Thomas v. Mason

1

ADRIAN THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. ADAM R. MASON, RONALD FOUNTAIN, TIM COLANERI, and MICHAEL SIKIRICA, Defendants.

No. 1:17-CV-626 (DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

March 30, 2023

OFFICE OF BRETT H. KLEIN, PLLC BRETT H. KLEIN, ESQ. Attorney for Plaintiff

PATTISON, SAMPSON, GINSBERG, & GRIFFIN RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, ESQ. JOSEPH T. PERKINS, ESQ. Attorney for City of Troy Defendants

BAILEY, JOHNSON, & PECK, P.C. CRYSTAL R. PECK, ESQ. JOHN W. BAILEY, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Sikirica

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

DANIEL J. STEWART United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents troubling claims arising from a tragic death. The Complaint in this action was filed on June 12, 2017. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading. Dkt. No. 31, Am. Compl. Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint which the District Court granted in part and denied in part. Dkt. No. 61. Following that motion practice, the following claims remain:

1) a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants;

2) a denial of the right to a fair trial claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants;^[1] and

3) a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants.^[2]

Presently pending are Motions for Summary Judgment on behalf of Defendants Colaneri, Fountain, and Mason (“City Defendants”), Dkt. No. 142, and Defendant Sikirica. Dkt. No. 143. Plaintiff opposes the Motions. Dkt. Nos. 152-158. Defendants filed replies. Dkt. Nos. 163-164. The Court held oral argument on these Motions on December 5, 2022. Text Minute Entry for Dec. 5, 2022. Following those arguments, Plaintiff and the City Defendants filed supplemental letter briefs. Dkt. Nos. 168 & 171. For the reasons that follow, the Motions for Summary Judgment are granted.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2008, between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m., Plaintiff's infant son “M.T.” was found unresponsive in his crib. Dkt. No. 142-6 at p. 3; Dkt. No. 156-4 at p. 5. Plaintiff dialed 911 and emergency services personnel responded to his residence in Troy, New York. Dkt. No. 156-4 at p. 5; Dkt. No. 156-18. M.T. was transported by ambulance to Samaritan Hospital in Troy where he underwent emergency evaluation. Dkt. No. 1569. As a result of M.T.'s critical condition he was transferred to Albany Medical Center. Id. at pp. 3-4. Upon arrival at Albany Medical Center, M.T. was initially treated by Dr. Walter Edge. Dkt. No. 142-9. At some point on September 21, staff at Albany Medical Center, concerned that the child had been the victim of abuse, contacted Child Protective Services (“CPS”). Id. Troy Police were eventually contacted and Defendants Fountain and Mason went to Albany Medical Center at around 9:00 p.m. Dkt. No. 142-7 at ¶ 11.

At the hospital, police spoke with Dr. Edge and Wilhelmina Hicks, M.T.'s mother. At one point during discussions with police, Dr. Edge reported that M.T.'s injuries were the result of “high impact,” either from being shaken or having his head hit against a hard object. Dkt. No. 156-21. Detectives Mason and Fountain eventually went to Plaintiff's residence and asked Plaintiff to come to the police station for questioning. Dkt. No. 1422 at ¶ 21. Mr. Thomas went with Defendants and was interviewed for approximately two hours. Id. at ¶ 24.^[3] During that interview, Plaintiff expressed suicidal thoughts which led police to bring him to Samaritan Hospital where he remained hospitalized for psychiatric evaluation for the next fifteen hours. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28; Dkt. No. 142-5. Upon Plaintiff's release, he agreed to return to the police station for further questioning. Dkt. No. 142-7 at ¶ 34. That questioning, lasting over seven hours, concluded with Plaintiff signing a statement implicating himself in injuring M.T. Id. at ¶¶ 36 & 41. On September 23, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the attempted murder of M.T. Dkt. No. 142-7 at ¶¶ 45-46. Later that day, M.T. was pronounced dead. Dkt. No. 156-27.

On September 25, 2008, Dr. Sikirica performed an autopsy on M.T. Dkt. No. 14335 at ¶ 33. He concluded that the cause of M.T.'s death was homicide resulting from blunt force trauma. Dkt. Nos. 156-27 & 156-28.

On September 26, 2008, Plaintiff was indicted for murder in the second degree related to M.T.'s death. Prior to trial, Plaintiff's criminal defense counsel sought to suppress Plaintiff's statements made to Troy police investigators during the second interview on the ground that they were not voluntarily given. The trial court judge denied the motion. Dkt. No. 163-3 at pp. 6-17. Plaintiff then proceeded to trial. As relevant to the pending Motions, the trial involved extensive, and often conflicting, medical testimony between doctors called by the prosecution and defense regarding M.T.'s cause of death. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 156-3, 156-9. 156-25, 156-26, 156-34, & 156-35. At the conclusion of the trial, Plaintiff was convicted.

On appeal, Plaintiff's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division. People v. Thomas, 93 A.D.3d 1019 (3d Dep't 2012). That court concluded, as part of its decision, that Plaintiff's incriminating statements to police “were voluntary and admissible.” Id. at 1028.

Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which was granted. 19 N.Y.3d 1105 (2012). The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the conviction, finding that Plaintiff's confession had been coerced. 22 N.Y.3d 629 (2014). Plaintiff was retried and acquitted.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). “[T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment^[4]

1. Effect of the New York Court of Appeals Ruling

In opposing the City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff first argues that this Court must give “preclusive effect” to the Court of Appeals' finding that Plaintiff's confession was involuntary. Dkt. No. 152 at pp. 12-13. This Court is not obligated to do so for several reasons.

First, the very nature of the claim here makes affording the state court's finding preclusive effect inappropriate. While federal courts “normally give great deference to the factual findings of the state court. . . . the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent federal determination.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

Second in a section 1983 action, the Court must give a state court judgment the same effect it would be given under New York law. Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 794 (2d Cir. 1996). “Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘bars a party from relitigating in a subsequent proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior proceeding and decided against that party where the party to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.'” Id. (quoting Weiss v. Manfredi, 83 N.Y.2d 974, 976 (1994)). Here, Plaintiff seeks to preclude the individual Defendants from relitigating the question whether Plaintiff's confession was voluntary. Those Defendants were not parties to Plaintiff's criminal trial and thus had no opportunity to litigate the voluntariness of Plaintiff's conviction in state court. McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 439 Fed.Appx. 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2011); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2007). Owens v. Treder, 873 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1989), on which Plaintiff relies, is not to the contrary. In Owens, the issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could relitigate an issue decided during his criminal trial. 873 F.2d at 606. The Second Circuit held only that the requirements for applying collateral estoppel had not been met. Id. at 611-12. The same is...