Thomas v. Rehma

1

JEWELL THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. NFN REHMA, et al. Defendants.

No. 3:19-CV-2903-G (BH)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

October 28, 2022

REFERRED TO U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE ^[1]

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

FINDINGS CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's case should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.

I. BACKGROUND

Jewell Thomas (Plaintiff), a state prisoner^[2], sues Dallas County and Parkland Hospital, as well as Dallas County Sheriff Marian Brown (Sheriff), Dr. Zia Rehman (Doctor), Nurse Practitioner Miroslawa Giovi (Nurse), and Dr. Frederick P. Cerise, the president and chief executive officer of Parkland Hospital (President/CEO), in their official capacities only, under 42 § U.S.C. 1983. (docs. 3, 9.)^[3] He generally claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by: (1) not providing him with a bottom bunk permit, causing chronic pain and suffering; (2) not providing him with a bottom floor permit, causing chronic pain and suffering; (3) not providing him with physicial therapy treatment, causing chronic pain and suffering; (4) not providing him with a pain management plan, causing chronic pain and suffering; (5) not providing him with adequate medical care to treat his chronic pain, causing a lack of sleep; (6) not providing him with adequate medical care to treat his psychiatric and psychological pain, causing a lack of sleep; (7) not treating his chronic pain syndrome, causing ongoing pain and suffering; (8) not treating his chronic pain, causing a lack of exercise ability; (9) not providing him with psychological counseling or psychological therapy, causing chronic pain and suffering; (10) not providing him with a proper discharge plan and failing to provide him with a supply of antipsychotic medication before his release from custody; (11) not providing him with prescribed medications used to reduce chronic pain, causing ongoing pain and suffering; and (12) administering antipsychotic medication, leading to an incomplete branch block. (doc. 3 at 5.)

More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Doctor “failed to properly address complaints of chronic pain,” leading to other pain relatated symptoms, and that Nurse failed to address his “complaints of psychotic features in that she failed to provide the proper treatment,” leading to other “mental health related symptoms.” (doc. 9 at 1-2.) He admits that he received “some” unspecified treatment, but he complains about the frequency, pain medication and mental health care were inadequate. (Id. at 5.) Sheriff and Dallas County allegedly violated his rights by adopting an unconstitutional policy that excluded his unspecified medical condition from a list of medical conditions qualifying prisoners for bottom bunk and bottom floor permits, resulting in his “chronic pain and suffering”, and that Parkland Hospital and President/CEO violated his rights through unspecified policies. (Id. at 4, 6.) He seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 6.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).^[4] Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or of any part of it, if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The analysis for determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same one employed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Fierro v. Knight Transp., No. EP-12-CV-218-DCG, 2012 EL 4321304, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2011), slip copy, (citing Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)) (applying the same standard of review applicable to dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) for screening dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Holt v. Imam, NO. C-07-406, 2008 WL 1782351, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2008) (citing Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998)) (noting that § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and Rule 12(b)(6) all employ the same language-“failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). “[P]leadings” for purposes of a motion to dismiss include attachments to the complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196.

“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. When plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. SECTION 1983

Plaintiff's claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute “provides for a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

To succeed on a claim for damages for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there has been “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” by prison officials or other state actors. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Only deliberate indifference, “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain...or acts repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” constitutes conduct proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id. A prison official is liable for “deliberate indifference” “only if he knows that the inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and [he] disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

There are two requirements an inmate must satisfy to establish a constitutional violation based on inadequate medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious'; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. at 834 (quotation omitted). This objective component requires deprivation of a sufficiently serious medical need “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). For the second component, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A prison official cannot be held liable “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. If a court finds that either component is not met, it need not address the other component. Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).

“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1999)) (further citations omitted). “Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.'” Domino v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107). To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).^[5]

A...