Timothy D. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

TIMOTHY D.^[1], Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-124 (JLS)

United States District Court, W.D. New York

January 25, 2023

DECISION AND ORDER

JOHN L. SINATRA, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Timothy D. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, seeking review of the decision made by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration finding that he was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt 7. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, to which Plaintiff replied. Dkts. 9, 10. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion and grants the Commissioner's cross-motion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originates from Plaintiffs application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and his application for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), both filed on May 29 2019.^[2] Tr. 126-31, 222-28.^[3] Plaintiffs applications were initially denied, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 132-41, 170-71.

Following the hearing, in which Plaintiff was represented by counsel ALJ Michael J. Stacchini issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 12-29. Plaintiffs request for Appeals Council Review was denied, after which he commenced this action. Tr. 1-6; Dkt. 1.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. District Court Review

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013).

The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. See Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

While the Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, the Commissioner's conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have his disability determination made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)) (holding that the Court's review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing under the .. . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the . .. Act.”).

II. Disability Determination

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities and is normally done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.

Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(c). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant's medical impairments, both severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant's ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(3), 416.960(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).

In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 416.960(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs in the national economy exists that the claimant can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 416.920(g), 416.960(c); see Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I. The AL J's Decision

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2019, and that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date of January 1, 2015. Tr. 17. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, hernia, plantar fasciitis, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, obesity, depression, bipolar disorder, amnesia, and anxiety.” Tr. 18. The ALJ concluded, however, that Plaintiffs severe impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 18.

Finally, after considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a reduced range of “light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] can sit, stand, and walk for six hours with regular scheduled breaks of 15 minutes in the morning and afternoon and half hour to one-hour midday. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but [he] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. In addition, [Plaintiff] can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He must avoid unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. Further, [Plaintiff] is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple routine tasks with regular breaks at two[-]hour intervals. Lastly, [Plaintiff] can have occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.

Tr. 20.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. 24. And he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC allowed him to perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy during the relevant period. Tr. 24. Therefore, according to the ALJ, Plaintiff had not been under a disability between January 1, 2015, through the date of his decision, August 3, 2020. Tr. 25.

II. Plaintiffs Argument

Plaintiff makes three arguments for judgment in his favor. Dkt. 7-1. First, he argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record. Id. at 15. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of his treating physician, Harnath Clerk, M.D. Id. at 16. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ's RFC determination was impermissibly based on his own lay opinion. Id. at 18. As discussed below, Plaintiffs arguments are without merit.

III. Analysis

A. The ALJ did not impermissibly rely on his own lay opinion in formulating Plaintiffs RFC.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on his own lay opinion in crafting his RFC. See Dkt. 7-1, at 18.

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed.Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013); accord Nora A. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 551 F.Supp.3d 85, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). The ultimate RFC determination does not need to “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in [the ALJ's] decision.” Matta, 508 Fed.Appx. at 56. The ALJ is not a medical professional, however, and is therefore “not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings.” Ortiz v. Colvin, 298 F.Supp.3d 581, 590 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).

In Plaintiffs case, the ALJ did not rely solely on bare medical findings to make his RFC determination. The ALJ considered Plaintiffs treatment records, noting his history of hernia left heel pain, and obesity. See Tr. 21-22. The ALJ also properly evaluated and considered the opinions of: (1) State agency medical consultants J. Lawrence, M.D., and J. Koenig, M.D.; (2) State agency psychological consultants L. Kekeon, Ph.D., and J. May, Ph.D.; (3) consultative psychiatric examiner Christine Ransom, Ph.D.; and (4) consultative physical examiner Nikita Dave, M.D. See Tr....