Tipps v. Chinn Exploration Co.

HELEN BUTTS TIPPS, SUE ETHEL MCEACHERN, ESTATE OF FLORA L. THOMPSON, PERRY THOMPSON, JR., INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR, PERRY THOMPSON, JR., AND SANDRA SUE SARTAIN, Appellants v. CHINN EXPLORATION COMPANY AND CHEROKEE ROYALTY SYNDICATE,HOWARD P. COGHLAN, RECEIVER, Appellees

No. 06-13-00033-CV

Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date Submitted: March 19, 2014

September 5, 2014

On Appeal from the 188th District Court Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009-2036-A

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice MorrissMEMORANDUM OPINION

The appearance of settled mineral ownership—which had surrounded three neighboring tracts of oil-and-gas-producing land in Gregg County since the late 1800s or early 1900s—was shattered beginning in late 2008 when three different lawsuits arose involving eight parties, one consolidation, multiple partial summary judgments, and two trials. One group of the parties generalized it well: "This case arises out of a convoluted set of facts and documents dating back to 1881, which are challenging to untangle, and which gave rise to a complicated procedural and legal history."

In fact, this contest is complicated enough to warrant a program listing that details the contestants and the prizes involved. Plaintiffs the Estate of Flora L. Thompson, Perry Thompson, Jr., as Independent Executor of the Thompson Estate, Perry Thompson, Jr., individually, and Sandra Sue Sartain, individually, are collectively referenced as Thompson. Plaintiffs Helen Butts Tipps and Sue Ethel McEachern are referenced herein as Butts. Defendant and Intervenor, Cherokee Royalty Syndicate, through its receiver Howard P. Coghlan, is referenced as Cherokee. Defendants Chinn Exploration Company and Chinn Family Limited Partnership are referenced as Chinn.

These parties are vying over mineral interests in three tracts of land, tracts called 137.5 acres, 6.6 acres, and 4.5 acres, respectively, in the Francisco Castro Headright Survey, A-236, in Gregg County, Texas. While there is no dispute that Thompson owns the first one-half undivided mineral interest in the 137.5 acres, the other one-half undivided mineral interest is claimed by Thompson, Butts, and Cherokee. The trial court ruled that Cherokee owned thedisputed mineral interest in the 137.5 acres. Thompson also claims fifty percent of the minerals in the 6.6 acres and twelve and one-half percent of the minerals in the 4.5 acres, those claims are contested by Chinn, and the trial court ruled that Chinn owned those disputed minerals.

We affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety because (1) no evidence contradicts the finding that the 137.5 acres was entirely the community property of Martin Hughes and wife, Mariah Hughes, at the time of their ownership, (2) Thompson has not established error as to the 4.5 acres and 6.6 acres, and (3) res judicata bars Butts' claim that the May 30, 1919, "Transfer of Royalties" was unambiguous and that the instrument was improperly construed to convey the fee interest.

Procedurally, this hodgepodge of parties and claims was simplified by partial summary judgments disposing of the Thompson claims to the second one-half of the minerals in the 137.5 acres. By agreement, this was followed by two separate trials, the first regarding the 137.5 acres at which Butts tried to make the case for ownership of the 137.5 acres, and the second regarding the 4.5 and 6.6 acres. Thompson was not permitted to participate in the first trial because Thompson's claims to the second half of minerals in the 137.5 acres had been rejected by the summary judgments. The trial court entered a judgment and, several months later, held the second trial over the smaller tracts. It then signed a final judgment disposing of all parties and issues.

A traditional motion for summary judgment is granted only when the movant establishes there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). Anappellate court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment. Id. Where, as here, both parties file dispositive cross motions for summary judgment and the court grants one and overrules the other, the appellate court has jurisdiction to review both the grant and the denial. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007). Thus, in this case, we are to review the summary judgment evidence presented by each party, determine all questions presented, and render judgment as the trial court should have rendered. Id.; Comm'rs Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997); Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).

Procedurally, there is substantial dispute among the parties about the finality of the partial summary judgments, specifically as to the last-filed motion and amended motion for summary judgment presented by Thompson. Although the trial court had denied Thompson's first motion and granted an opposing motion by Cherokee, the final judgment indicates that the trial court did consider and explicitly ruled on the second motion.¹ It is also apparent from the record that, although the second motion did not formally ask for a reconsideration of the prior ruling, the trial court and the parties treated it as having done so. For those reasons, we treat the second summary judgment motion as before this Court on appeal.

(1) No Evidence Contradicts the Finding that the 137.5 Acres Was Entirely the Community Property of Martin Hughes and Wife, Mariah Hughes, at the Time of Their Ownership

Thompson's theories revolve around the nature of the ownership of the undivided property in the late 1890s. They argue that the property was the separate property of Martin Hughes, despite the undisputed fact that he was married to Mariah Hughes when the property was acquired and was still married to her at the time that a portion was divided through partition into his name. Thompson's argument is based broadly on the lack of Mariah's name on the deed and partition documents. Neither of those proposed problems contradicts the presumptively community nature of the property.

In 1881, as now, Texas presumed that property obtained during a marriage was community in nature.² Community property, under the Texas Constitution and statutes, has been defined as property acquired during the marriage, except property received by gift, devise, or descent or recoveries for non-earnings-capacity personal injuries. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15; TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West 2006); see TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.001(2)-(3) (West 2006).

The community presumption is not contradicted by legal title in just one spouse. See TEX. PROP. CODE T. 2, App. Title Examination Standard 14.10. The Texas Supreme Court in 1891 approved language where a jury was told that, where deeds to property are made to either husband or wife during marriage, that property is presumed by law to be community property and that the presumption can be overcome by adequate proof. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 15 S.W. 705,708 (Tex. 1891). "Where the grant or deed to community lands is in the name of the husband, the legal title to the lands is in him." Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 (Tex. 1917). But legal title in the husband's name does not, alone, alter the community nature of the property, and the wife still can have an equally absolute estate or interest in the property. Id.

In this case, the uncontroverted evidence is that Martin and Mariah were married before the initial purchase of the property and remained married on the date of its division by partition. There is no evidence from any source to show that the property was Martin's separate property.

In a parallel argument, Thompson contends that, because Mariah was not separately named in the partition suit, it was invalid. If the partition were between the two spouses, she would have been a necessary party. The partition was not of the community estate, but was between the Hugheses and other owners. Under the state of the law at the time—because Mariah's interests were "protected" by her husband's management and representation and the law invested the husband with management of all property in which she had an interest—the absence of her name on the pleadings and partition is, again, irrelevant. See McMurry v. McMurry, 4 S.W. 357, 361 (Tex. 1887).

Thompson also argues that the partition was not viable because, at that time, community property could be partitioned only on divorce or death. Martin v. Martin, 17 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929). Again, that argument is applicable only to a partition between spouses, not what happened here. We have been directed to no authority suggesting that such rule applies when property is partitioned between the community and other parties.

Starting with the presumption that property acquired during the course of a marriage is community, the trial court correctly concluded that the absence of Mariah's name was immaterial. Where the community is aligned, especially in light of the apparently typical practice a century ago of naming only the husband on behalf of the community, we see no logical reason to retroactively impose such a requirement. Indeed, one would not be required now. The interest was community.³

Thompson also complains of being excluded from the trial addressing the 137.5 acres. That complaint is based on a misunderstanding of summary judgment practice. The summary judgment ultimately granted before the trial disposed of Thompson's claims to the disputed minerals in the 137.5 acres and was final as to those claims.⁴

(2) Thompson Has Not Established Error as to the 4.5 Acres and 6.6 Acres

In an issue relating solely to the second trial concerning the two smaller tracts, Thompson contends that the trial court erred by denying its claims against Chinn. As with the...