Thomas v. Dall. Hous. Auth.

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CAROLYN SUE THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 3:23-cv-1792-E-BN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

August 14, 2023

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Carolyn Sue Thomas filed a pro se complaint against the Dallas Housing Authority and two Dallas County courts related to state judicial proceedings, alleging violations of Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The Court will grant Thomas's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) [Dkt. No 5] through a separate order, subjecting Thomas's complaint to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, to the extent and for the reasons set out below, the Court should dismiss the complaint.

Legal Standards

Section 1915(e)(2) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). The pleading requirements as set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) therefore apply to the Court's screening of a complaint filed IFP.

Considering these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

But, while a court must accept a plaintiff's allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements, including,'” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.'” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).

So, to avoid dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief' is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

Analysis

To start, the civil rights violations that Thomas alleges occurred in judicial proceedings in state court. See e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 4 (“Event occurred in courtroom and during appeals process. JP Judge claimed she did not read my response to Dallas Housing Authority suit against me for possession of property. Refused to enter appeal I prepared to higher court.”). And Thomas attaches to her complaint multiple flings from state court proceedings, including the August 6, 2023 judgment against her in an eviction proceeding. See id. at 7-16, 27-32, 35-38.

So, to the extent that Thomas asserts claims in this federal proceeding that implicate ongoing state court proceedings, the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over those claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which, “following Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987), [ ] also applies ‘when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government,'” Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 2008).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “does not ‘qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.'” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47).

And, under Younger, a federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction when to do so would result in the interference in certain, select state proceedings. Younger abstention “applies only to three exceptional categories of state proceedings: ongoing criminal prosecutions, certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, and pending civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (quoting, in turn, New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (NOPSI)); internal quotation marks omitted).

The doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); internal citations omitted); accord Hood, 822 F.3d at 222-23.

Of the three exceptional categories identified in NOPSI, which “define Younger's scope,” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78, the unique posture of this litigation - filed to request that a federal district court direct how a state court should conduct a pending proceeding - fits within the third, see Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 13-14 (“Both Juidice[ v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977),] and this case involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained.”); Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[B]oth Juidice and Pennzoil involved requests to directly or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” (citing Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Younger governs whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court's ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.”); Zeeco, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, No. 17-CV-384-JED-FHM, 2017 WL 6539504, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2017) (“What Younger, Juidice, and Pennzoil have in common is that they all involved plaintiffs filing separate federal suits in an attempt to enjoin ongoing state proceedings.”))).

The additional Middlesex County factors are present here: “In this case, the state proceedings are judicial in nature and represent important state interests, as state courts must be empowered to enforce their own orders and judgments. Moreover, [Thomas] has had opportunities to raise [her] federal challenges in these state proceedings and there has been no procedural bar to his doing so.” Dandar v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 619 Fed.Appx. 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see also Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15 (“[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that the state procedures will afford an adequate remedy.”); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979) (“Certainly, abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.”); Gates, 885 F.3d at 880 (“The relevant question is whether the would-be federal plaintiff has the opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court.” (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 425; emphasis in original)).

And insofar as state judicial proceedings have concluded, such that no appeal was pending when Thomas filed this lawsuit,...