Thornhill Motor Car, Inc. v. Thompson

874 S.E.2d 693

THORNHILL MOTOR CAR, INC. d/b/a Thornhill Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, Petitioners,

v.The Honorable Miki THOMPSON, Judge of the 30th Judicial Circuit, and Moore Chrysler, Inc., Respondents.

No. 21-0899

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 5, 2022

Filed: April 26, 2022

Johnnie E. Brown, Esq., Donovan M. Powell, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC, Counsel for Petitioner

Charles R. Bailey, Esq., John P. Fuller, Esq., Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, Counsel for Respondent

WOOTON, Justice:

The petitioner, Thornhill Motor Care, Inc., d/b/a Thornhill Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram ("Thornhill"), seeks relief from the June 29, 2021, order prohibiting the Circuit Court of Mingo County from enforcing its order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss based on improper venue. Thornhill asserts that the proper venue for a lawsuit brought against it by another new motor vehicle dealer, the respondent, Moore Chrysler, Inc. ("Moore"), is in Logan County pursuant to the general venue statute, West Virginia Code § 56-1-1 (2020). The circuit court found that the proper venue for the action was in Mingo County, basing its ruling upon a specific venue statute, West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-12(3) (2021), which governs declaratory judgment actions by new motor vehicle dealers against manufacturers or distributors.

After careful review of the parties’ arguments, the record before us, and the applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court committed a clear legal error in applying the specific venue statute, § 17A-6A-12(3), rather than the general venue statute, § 56-1-1. We therefore grant the writ of prohibition and remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an order transferring this action to the Circuit Court of Logan County.¹

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On February 18, 2021, Moore filed a lawsuit against Thornhill in Mingo County, West Virginia, which included a verified complaint asserting various causes of action,² a motion for both temporary and permanent injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment action – all predicated upon violations of West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1 to - 18 (2021), entitled "Motor Vehicle Dealers, Distributors, Wholesalers and Manufacturers."³ Specifically, Moore alleged that it operates its "established place of business" in Williamson, Mingo County, West Virginia, where it sells Fiat Chrysler ("Fiat") automobiles, "including vehicles market[ed] under the brands Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram [(‘CDJR’][.]" Moore further alleged that Thornhill's "principal office" is located on Dingess Street in Logan, Logan County, West Virginia, along with three other properties which, Moore alleged, Thornhill uses, or has used, to sell Fiat automobiles.

According to Moore's allegations, "[i]n approximately 2018, representatives of Fiat ... approached Moore ... and requested that Moore ... waive its rights under West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-3 and agree to Fiat ... permitting another CDJR dealership being placed in the ‘relevant market area’ as defined by West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-3(14)."⁴ The CDJR dealership was to be located at Fountain Place Mall in Logan, West Virginia, which Moore alleged was located within its "relevant market area." Moore alleged it refused to waive its right and refused to allow a " ‘new’ CDJR dealership within the statutory ‘relevant market area.’ " Thereafter, Moore avers that Fiat informed it that "Thornhill CDJR would be given a dealership...."

Moore also alleged that the notice provision of section 17A-6A-12(2)⁵ was violated when Fiat gave the Thornhill CDJR dealership "permission to relocate mobile home sales office to the Fountain Place Mall" without giving Moore statutory notice. Moore further averred that Thornhill was running its business out of a "mobile home" located on Stratton Street in Logan, "with the ultimate goal to call the rues [sic] dealership location an ‘established business’ for the express purpose of then utilizing" the provisions of section 17A-6A-12 "to tow the mobile home sales office to Fountain Place Mall and begin selling CDJR vehicles within the statutorily protected ‘relevant market area’ " of Moore. Moore averred that Thornhill's office was not an "established place of business" as defined in West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-3(4).⁶

On March 18, 2021, Thornhill moved to dismiss Moore's complaint pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) on the basis of improper venue. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion by an order entered on June 29, 2021.⁷ The court determined that the specific venue statute, § 17A-6A-12(3), took precedence over the general statute, § 56-1-1. Thornhill pursued extraordinary relief by filing a writ of prohibition with this Court.⁸

II. Standard of Review

In deciding whether to grant relief in prohibition, we are mindful that "[a]s an extraordinary remedy, this Court reserves the granting of such relief to ‘really extraordinary causes.’ " State ex rel. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Nibert , 237 W. Va. 14, 19, 784 S.E.2d 713, 718 (2016) (quoting, in part, State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan , 198 W. Va. 339, 345, 480 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). We have explained that "[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code § 53-1-1" Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver , 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).

In the context of venue, we recognized in State ex rel. Thornhill Group, Inc. v. King , 233 W. Va. 564, 759 S.E.2d 795 (2014) :

That the issue of venue may properly be addressed through a writ of prohibition is well-settled. In State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson , 195 W.Va. 121, 464 S.E.2d 763 (1995), we explained our preference for "resolving this issue [venue] in an original action" given the "inadequacy of the relief permitted by appeal." Id. at 124, 464 S.E.2d at 766 ; accord State ex rel. Huffman v. Stephens , 206 W.Va. 501, 503, 526 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1999) (recognizing that concerns regarding litigants being placed at unwarranted disadvantage and inadequate appellate relief compel exercise of original jurisdiction in venue matters). In deciding whether to grant a writ of prohibition in cases where the lower court is acting within its jurisdiction but alleged to have exceeded its authority, we rely upon those now axiomatic factors set forth in syllabus point four of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger , 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).

Thornhill Group , 233 W. Va. at 567, 759 S.E.2d at 798.

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

Hoover , 199 W. Va. at 14-15, 483 S.E.2d at 14-15, Syl. Pt. 4. We now turn to whether a writ of prohibition should issue in this case.

III. Discussion

The sole issue is which statute controls venue for Moore's lawsuit – the general venue statute or the specific venue statute. Thornhill argues that the general venue statute, W. Va. Code § 56-1-1, is controlling and that the proper venue for this case is in Logan County where Thornhill's principal office is located, its chief officer, Wally Thornhill, resides, and the allegations giving rise to this action arose. See id. § 56-1-1(a)(1)-(2) ("(a) Any civil action or other proceeding, except where it is otherwise specially provided, may hereafter be brought in the circuit court of any county: (1) Wherein any of the defendants may reside or the cause of action of arose ...; (2) If a corporation or other corporate entity is a defendant, wherein its principle office is or wherein its ... president or other chief officer resides ...."). Conversely, Moore argues that the specific venue statute set forth in West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-12(3) provides for its action to be pursued in "the circuit court for the county in which the new motor vehicle dealer is located," see id. , and that the circuit court correctly found that Mingo County was the proper venue. We agree with Thornhill that the general venue statute controls. See § 56-1-1.

The specific venue statute relied upon by Moore is inapplicable to this case for two reasons. See id. First, under a clear reading of the statutory provision, the venue is inextricably linked to the notice requirements of the statute. In this regard, West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-12(2) - (3), provide, in relevant part:

(2) Before a manufacturer⁹ or distributor¹⁰ enters into a dealer agreement establishing or relocating a new motor vehicle dealer¹¹ within a relevant market area where the same line-make is represented, the manufacturer or distributor shall give written notice to each new motor vehicle dealer of the same line-make in the relevant market area of its intention to establish an additional dealer or to relocate an existing dealer within that relevant market area.

(3) Within sixty days after

...