Thompson v. Warren

TERENCE THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. CHARLIE WARREN, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 11-7164 (RMB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

July 31, 2014

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

BUMB, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court upon Terence Thompson's § 2254 Petition (the "Petition"), Respondents' answer and Petitioner's traverse. For the reasons detailed below, the Petition will be denied as to all Petitioner's claims raised in the Petition, as well as those raised in Petitioner's post-pleading motions. This Court's decision as to Petitioner's traversed claim (challenging his counsel's performance on the grounds that Petitioner was unaware of his maximum sentencing exposure at the time he rejected the prosecutor's plea offer) will be reserved, and the parties will be directed to file supplemental briefs as to that claim. The Court's decision as to whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted, and whether a limited appointment of counsel to Petitioner is required for thepurposes of such hearing, will also be reserved, subject to resolution upon the parties' supplemental briefing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 1996, Michael Lamb ("Lamb"), a drug dealer operating in Camden, tried to purchase cocaine from another drug dealer, Juan Collado ("Collado"). Collado was staying at the apartment of Richard Almanzar ("Almanzar"), who assisted Collado with drug sales. Collado and Almanzar made acquaintances with another drug dealer, Ronnie Leary ("Leary"), and with Petitioner.¹ In the early evening hours of July 31, 1996, when Collado was in Leary's company, Lamb paged Collado inquiring about purchasing one and one-half kilos of cocaine. Leary, being told of the page: (a) opined that Lamb would purchase drugs from Collado once or twice and then either rob or kill Collado; and (b) offered to rob Lamb "preemptively," i.e., instead of selling him cocaine. Collado agreed and set up a meeting with Lamb for later that night.

The plan was for Collado and Almanzar to meet Lamb, check the money and lead Lamb to the bushes, where Leary and Petitioner would rob him. However, when Collado and Almanzar actually ledLamb to where Leary and Petitioner were hiding, Lamb saw Petitioner coming at him, pulled out his gun and shot Petitioner in the abdomen. When Petitioner began wrestling with Lamb, Leary shot Lamb. Although Lamb was already on the ground, Petitioner and Leary continued shooting Lamb in plain view of Collado and Almanzar, who heard Lamb screaming. Collado then grabbed Lamb's money, and he and Almanzar ran to their Buick, while Leary and Petitioner got into Leary's minivan, and both cars drove to an area outside the apartment complex where Almanzar lived.²

Since Petitioner was shot, Leary took him to a hospital, telling Collado and Almanzar that he would meet with them later to divide the money.³ Collado and Almanzar were soon questioned by police officers who had received reports of gunfire. The officers also recovered casings at the scene of the crime, and bullets were recovered from Lamb's body during his autopsy, which revealed thirteen lethal wounds. Collado and Almanzar were arrested for their involvement in the homicide, and Leary was arrested a week later, after admitting his involvement.

Three months after the murder, an investigator visited Petitioner at the hospital in response to Petitioner's callstating that he wished to talk about Lamb's murder.⁴ During that visit, Petitioner told the investigator a story where Leary was purchasing cocaine from Lamb when "the commotion jumped off," and Petitioner, after getting accidentally shot by Lamb, shot Lamb back since it was Petitioner's "natural reaction."

Two days later, after Petitioner was released from the hospital and settled at his girlfriend's apartment, he called and asked for another meeting with the investigator. During that second encounter, he confessed and provided a detailed account of the plan to rob Lamb, the robbery itself and Lamb's murder. Petitioner also admitted that the story he told during the investigator's visit at the hospital was false. His second account corresponded to those provided by Collado and Almanzar.⁵

Three years passed by. By that time, having been charged with Lamb's murder, armed robbery, felony-murder, conspiracy to commit robbery and three weapon-related offenses, Petitioner moved for suppression of his second confession to theinvestigator. After an eleven-day hearing, the trial court held that the confession was admissible.⁶

More than six months later, in January 2000, trial commenced against Petitioner and Leary. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the murder charge but found him guilty of the remaining offenses. In light of his criminal history, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction but remanded for resentencing.⁷ The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification.

Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which was denied by the Law Division. That denial was affirmed by theAppellate Division, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.

The Petition at bar followed, and Petitioner was notified of his Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), rights.⁸

II. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

In addition to the claims raised in his Supplemental Ground, see this Opinion, n.8, Petitioner asserted six original Grounds:

Ground I: . . . Petitioner's physical condition precluded his competency to stand trial . . . .

Ground II: Petitioner's physical condition . . . render[ed] him incompetent to give [his confession to the investigator during the second visit].

Ground III: Petitioner was . . . subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's failure to call . . . Leary as [witness]. . . .

Ground IV: Petitioner was . . . subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's failure to object to . . . [C]ollado and [A]lmanzar testifying [while] wearing handcuffs and prison garbs . . . .

Ground V: Petitioner was . . . subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's failure to request adequate jury instructions on accomplice liability . . . .

Ground Six: Petitioner was . . . subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense . . . .

See Docket Entry No. 1.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of federal habeas review is long-established, and it sets forth a narrowly-tailored test. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ("As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ('AEDPA'), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (April 24, 1996)], 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner"). Section 2254 permits a federal court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is held in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The AEDPA further limits a federal court's authority to grant habeas relief by providing that, when a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits, adistrict court "has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state court's] decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.'" Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Thus, the starting point of federal habeas review is to determine the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court.⁹ See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions [entered by] the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); accord Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if: (a) the state court outright"contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court] cases"; or (b) the state court 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "'unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Notably, under § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). Correspondingly, the standard posed by federal habeas review "is . . . difficult to meet, [since it is a] highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, [and that standard] demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Grounds present two groups of challenges. One group (consisting of Petitioner's Grounds One and Two and the elaborations provided in Petitioner's Supplemental Ground) builds on Petitioner's assertion of his almost four-year-long mentalincompetence which, he claims, he experienced as a result of: (a) physical pain he constantly suffered during that entire period; and (b) effects of pain-reducing medications he was consuming during that period. The other group of challenges consists of Petitioner's attacks on the performance of his trial c...