Thorpe v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication

Thomas A. Thorpe, Appellant v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication

No. 951 C.D. 2013

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted: November 8, 2013

January 23, 2014

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON

Thomas Thorpe (Thorpe) representing himself, seeks review of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying his appeal from an order of the City of Philadelphia's Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA) finding him liable for 12 parking tickets. Thorpe assigns various errors and raises constitutional issues related to the issuance of the tickets, to the BAA's appeal hearing process and to the trial court's denial of his discovery requests. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background

From December 2010 to September 2011, Thorpe received 12 parking tickets in the City of Philadelphia (City). Thorpe's parking violations included five tickets for parking over a two-hour time limit (fines: four at $36 each and one for $26), three tickets for expired meters (fines: $36 each), one ticket for parking in a handicap space (fine: $301), two tickets for double parking (fines: $76 and $51) and one ticket for blocking a highway (fine: $76). In December 2011, Thorpe challenged these tickets before a BAA hearing examiner, who found him liable for all the citations.¹ Thorpe's fines and penalties totaled $1,067.00. See Certified Record (C.R.) at Item #2 (BAA Documents).

Thorpe appealed. At the appeal hearing, Thorpe did not contest that he committed 11 of the 12 violations, but offered various justifications for his conduct. He testified he could not move his vehicle at times because of illness. However, Thorpe did not present any medical evidence in support of his claims of incapacity. Thorpe admitted he double parked and blocked a roadway to unload landscaping materials from his vehicle to his residence. Thorpe also believed he could temporarily park in a handicapped spot with his flashers on. The BAA did not accept Thorpe's reasons for the parking violations, including his claims of inability to move his vehicle due to illness, as valid defenses justifying dismissal of the charged violations. See BAA Regulations §5.02(e)(x). Following the appeal hearing, the BAA hearing examiner found Thorpe liable for all 12 tickets.

Representing himself, Thorpe appealed to the trial court and raised several constitutional issues. On review, the trial court rejected Thorpe's constitutional arguments and denied his appeal. Thorpe appeals.²

II. Discussion

A. Local Agency Proceeding

In Blount v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 600 Pa. 277, 965 A.2d 226 (2009), our Supreme Court recognized the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) is a hybrid regulatory agency with multiple functions at the local and statewide level. The PPA's parking regulations are legislatively enacted by the City. See Chapter 12-2800 of the Philadelphia Code (City Code). The BAA functions as the sole local agency responsible for adjudicating the validity of parking tickets issued in the City.

In reviewing a local agency decision, a reviewing court must accept the credibility determinations of the agency which heard the testimony, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and served as fact-finder. In re Nevling, 907 A.2d 672 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); In re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In addition, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. If supported by substantial evidence, the local agency's findings are binding on appeal. Id. With these principles in mind, we review Thorpe's appeal.

B. Illness or Incapacity

In his first issue, Thorpe argues the trial court³ erred and abused its discretion by rejecting his contention that his bouts of illness or injury precluded him from moving his car and therefore warranted dismissal of those parking tickets. Given his illnesses, Thorpe asserts, his parking in a legal space posed no inconvenience to anyone; thus, the posted time limit should have been considered a mere formality. Thorpe further asserts that fining someone when they are sick and physically unable to move amounts to taking advantage of them or kicking them while they are down. "Kicking, beating, torturing a person when they have been 'knocked down' is the hallmark of slavery, racism, anti-Semitism, every prejudice against ethnicity and religion, and certainly of fascism and totalitarianism; to practice or espouse such degradation, especially in minor incidents ... is an un-American activity." Appellant's Br. at 11-12.

We reject Thorpe's assertion that his illnesses provided a valid defense to his parking violations. First and foremost, Thorpe failed to present any medical evidence corroborating his claims of incapacity. When asked by the trial court if he could obtain a doctor's note establishing his incapacity at the time of his parking violations, Thorpe replied, "I can't afford to go to the doctor, I am too poor." See Supplemental Record, Trial Ct. Hr'g, 5/9/13, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 16. As such, Thorpe's illness claims rested solely on his own testimony.The BAA weighed his testimony but ultimately deemed it insufficient to warrant dismissal of any of the tickets.

What is more, in Fullman v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 400 C.D. 2013, filed September 25, 2013), 2013 WL 5433750 (unreported), an unreported but persuasive opinion, we upheld a decision rejecting a motorist's assertion that his medical condition warranted the dismissal of his parking citation. In Fullman, the motorist, who possessed a handicapped parking placard, was issued a ticket for parking his vehicle in a no stopping zone after being denied access to a marked handicapped spot by a police cruiser parked in it. The motorist explained that he needed to use the restroom due to his medical condition. He argued the trial court erred or abused its discretion by not considering his medical condition, disability and health sustaining medications. Ultimately, we affirmed the trial court's reasoning that the motorist's inability to park in a handicapped spot at a specific time did not provide him with an unlimited right to park illegally due to his medical condition. Id.

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Geigley, 650 A.2d 1224 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), we rejected a handicapped motorist's argument that the borough's failure to provide him with a reserved spot in front of his residence excused his violation of parking more than three hours in a spot with a two-hour time limit. The motorist argued Section 3354(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3354(d)(2), required the borough to erect a sign designated a reserved parking spot for him. Noting the statute provided only that the borough "may" erect such a sign, we reasoned that the statute did not compel the Borough to do so.

We also noted in Geigley that the Vehicle Code permits a handicapped person to park for a period of 60 minutes in excess of the legal parking period permitted by local ordinances. See 75 Pa. C.S. §3354(d)(1). However, the motorist's two violations each exceeded the grace period. As such, the grace provision was not exculpatory.

We find our decisions in Fullman and Geigley instructive here. Thorpe's purported illnesses did not entitle him to either park in a metered spot indefinitely without paying, or to park in a time-limited parking space indefinitely until he felt better. Id. Therefore, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the BAA's rejection of Thorpe's claims that his illnesses justified dismissal of several of his parking violations.

Nonetheless, Thorpe contends fining him for not moving his car when he was sick violates the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Thorpe's claim lacks merit. The Ninth Amendment is not a source of substantive rights. See, e.g., Perry v. Lackawanna Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 345 Fed. Appx. 723 (3d Cir. 2009) (Ninth Amendment does not independently provide a source of individual constitutional rights).

Furthermore, we discern no error in the trial court's rejection of Thorpe's absurd argument below that enforcement of parking tickets without regard to the individual's health somehow elevated the City's parking laws to adivine status, in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment of Religion Clause.⁴ In its opinion in support of it order, the trial court determined Thorpe's religious freedoms were not violated when PPA officers ticketed him while in ill health. See Tr. Ct., Slip. Op., 7/15/13, at 5-6.

Thorpe also argues that holding him liable for parking violations when he could not move his car due to illness constitutes an act of official oppression in violation of Section 5301 of the Crimes Code, which provides:

A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing his conduct is illegal, he:

(1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal property rights; or

(2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity.

18 Pa. C.S. §5301. Here, the record lacks any evidence of illegal activity, acts of oppression or constitutional violations by the BAA in finding Thorpe liable for his parking violations. Therefore, Thorpe's reliance on 18 Pa. C.S. §5301 is misplaced.

C. Evidence

In his next three issues, Thorpe essentially contends the BAA hearing examiners abused their discretion by disregarding his testimony and finding him liable for the 12 parking violations. In so doing, Thorpe claims the BAA disregarded...