Thomas v. Duvall

ANGEL LUIS THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. ANGELA R. DUVALL, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:16-CV-00451

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 1, 2021

(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Angel Luis Thomas, formerly a Pennsylvania state prisoner confined at the State Correctional Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania ("SCI Huntingdon"), filed this amended civil rights complaint alleging that numerous prison officials violated his Constitutional rights.¹ Thomas raised several claims including, as relevant here, claims that Defendants interfered with his right of access to courts and with his rights of free speech, association, and privacy, conspired to deprive Thomas of those constitutional rights, and conspired to interfere with Thomas' ability to testify in federal court.²

In October 2019, Magistrate Judge Susan E. Schwab issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court grant in part and deny in partDefendants' motion for summary judgment.³ First, Magistrate Judge Schwab recommended finding that Defendants had admitted certain factual allegations in Thomas' amended complaint by failing to properly deny those allegations, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6).⁴ Specifically, she recommended that "the factual allegations in Paragraphs 37-39, 45, 59, 72, 74-76, 81, 83-84, 86-87, 90-91, 93-97, 100, 108-111, 114-115, 118-120, 122, 126, and 133-134 of the amended complaint [be] deemed admitted for the defendants' failure to deny them."⁵

With regard to Thomas' access to courts claim, Magistrate Judge Schwab determined that this claim should survive summary judgment, as several admitted allegations supported Thomas' claim.⁶ Specifically, two prison officials "made Thomas and Sawicki meet in the middle of the visiting room and then refused to carry papers back and forth between them after [they were] placed . . . on either side of a glass wall."⁷ Additionally, Defendants "required Thomas and Sawicki to meet in a non-contact booth with inoperative phones, causing them to have to shout and allowing other inmates to hear their conversation."⁸ The sum of these admitted facts "could establish that [Defendants] interfered with Thomas's ability to visit with his attorney."⁹

As to Thomas' freedom of speech and association claims, Magistrate Judge Schwab recommended that summary judgment be denied, as Defendants failed to demonstrate a rational connection between their actions and any legitimate penological interest.¹⁰ Magistrate Judge Schwab recommended that summary judgment be granted as to Thomas' equal protection and conditions of confinement claims due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and be denied as to Thomas' 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and 1986 conspiracy claims because Defendants failed to proffer any argument in favor of summary judgment as to those counts.¹¹ Over Defendants' objections, this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation.¹²

After disposing of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, six claims remain in this matter, including Thomas' claims for: (1) a violation of his right of access to courts (Count II); (2) conspiracy to violate his right of access to courts (Count III); (3) a violation of his rights to privacy, freedom of speech, and freedom of association (Count IV); (4) conspiracy to violate his rights to privacy, freedom of speech, and freedom of association (Count V); (5) conspiracy to deter him from testifying in federal court (Count VII); and (6) the failure of certain Defendants to prevent others from conspiring to deter Thomas from testifying in federal court (Count VIII).

Despite this matter ostensibly being ready to proceed to trial after the motion for summary judgment was disposed of, trial has been delayed by a series of additional motions that have since been filed. First, Defendants filed a motion to disqualify Thomas' attorney at trial, which this Court granted.¹³ Prior to the Court granting that motion, Thomas filed a motion for sanctions related to the motion to disqualify, which this Court denied.¹⁴ Thomas then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying sanctions, which was also denied.¹⁵ Now pending before the Court is Thomas' motion for judgment on the pleadings,¹⁶ which he asserts should be granted because Defendants' admissions establish the necessary elements of every remaining claim.¹⁷

Defendants respond that the motion should be denied because (1) it is untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), or because Thomas included extraneous documents in his motion, which converts the motion into an untimely motion for summary judgment and (2) in any event, any admissions are insufficient to establish Defendants' liability.¹⁸ Thomas has filed a reply brief,¹⁹ and this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Thomas' motion will be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."²⁰ Accordingly,

the court must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and may not grant the motion unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.²¹

"Thus, in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may only consider the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents."²²

A. Timeliness of Thomas' Motion

Defendants first argue that Thomas' motion for judgment on the pleadings is untimely for two reasons. First, they assert that the motion will delay trial, and is therefore untimely under Rule 12(c).²³ Second, they contend that the inclusion of materials outside of the pleadings should convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment, which would be untimely under the Scheduling Order.²⁴

As to Defendants' first argument, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that motions for judgment on the pleadings may be filed "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." "While such motions are typically filed near the inception of the lawsuit and shortly after the pleadings close,"²⁵ motions for judgment on the pleadings "can be filed at any time before trial."²⁶ When such motions are filed after the close of discovery and after the dispositive motions deadline, courts have uniformly held that where the matter has not yet been "scheduled . . . for trial . . . [a motion for judgment on the pleadings] [ha]s undoubtedly" been filed early enough not to delay trial.²⁷ Because trial has not yet been scheduled in this matter, the Court concludes that Thomas' motion was filed "early enough not to delay trial"²⁸ and, accordingly, the motion is timely.

As to Defendants' assertion that the inclusion of materials beyond the pleadings converts Thomas' motion to a motion for summary judgment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, if in a motion for judgment on the pleadings "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, themotion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."²⁹ As this language implies, where matters beyond the pleadings are included in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court has complete discretion to exclude them."³⁰

Here, as Thomas concedes, the declaration that he has attached to his motion for judgment on the pleadings "has no relevance to any of the" dispositive issues in his motion.³¹ Because the declaration is wholly irrelevant to the pending motion, the Court will exclude that declaration and its accompanying attachments. This motion therefore remains a motion for judgment on the pleadings and is not untimely.

B. Whether Thomas' Claims are Established by the Admissions

Second, Defendants argue that Thomas' motion fails on its merits; the Court agrees, as any admissions are insufficient to warrant judgment on the pleadings. As to four of Thomas' claims, he faces an insurmountable hurdle in attempting to obtain judgment on the pleadings: the existence of burden-shifting frameworks that permit Defendants to argue that, even if they infringed upon Thomas' constitutional rights, that infringement was justified by the penological setting in which the infringements occurred. These burden-shifting frameworks are "exceedingly fact-intensive,"³² which renders Thomas' task of obtaining judgment on the pleadings difficult underany circumstances.³³ Judgment on the pleadings is also not warranted for Thomas' other two claims because any admissions do not satisfy all elements of those claims.

i. Freedom of Privacy, Speech, and Association Claims

With regard to Thomas' freedom of speech and association claims, a prison rule that "impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."³⁴ The burden rests with Defendants to put forward a "legitimate governmental interest alleged to justify the regulation . . . and demonstrate that [Defendants] could rationally have seen a connection between the policy and that interest."³⁵ However, "[i]f such a rational relationship is found to exist," the burden would then shift to Thomas to show that Defendants' actions or rules were unreasonable.³⁶

At the summary judgment stage, Defendants asserted that their actions were rationally related to their interest in the safety and security of SCI Huntingdon. It isbeyond cavil that prisons have "a 'substantial interest' in institutional security."³⁷ Despite this substantial interest, the Court denied summary judgment because Defendants failed to proffer evidence in their summary judgment motion that connected their actions with that legitimate penological interest.³⁸

Nevertheless, Thomas asserts that Defendants'...