The Segerdahl Corp. v. Ferruzza

THE SEGERDAHL CORP. d/b/a SG360°, Plaintiffs, v. ANTHONY FERRUZZA ET AL., Defendants.

No. 17-cv-3015

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

February 22, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Martha M. Pacold, J.

Plaintiff Segerdahl Corp. has moved to exclude the testimony, opinions and report of Matthew Scott, an expert witness for defendant American Litho, Inc. [588]. Segerdahl contends that Scott is unqualified and his opinions are unreliable. Segerdahl also seeks to preclude defendants Anthony Ferruzza, Michael Ferruzza, Daniella Tucci, Christopher Knoll, Erica Knoll, and Eugene Czech (together, “Individual Defendants”) from relying upon Scott because they did not disclose him as an expert witness. As explained below, Segerdahl's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Scott's report describes him as “an expert in commercial printing, having worked in the printing industry for over 40 years.” [644-1] at 2.^[1]Over that time, he has held a variety of different positions working in different industry segments and with different types of products. Id. at 2, 10-11. He served on the Board of Directors for the Association of Graphic Communications from 1998 to 2001, as the Treasurer for the Association for an unspecified period of time, and he was on the Board of Directors for the National Association of Printers and Lithographers from 1998 to 2000. Id. at 3, 11. Scott has also worked as an expert on print manufacturing in litigation and performs consulting work related to the printing business. Id.

In his expert report, Scott provides an overview of the printing industry. He observes that “[t]he printing industry is highly specialized and unique” and requires significant capital investment, resulting in “a limited number of companies with the resources . . . to manufacture substantial print volume.” Id. at 3. Scott asserts that “[p]rinting companies run the same or similar equipment and use the same processes, but are otherwise unique” and that “standard expertise . . . is developed shaped, and shared through” the movement of individual workers “from company to company.” Id. at 3-4; see also id. at 5 (“Top printing companies use the same techniques, equipment, suppliers standards, paper, and subcontractors.”).

According to Scott, printers “prepare a set of written procedures based on their knowledge of the process.” Id. at 5. “As the standards are the same, so are the Standard Operating Procedures different printing companies use.” Id.; see also Id. (“SOP's are generally the same from printer to printer.”).

Scott also states that “[m]ost customers maintain a ‘go to' roster of qualified printers and” use “Master Supply agreements” with printers.” Id. at 4. “Almost all Master Supply agreements contain ‘work for hire' provisions, such that the customer owns all of the print company's work for that customer.” Id.

Based upon his review of various documents, Scott reaches four general conclusions: (1) R.J. Reynolds “artwork, templates and forms are considered customer supplied information, [and] therefore owned by the customer.” Id. at 8. (2) Quality Assurance forms “in use [by Segerdahl] are standard in nature, various forms of which are in use at larger printing companies. These forms are completely adequate for the purpose and are generally known in the industry.” Id. (3) “The Segerdahl SOP's contain nothing commercially advantageous or unique. Similar, if not identical[,] SOP's can be found in every large print company.” Id. And (4) “[b]lanks, partial, and incomplete templates contain little information helpful in determining their ownership or proprietary nature.” Id.

After reviewing the briefs and Scott's report, the court held a Daubert hearing focused on the reliability of Scott's methodology. [714], [717], [722].

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),] govern the admissibility of expert testimony.” Timm v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 932 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 2019). “Under this framework, a trial judge, as a gatekeeping matter, is responsible for ensuring that proposed expert testimony ‘is not only relevant, but reliable.'” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). “An expert's testimony qualifies as relevant under Rule 702 so long as it assists the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case.” Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).

The court “must engage in a three-step analysis before admitting expert testimony. It must determine whether the witness is qualified; whether the expert's methodology is scientifically reliable; and whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Gopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The proponent of the expert bears the burden of demonstrating that the expert's testimony would satisfy the Daubert standard.” Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

I. Scott's Qualifications

Segerdahl first challenges Scott's qualifications. “For a witness to be considered an ‘expert,' Rule 702 requires that person to be qualified as such ‘by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.'” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 705 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). “Whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness's testimony.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court “must look at each of the conclusions [an expert] draws individually to see if he has the adequate education, skill, and training to reach them.” Id. at 617; see, e.g., Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 928-30 (7th Cir. 2016) (expert was qualified to offer some opinions but not others).

Here, Segerdahl lumps all of Scott's opinions together and asserts that he is unqualified to offer any opinions “on the business of large printers [like Segerdahl] because he has never worked for such a company.” [589] at 7. American Litho responds that Scott need not have specialized experience with large printers and that having over forty years of experience in the printing industry is sufficient.

Scott is qualified to offer opinions about the printing industry. As recounted above, Scott has over forty years of experience holding a variety of roles across the industry and at companies he himself owns. [644-1] at 2-3, 10-11. Segerdahl does not challenge that Scott has significant experience and knowledge of the printing industry in general, but instead contends that he needs specific experience with large printers. Segerdahl, however, does not explain why Scott must have specific work experience with large printers and why the experience he does have is inadequate. See Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 845 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying Daubert motion where movant “fail[ed] to explain how Dr. Vinson's . . . lack of experience within the ladder industry render[ed] him unqualified”); In re Fluidmaster, Inc., Water Connector Components Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-cv-5696, 2017 WL 1196990, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Plaintiffs fail to explain why the experience that Meek actually possesses is insufficient to qualify him to offer his opinions, and that failure dooms their Daubert challenge.”). Regardless, courts generally “impose no requirement that an expert be a specialist in a given field,” so the fact that Scott has not worked at a large printer “goes to the weight to be placed on [his] opinion[s], not [their] admissibility.” Hall, 840 F.3d at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted). Scott's general experience in the printing industry is sufficient to qualify him as an expert regarding the opinions he offers about what information, forms, procedures, and practices are commonly known or typical in the industry. See Smith v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 11-cv-986, 2017 WL 2656583, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2017) (vocational counselor was qualified to testify about plaintiff's ability to return to work even though lacked expertise on substance abuse and had not previously worked with locomotive engineers like plaintiff).

II. Reliability Of Scott's Opinions

Segerdahl next argues that Scott's opinions are unreliable. To assess reliability, the court must “determine whether the expert is qualified in the relevant field and examine the methodology the expert has used in reaching his conclusions.” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000). Reliability is “assessed case by case,” although the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in Daubert and its progeny can be instructive.^[2] Timm, 932 F.3d at 993. “Rule 702's reliability elements require the district judge to determine only that the expert is providing testimony that is based on a correct application of a reliable methodology and that the expert considered sufficient data to employ the methodology.” Gopalratnam, 877 F.3d at 780 (emphasis omitted). “[T]he correct inquiry focuses not on ‘the ultimate correctness of the expert's conclusions,' but rather on ‘the soundness and care with which the expert arrived at her opinion.'” Timm, 932 F.3d at 993 (quoting Schultz v. Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC, 721 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2013)). Ultimately, to be reliable, an expert must “show that his conclusions were the fruit of a rigorous, objectively-verifiable approach-something more than mere speculation.” Id. at 994. Even when an expert relies upon his experience, he “still need[s] to show how his experience or expertise led to his conclusions.” Varlen...