 2-3 (citing Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981)). The cornerstone of his ruling...
