Thomson v. Ross

SAVITRIE THOMSON, Plaintiff, v. WILBER ROSS, SECRETARY U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. SAG-19-1582

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

June 23, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER concerns a suit by Savitrie Thomson ("Plaintiff") against her employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal law. United States Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (collectively, "Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment. ECF 13. In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint, ECF 22, which Defendants have opposed, ECF 26. Plaintiff filed a Reply to the opposition, ECF 32, and also filed a separate opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF 23. The Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Amend the Complaint are now ripe for adjudication, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons explained below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment, ECF 13, will be DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend will be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff started working for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") as a Management Analyst in 2009. ECF 22-2 ¶ 13.¹ As a GS-14 Management Analyst,she was responsible for overseeing three $9.9 million dollar contracts. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff suffers from dysfunctions/vertebral subluxation in her spine, a disability that impairs her ability to sit, bend, walk, and perform other major life activities. Id. ¶ 17-19. Because of this spinal issue, Plaintiff requested and was approved for telework. She submitted the requested accommodation on September 14, 2016, id. ¶ 37, and it was granted shortly thereafter, id. ¶ 40. Although Plaintiff teleworked pursuant to the accommodation for multiple months, the telework agreement was rescinded on April 12, 2017. Id. ¶ 20.

In addition to revoking Plaintiff's teleworking privileges, Plaintiff's supervisors took a number of disciplinary actions against her that were, in Plaintiff's view, unjustified. For example, on April 14, 2017, Defendants charged Plaintiff with eight hours of "Absent without Leave" or "AWOL." Id. ¶ 22. Although Defendants contend that Plaintiff had deficient medical documentation, in actuality, Plaintiff's 12-year-old daughter was ill, which necessitated her absence from work. Id. ¶ 22. As a second example, in May, 2017, Plaintiff received an unwarranted letter of reprimand. Id. ¶ 24. The letter erroneously accused Plaintiff of misusing her leave on April 13 and April 14, and Defendants leveraged this letter to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment. Id.

Several months later, in August, 2017, Defendants took Plaintiff off of a flexible work schedule and, moreover, charged her with AWOL once again. Id. ¶ 25-26. In December, 2017, Plaintiff was given an "ineligible performance rating," based on Plaintiff's purported failure to complete an assignment. Id. ¶ 27. However, the assignment, i.e., the drafting of a memorandum, could not be completed because Plaintiff was never given any guidance on the specific task. See id.

In March, 2018, Plaintiff's training requests were denied, which caused her to lose certain certifications. See id. ¶ 29. Defendants' hostility, in Plaintiff's view, persisted throughout 2018. For example, Defendants again charged Plaintiff with AWOL in March, 2018, and denied her request to telework the following month. Id. ¶ 30, 35. With regard to performance evaluations, Plaintiff was not given a mid-year performance plan for 2018, nor was she provided with a mid-year review. Id. ¶ 31, 32.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have consistently failed in their obligation to accommodate her disability. Namely, Defendants' stated reasons for rescinding the telework agreement are false, and any perceived attendance issues were insufficient to warrant removal of the reasonable accommodation. See id. ¶ 45, 49. Plaintiff filed two administrative complaints with the EEO — one on June 14, 2017, and a second on April 16, 2018 — alleging discrimination and retaliation. See id. ¶ 6, 8. Plaintiff contends that the discrimination, primarily the failure to accommodate her disability, continued throughout the administrative process and persists to today. Id. ¶ 65.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . ."); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). However, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam).

Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" and must "draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts]in favor of the plaintiff." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. MTA, 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when matters outside the pleadings are submitted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985). However, before a court may convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, the opposing party must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. See id.

III. ANALYSIS

In the proposed amended Complaint, Plaintiff has reduced her claims to three counts: discrimination based on disability (Count I), retaliation (Count II), and failure to accommodate a disability (Count III). ECF 22-2. Defendants contend that the proposed amendments have not cured the infirmities in the original Complaint, and, as a result, they continue to move for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See generally ECF 26. As an initial matter, the Courtdeclines to convert this Motion into one for summary judgment. Plaintiff supplied a Rule 56(d) affidavit, in which counsel cogently identified the information that Plaintiff will seek if permitted to engage in discovery. See ECF 22-8. For instance, to establish that Plaintiff was unfairly disciplined because of her disability, she will need access to the time and attendance records for comparable employees, i.e., those with similar absences and other employment issues during the same period. See id. at 1-2. More broadly, Plaintiff will seek access to all communications between herself and others at the agency, including her supervisors, regarding her requests for accommodation. Id. at 3. Defendants have not shown that obtaining this information would be futile with respect to Plaintiff's efforts to substantiate her claims. Accordingly, the Court will address each Count below, while accepting the...