Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.

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REGINA M. THORNTON, Plaintiff, v. IPSEN BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 23-11171-JCB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

October 26, 2023

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [Docket No. 6]

JENNIFER C. BOAL U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this action, plaintiff Regina M. Thornton has brought claims against her former employer Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Ipsen”) in connection with her termination for failure to comply with Ipsen's COVID-19 vaccination policy. Ipsen has moved to dismiss the second amended complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Docket No 6.^[1]For the following reasons, this Court grants the motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2022, Thornton filed her original complaint against Ipsen in Middlesex Superior Court. See Docket No. 17 at 1, 5-11. On February 21, 2023, Thornton filed an amended complaint. Id. at 2, 23-29. On May 2, 2023, Thornton filed a second amended complaint. Id. at 3, 39-45. Ipsen removed the case to this Court on May 25, 2023. Docket No. 1.^[2]

On June 1, 2023, Ipsen filed the instant motion to dismiss. Docket No. 6. On June 28, 2023, Thornton filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 12. Ipsen filed a reply on July 26, 2023. Docket No. 16. This Court heard oral argument on October 24, 2023.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Scope Of The Record

Both parties have relied on documents not attached to the complaint. See Docket No. 71; Docket No. 12 at 5; Docket No. 12-1; Docket No. 23. “In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ‘a court ordinarily may only consider facts alleged in the complaint and exhibits attached thereto, or else convert the motion into one for summary judgment.'” Douglas v. Hirshon, 63 F.4th 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 3536 (1st Cir. 2013)). “Under certain ‘narrow exceptions,' including for ‘documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties,' and ‘official public records' -- ‘some extrinsic documents may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

Ipsen has attached a copy of its COVID-19 vaccination policy to its memorandum of law. Docket No. 7-1. This Court may properly consider this document because Thornton has referred to it in her complaint (SAC at ¶¶ 4, 5), has not disputed its authenticity, and it is central to her claims. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Similarly, this Court may consider the October 26, 2021 letter attached to Thornton's opposition and the November 5, 2021 letter filed after the hearing on this matter. Docket No. 12-1; Docket No. 23. These letters were also sufficiently referred to in her complaint. See SAC at ¶¶ 6-8.

Finally, the parties refer to certain executive orders issued by President Biden. See Docket No. 12 at 5; Docket No. 16 at 3. This Court may take judicial notice of such orders. See, e.g., Michael Cetta, Inc. v. Admiral Indem. Co., 506 F.Supp.3d 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (taking judicial notice of executive orders as public documents or matters of public record).

B. Facts^[3]

Thornton was employed as Associate Director - Patient Safety for Ipsen from April 29, 2019 to November 10, 2021. SAC ¶¶ 3, 9. Ipsen implemented a COVID-19 Vaccination Policy effective September 7, 2021 (the “Vaccination Policy”). Id. at ¶ 4; Docket No. 7-1. Pursuant to the Vaccination Policy, all employees were required to be fully vaccinated for COVID-19 no later than November 1, 2021. Docket No. 7-1 at 2.^[4] Any employee who failed to provide timely proof of vaccination was “subject to termination for Cause.” Id. at 4.

The Vaccination Policy provides a procedure for employees to request religious or medical exemptions to the vaccination requirement. Id. at 3; SAC ¶ 5. Specifically, employees seeking to request an exemption from the vaccination requirement due to a sincerely held religious belief must complete and submit the applicable accommodation request form provided by Ipsen. Docket No. 7-1 at 3, 8. Ipsen reviews all religious exemption requests “on a case-by-case basis, with due care and consideration.” Id. at 8.

On October 26, 2021, Thornton submitted a request for religious exemption from the Vaccination Policy. SAC ¶ 6. She stated, in relevant part, that:

Receiving a vaccine (including the Covid 19 vaccine) goes against my personal, private and sincerely held religious beliefs. Therefore, I am requesting a reasonable accommodation based on my religious convictions. My long standing beliefs are sincerely held and firmly established in my faith, the Holy Bible and my awareness that what God has created is perfect.

Docket No. 12-1. On November 2, 2021, Ipsen denied Thornton's request for a religious exemption and advised Thornton. SAC ¶ 8. Thornton attempted to appeal by written letter, even though Ipsen's policy failed to provide an appeal process. Id. Ipsen terminated Thornton's employment on November 10, 2021, for her failure to comply with the Vaccination Policy. Id. at ¶ 9.

Thornton filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 16, 2021. Id. at ¶ 13. She received a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC on August 30, 2022. Id. She filed her original complaint on November 22, 2022. Docket No. 17 at 1. The second amended complaint contains three counts: (1) violation of Title VII and M.G.L. c. 151B (SAC ¶¶ 22-26); (2) violation of her equal protection and equal treatment rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (SAC ¶¶ 27-32); and (3) violation of her substantive and procedural due process rights pursuant to the U.S. Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. (SAC ¶¶ 33-39).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard Of Review

A complaint must contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Abdisamad, 960 F.3d at 59 (quoting Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016)). “If the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” Id. (quoting Barchock v. CVS Health Corp., 886 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2018)).

In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the “court approaches the complaint as follows: it ‘isolate[s] and ignore[s] statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements,' then ‘take[s] the complaint's well-plead (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see[s] if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.'” Sonoiki v. Harvard Univ., 37 F.4th 691, 703 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Zell v. Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2020)). “Plausible, of course, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels us to draw on our judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

B. Thornton Has Failed To State A Plausible Claim Of Religious Discrimination Under Title VII Or Chapter 151B

Thornton maintains that Ipsen's failure to grant her a religious exemption from the Vaccination Policy constitutes religious discrimination under Title VII and Chapter 151B. SAC ¶¶ 22-26. Religious accommodation claims are subject to the same analytical framework under both Title VII and Massachusetts law. See Mekonnen v. OTG Mgmt., LLC, 394 F.Supp.3d 134, 157 (D. Mass. 2019). The employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that “the employer required the employee to violate a required religious practice,” and “that he or she gave the employer the required notice of the religious obligations.” Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 452 Mass. 674, 676 (2008). The plaintiff must show that “a bona fide religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for the adverse employment action.” Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004)).

“The requirement that the employee have a ‘bona fide religious belief' is an essential element of a religious accommodation claim. Title VII does not mandate an employer or labor organization to accommodate what amounts to a ‘purely personal preference.'” E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 5556 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1997)). A bona fide religious belief is one that is both “religious” and “sincerely held.” Id. Title VII's definition of religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (“[R]eligious practices . . . include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”). A belief is religious if it “addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,” are “comprehensive in nature,” consisting of “a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching,” and are accompanied by “certain formal and external signs.” Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 2017).

In order to plausibly plead a claim of religious discrimination based on a vaccination policy, therefore, “[t]he complaint must allege...