Thomas v. Blevins

JOZLYN THOMAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JAMES SCOTT BLEVINS, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

F078333

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

February 6, 2020

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 428536)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Stacy P. Speiller, Judge.

Jozlyn Thomas, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gianelli/Nielsen, Eric Thomas Nielsen and Michael Louis Gianelli for Defendant and Respondent.

-ooOoo- Appellant, Jozlyn Thomas, a beneficiary of the Giles Revocable Trust (or the trust), appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to vacate¹ an order issued nine years earlier concerning the administration of the trust (the 2009 order). The 2009 order had granted an amended petition by the trustee, respondent James Scott Blevins (respondent or trustee), seeking court approval of his account and report, plan of distribution, and settlement agreement with another beneficiary, Dawn Morin. By 2011, presumably in reliance on the 2009 order, all the assets of the trust were distributed to the various beneficiaries, including appellant, and the trust administration was completed. In her motion to vacate, appellant claimed the 2009 order should be set aside as void, and the trust administration and/or distribution "reopened," because there was a lack of proper service of process on her relating to the subject petition; that is, the trustee mailed the relevant pleadings and notices to an incorrect address. The trial court denied appellant's motion on the primary ground that appellant's "attack on the Court's May 2009 Order comes far too late." In her appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred because the 2009 order had to be set aside as void regardless of when the invalidity was brought to the trial court's attention. We disagree. Under the unique circumstances of this case, and for reasons explained below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to vacate the 2009 order. Accordingly, the order of the trial court denying appellant's motion to vacate is hereby affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Background Regarding Giles Revocable Trust

For purposes of the present appeal, neither party disputes the basic accuracy of the background facts set forth in the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to vacate.The following is a reiteration of the trial court's description and history of the Giles Revocable Trust and of the relevant court proceedings relating thereto which resulted in the 2009 order.²

The settlors/trustors of the Giles Revocable Trust were Charles L. Giles and Bobette Giles, husband and wife. The trust was established in January 2002. At the time, Charles had two sons from a former marriage—Charles W. Giles (deceased) and Joseph Giles (appellant's father). Bobette had five children from a former marriage—James Scott Blevins, William Blevins, Brent Blevins, Bryan Blevins, and Kelly Bergman. Charles and Bobette were the initial trustees of the Giles Revocable Trust—it was created as a revocable living trust. Bobette's son James was designated as the successor trustee—i.e., the person who would take over administration of the trust upon the death of both Charles and Bobette.

In the Giles Revocable Trust, Charles specifically provided for some of his grandchildren. This included his grandchildren through his deceased son Charles W. (i.e., Charles W. Giles, Jr., Anthony Giles, and Michael Giles), and his grandchild through his son Joseph—i.e., Joseph's daughter, appellant herein. Charles left his son Joseph a small bequest ($50,000 in trust) that was dependent on Joseph refraining from use of illicit drugs.

Charles also treated Dawn Morin as his own daughter, though she was never adopted by him, according to the pleadings. As will be noted below, Dawn Morin was one of the beneficiaries of the trust.

The trust assets were supposed to be placed into three different sub-trusts upon the death of the first spouse. First, a marital share trust was supposed to be created and funded to the extent of the federal marital estate tax exemption amount to reduce and/or eliminate taxes at the time of the surviving spouse's death. Second, a family share trust was to be created, which would hold the community property share of the deceased spouse as well as the balance of that spouse's separate property, if any. Third, a surviving spouse trust was supposed to be created to hold the surviving spouse's share of the community property as well as that spouse's separate property, if any. The surviving spouse was to maintain control over all the assets in the surviving spouse trust and upon death, those assets were to be equally divided among the surviving spouse's beneficiaries.

Depending on who died first, the applicable distribution provisions in the trust were slightly different. However, since Charles died first, this is what was supposed to happen: First, immediately upon his death, Stoney Dahlberg was to receive $1,000, Dawn Morin was to receive $25,000, and "each living grandchild" was to receive $25,000, including appellant.³

Then, upon Bobette's death, Charles's beneficiaries (who inherit the balance of the marital share and family share sub-trusts) were to receive as follows: $50,000 to Joseph Giles (conditional on his refraining from use of illicit drugs), 10 percent of the value of the sub-trusts to the Boys & Girls Club of Manteca, 10 percent to St. Vincent de Paul's, and 10 percent to each living grandchild (there were four at the time of Bobette's death—including appellant). The remainder of the marital share and family share sub-trusts was left to Dawn Morin. Thus, appellant was to inherit about 10 percent of the remaining value of the marital share and family share sub-trusts, and Dawn Morin about 40 percent of the assets left in those two sub-trusts. Under the terms of the Giles Revocable Trust,Bobette's five children, including respondent James Scott Blevins, inherited equal shares in the third sub-trust—the surviving spouse trust.

Trust Litigation and Proceedings Leading to the 2009 Order

After the death of the trustors, respondent James Scott Blevins became the successor trustee. The administration of the Giles Revocable Trust took several years. In June 2008, Dawn Morin filed a petition seeking "information and an accounting" from respondent in his capacity as trustee, alleging that respondent was improperly attempting to sell trust property to his brother at an inappropriate discount. Additionally, Dawn Morin raised some questions regarding the delay in funding the sub-trusts, the propriety of transactions Bobette had undertaken in her lifetime and of the allocation of certain shares of stock to respondent.

Respondent objected to Dawn Morin's petition, offering explanations for each of the challenged actions. After settlement negotiations, the parties reached an agreement in March 2009. Therefore, on March 25, 2009, respondent filed an amended petition⁴ seeking, among other things, court approval of a proposed plan of distribution pursuant to which Dawn Morin would receive slightly less than her designated 40 percent of the two sub-trusts. Notably, pursuant to the proposed plan, appellant also would receive slightly less than 10 percent of the sub-trusts.

On April 29, 2009, pursuant to the settlement agreement, Dawn Morin dismissed her petition for information and an accounting, with prejudice.

On May 5, 2009, the trial court granted respondent's amended petition and signed what we have referred to as the 2009 order approving, among other things, the distribution plan proposed by the trustee. Distribution of the trust assets to the variousbeneficiaries was completed in 2011. Since that time, appellant has become a record owner of a number of assets pursuant to the distribution plan and she has, according to the pleadings, received income from those assets through her guardians and maternal grandparents, Daniel Thomas and Mary Thomas.

Appellant's Motion to Vacate

On March 26, 2018, appellant filed her motion to vacate the trial court's 2009 order and, as a corollary to that relief, to reopen the trust administration. Preliminarily, appellant's motion pointed out that she was born in June of 2000, and as a minor she was under the care of her maternal grandparents, Daniel and Mary Thomas, who have been guardians of her person and estate. The reason for this guardianship was that appellant's parents, Joseph Giles and Lisa Thomas, were unable to take care of her due to their drug abuse and her father Joseph's incarceration in Florida. Appellant was first placed with Daniel and Mary Thomas in June of 2007, and their guardianship was formally approved in February of 2008 by a Wisconsin court. Since June of 2007, appellant has resided with her grandparents, the Thomases, at their home in Punta Gorda, Florida.

Appellant and her grandparents asserted in support of the motion that they were not aware that the Giles Revocable Trust existed or that appellant was a beneficiary until 2009, when the wife of the trustee called and disclosed that appellant was a beneficiary of the trust entitled to distribution of a portion of its assets. However, it was not disclosed at that time that a "lawsuit" had been initiated by Dawn Morin or a petition filed by the trustee. Nor was it disclosed at that time that a final order of the trial court had been entered concerning those matters. These relevant facts allegedly were not discovered by appellant until superior court files were inspected in 2017.

According to appellant's motion to vacate, neither appellant nor her...