Timmonds v. AGCO Corp.

MICHAEL TIMMONDS Appellant v. AGCO CORPORATION D/B/A AND OR F/K/A MASSEY FERGUSON, INC., M.M. WEAVER & SONS, INC.,SPORTING VALLEY TURF FARMS, INC., HUMMER SPORTS SURACES, LLC., AND HUMMER TURFGRASS SYSTEMS, INC.

J-A13015-20

No. 2916 EDA 2019

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 12, 2021

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment Dated November 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): No. 151103681

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:

Michael Timmonds appeals from the judgment,¹ entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after a jury returned a verdict in favorof Appellees, AGCO Corporation, d/b/a and/or f/k/a Massey Ferguson, Inc. ("AGCO"), M.M. Weaver & Sons, Inc. ("Weaver"), Sporting Valley Turf Farms, Inc., Hummer Sports Surfaces, LLC, and Hummer Turfgrass Systems, Inc. (collectively, "Turf Defendants"). Upon careful review, we affirm.

The matter before the Court stems from injuries Timmonds sustained in the course of his employment with George E. Ley Co. ("Ley").² Specifically, on March 19, 2015, Timmonds was performing irrigation work at Flying Hills Golf Course, which required him to use a tractor for the displacement and loading of dirt. See Amended Complaint, 4/14/16, at ¶¶ 1-3. Timmonds attempted to start the tractor, manufactured by AGCO (model number MF-451) and owned by Ley. In order to start the tractor, Timmonds positioned himself in the seat and turned the key in the ignition. See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/6/18, at 9. The tractor failed to start. See id. As a result, Timmonds dismounted the tractor in order to use a "rigging method" to start the ignition, which entailed touching a wire to the tractor's solenoid.³ Amended Complaint,supra, at ¶ 6; N.T. Jury Trial, 6/6/18, at 9. When Timmonds did so, the tractor "immediately took off and ran over" him. N.T. Jury Trial, 6/6/18, at 10. As a result, Timmonds suffered injuries to his left foot which required multiple surgeries and for which he continues to require pain medication. See id. at 12-14.

Timmonds filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Following discovery and the disposition of numerous pretrial motions, trial commenced on June 4, 2018. At trial, Timmonds pursued claims of negligence and products liability against AGCO and Weaver, and a negligence claim against the Turf Defendants.⁴ Relevant to this appeal, Timmonds' claimsagainst AGCO were based on AGCO's failure to incorporate an occupant presence control ("OPC")⁵ on the tractor.

Timmonds presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying [Timmonds'] motion for a new trial stemming from the trial court's improper dismissal of [his] claim of negligence against defendant AGCO by means of a directed verdict?

2. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion, thereby entitling [Timmonds] to the remedy of a new trial, in improperly instructing the jury concerning the elements of a product[s] liability claim?

3. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion, thereby entitling [Timmonds] to the remedy of a new trial, in permitting defendants to argue that the negligent actions and inactions of [Ley] were responsible for [Timmonds'] injuries and damages, even though the worker's compensation bar precluded [Timmonds] from recovering in tort against [Ley], and [Ley] was neither a party to this suit at the time of trial nor shown on the jury verdict slip as a potentially liable party?

4. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion, thereby entitling [Timmonds] to the remedy of a new trial, in barring [Timmonds'] counsel from impeaching AGCO's expert witness with the report of another expert that AGCO's expert reviewed and considered in reaching his own expert opinions?

Brief of Appellant, at 4-5.

Timmonds first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on his assertion that the court improperly granted adirected verdict in favor of AGCO on Timmonds' negligence claim. We begin by noting our standard of review:

In reviewing a trial court's decision whether or not to grant judgment in favor of one of the parties, we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard[s] of review when considering the motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV] are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a [directed verdict or JNOV] only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a [directed verdict or JNOV] can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.

Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation omitted). See Berg v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Inc., 44 A.3d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54 A.3d 381, 395 (Pa. Super. 2012) (brackets in original).

Timmonds raised claims against AGCO sounding in both negligence and strict products liability. "[I]n order to maintain a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct; that the defendant breached that duty; that such breachcaused the injury in question; and actual loss or damage." Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008 (Pa. 2003).

Of these four elements, the primary one is whether the defendant owed a duty of care. Althaus v. Cohen, [] 756 A.2d 1166, 1168 ([Pa.] 2000). To determine whether the defendant owed a duty of care, we must weigh the following five factors: "(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the [defendant's] conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the [defendant]; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution." Id. at 1169. No one of these five factors is dispositive. Rather, a duty will be found to exist where the balance of these factors weighs in favor of placing such a burden on a defendant.

Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1008-09.

Our Supreme Court, in Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966), formally adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law governing strict products liability actions. This section provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965). To prevail on a strict products liability claim, a plaintiff must prove that the product was defective, the defect existed when it left the defendant's hands, and the defect caused the harm. Barton v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 124 A.3d 349, 354-55 (Pa. Super. 2015). The threshold inquiry in all products liability cases is whether there is a defect. Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges a design defect, he must demonstrate that the design of the machine results in an unreasonably dangerous product. Id.

As a preliminary matter, we will begin by addressing AGCO's claim that, following our Supreme Court's decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), Timmonds was not entitled to simultaneously proceed with both a common law negligent design claim and a strict liability claim under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.⁶ In Tincher, our Supreme Court overruled the long-standing precedent set forth in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), in which the Court imposed a strict segregation between negligence and strict liability concepts by removing from the purview of the jury the question of whether a product was "unreasonably dangerous" and placing that determination in the hands of the trial court tobe determined as a question of law. The Court reasoned that "the phrases 'defective condition' and 'unreasonably dangerous' as used in the Restatement formulation are terms of art" whose "resolution depends upon social policy," and thus "do not fall within the orbit of a factual dispute which is properly assigned to the jury for resolution." Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026, overruled by Tincher, supra.

In Tincher, the Supreme Court revisited the scheme established in Azzarello. The Court noted that the Azzarello holding was "premised . . . on the assumption that the term 'unreasonably dangerous' is misleading to jurors because it 'tends to suggest considerations which are usually identified with the law of negligence.'" Tincher, 104 A.3d at 376. Such negligence-based rhetoric, in the view of the Azzare...