Tompkins v. Thomas

1

SHAWN MARSHALL TOMPKINS, Plaintiff, v. S. THOMAS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-01415-JLT-EPG (PC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 1, 2024

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED, THAT THE DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE BE GRANTED, AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE BE GRANTED

(ECF Nos. 27, 28, 38).

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff Shawn Tompkins is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. (ECF Nos. 1, 8). This case proceeds on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims against Defendants Thomas Layshot, Muro, Salazar, Mitchell, Velazquez, and Gonzalez based on an incident in which these Defendants allegedly assaulted Plaintiff while he was confined at Wasco State Prison-Reception Center.

On March 13, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff from pursuing this case because success on the merits would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state court criminal conviction and his related guilty finding for a prison Rules Violation Report (RVR). (ECF No. 27).

After review of the parties' briefs, the Court will recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted. (ECF No. 27). Additionally, the Court will recommend that Defendants' request for judicial notice be granted, and that Plaintiff's request for judicial notice be granted. (ECF Nos. 28, 38).

I. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's complaint alleges as follows.^[1]While Plaintiff was in his assigned cell, which was boarded (papered) up, Defendant Thomas, a sergeant, came to Plaintiff's cell with two other correctional officers. Defendant Thomas stated, “Are y'all ready because y'all don't look ready?” Plaintiff's cell door was then opened, and Plaintiff was struck in the face and pulled out onto the tier. Defendant Thomas then began striking Plaintiff with closed fists. Plaintiff was then slammed to the ground. Defendant Thomas then began kicking Plaintiff and stomping on him. Defendant Thomas then grabbed Plaintiff's right arm and twisted it until Plaintiff yelled in pain. Defendant Thomas then told the other correctional officers to stop hitting Plaintiff in his face and to instead only hit him in his body. The other correctional officers ignored this command.

As to Defendant Layshot, a correctional officer, Plaintiff alleges that, when his cell door opened, Defendant Layshot punched Plaintiff in the face. Defendant Layshot then grabbed Plaintiff by his shirt and pulled him out of his cell, all while striking Plaintiff in his face with a closed fist. Defendant Layshot continued striking Plaintiff while Plaintiff begged for help. Defendant Layshot then slammed Plaintiff to the ground and got on Plaintiff's back, continuously striking Plaintiff on his head. Defendant Layshot then handcuffed Plaintiff. After that Defendant Layshot continued striking Plaintiff while calling him a “bitch” and “motherfucker.” Other personnel placed leg restraints on Plaintiff's ankles while Defendant Layshot continued to strike Plaintiff. As Defendant Layshot got off Plaintiff's back, he twisted Plaintiff's right arm, causing extreme pain and bringing Plaintiff to his feet. Defendant Layshot then escorted Plaintiff out of the building while twisting his right hand/wrist behind his back. He also repeatedly struck Plaintiff. Defendant Layshot slammed Plaintiff into a wheelchair.

Plaintiff yelled for help and for Defendant Layshot to stop, but help never came and Defendant Layshot did not stop. While Plaintiff was being escorted in a wheelchair to a cage by the program office, Defendant Layshot grabbed Plaintiff's shirt from behind, yanked it, and held it until Plaintiff lost consciousness. Defendant Layshot continued to strike Plaintiff.

As to Defendant Muro, a correctional officer, Plaintiff alleges that after he was handcuffed and in leg restraints, Defendant Muro came and began kicking and stomping on Plaintiff, while calling him a “bitch.” While Plaintiff was being escorted out of the building, Defendant Muro continuously struck him. While Defendant Layshot was ripping the clothes off his body, Defendant Muro continued to strike Plaintiff in his face, ignoring Defendant Thomas's command to stop hitting Plaintiff in his face.

As to Defendant Salazar, a correctional officer, Plaintiff alleges that as Defendant Layshot pulled Plaintiff out of his cell, Defendant Salazar began hitting Plaintiff. When Plaintiff was slammed to the ground, Defendant Salazar got his baton and hit Plaintiff a few times on his right ear. Plaintiff turned his head, and Defendant Salazar then hit the left side of Plaintiff's head, by his ear. Defendant Salazar then applied a lot of pressure to the back of Plaintiff's left ear, causing him to move his head. Defendant Salazar then struck Plaintiff with his closed fist on the left side of Plaintiff's head. Defendant Salazar then got his baton, put it on Plaintiff's lips, and said, “Suck on this, bitch!” Plaintiff moved his face away, then Defendant Salazar put his boot on Plaintiff's lips, said, “Kiss my boot,” and laughed. All of this happened while Plaintiff's hands were cuffed behind his back and he was in ankle restraints.

As to Defendants Mitchell and Gonzalez, correctional officers, Plaintiff alleges that while he was on the ground with his hands cuffed behind his back, Defendants Mitchell and Gonzalez placed leg restraints on Plaintiff while striking him. After the leg restraints were fully on Plaintiff's ankles, Defendants Mitchell and Gonzalez bent Plaintiff's legs upward, behind his back. Defendants Mitchell and Gonzalez then let Defendant Velazquez strike Plaintiff in the groin area approximately three times. Plaintiff was then brought to his feet and escorted out of the block by defendants Layshot and Muro.

As to Defendant Velazquez, a correctional officer, Plaintiff alleges that while he was in his assigned cell, Defendant Velazquez told the nurse to leave the building. The nurse said that Plaintiff was boarded up. Defendant Velazquez told her to log it and leave. Defendant Velazquez ushered the nurse out of the building. While Plaintiff was in full restraints, Defendant Velazquez told defendants Mitchell and Gonzalez to raise Plaintiff's legs upward, behind his back. After they did so, Defendant Velazquez proceeded to strike Plaintiff in the groin area approximately three times.

Based on these allegations, the Court found “that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims against defendants Thomas, Layshot, Muro, Salazar, Mitchell, Velazquez, and Gonzalez should proceed past screening.” (ECF No. 9, p. 8).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In addition, pro se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 (1974).

The scope of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is ordinarily limited to the contents of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, a court may look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.”). If a court considers evidence outside of the complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). However, exceptions exist for “documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice,” which a court may properly consider “without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted).

B. Favorable Termination Rule

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. 512 U.S. at 486-87. This “favorable termination rule” preserves the rule that federal challenges, which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or its duration, must be brought by way of petition for writ of...