Tonelli v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

STEPHEN TONELLI, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-00442-KAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

July 17, 2020

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 8

Plaintiff Stephen Tonelli filed the instant case against Defendant Wells Fargo, alleging that Defendant failed to: (1) provide information regarding certain bank accounts, and (2) return the funds held in the bank accounts. (First Amended Compl. ("FAC") ¶¶ 18, 35, Dkt. No. 1.) On January 28, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 8.)

Having considered the parties' filings, the relevant legal authorities, and the arguments presented at the July 16, 2020 hearing, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 8, 2015, Plaintiff's brother, Kevin Tonelli, executed the Tonelli Trust - 2005 ("Trust"). (FAC ¶ 5.) On January 11, 2018, Mr. Tonelli executed a Second Amendment which identified Mr. Tonelli's Wells Fargo checking and savings accounts ("Bank Accounts") as property of the Trust. (FAC ¶¶ 7-8.)

On December 18, 2017, Mr. Tonelli executed a special power of attorney, giving Plaintiff authority to conduct business with Defendant. (FAC ¶ 10.) Using that authority, Plaintiff deposited funds into the Bank Accounts. (FAC ¶ 11.) As of April 30, 2018, the balance in the Bank Accounts exceeded $497,000. (FAC ¶ 12.)

After April 2018, Defendant stopped sending communications, including bank statements, to Plaintiff or Mr. Tonelli. (FAC ¶ 13.) On February 21, 2019, Mr. Tonelli passed away, making Plaintiff the successor trustee of the Trust. (FAC ¶¶ 14-15.)

On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff notified Defendant that Mr. Tonelli had passed away. (FAC ¶ 16.) Defendant told Plaintiff that it would not provide him any information about the Bank Accounts other than their balance was sixty cents. (FAC ¶ 17.) On July 2, 2020, Plaintiff gave Defendant a Certificate of Trust, but Defendant still refused to provide any information regarding the Bank Accounts. (FAC ¶ 18.)

On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in state court based on the same facts, asserting claims for conversion, accounting, and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). (See Case No. 19-cv-4904-KAW (Tonelli I).) On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a "Petition for Order to Confirm Trust; Confirm Trustee; and Confirm Trust Assets" with the Probate Division of the Sonoma County Superior Court. (Saelao Decl., Exh. A, Dkt. No. 8-1 ("Petition for Order to Confirm").) In the Petition for Order to Confirm, Plaintiff states: "At the time of Kevin Tonelli's death, the bank accounts and real property identified remained vested in Kevin Tonelli's individual name as his separate property." (Petition for Order to Confirm ¶ 12.)

On August 15, 2019, Defendant removed Tonelli I to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Tonelli I, Dkt. No. 1.) On October 21, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to remand because there were non-diverse defendants. (Tonelli I, Dkt. No. 24.)

On December 6, 2019, the Probate Division issued an order confirming that the Trust was valid, that Plaintiff was the successor trustee, and that the Bank Accounts were property of the Trust. (FAC ¶ 20, Exh. E.)

On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint, removing the non-diverse defendants. On January 21, 2020, Defendant again removed the case to federal court. (Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1.) On January 28, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed his opposition. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff included a declaration by his counsel, stating that Defendant had provided the bank statements at issue, and that the statements show that the Bank Accounts' funds were completely transferred out by unknown third parties. (See id. at 3; Kelly Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E, Dkt. No. 24-2.) On June 25, 2020,Defendant filed its reply. (Def.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 25.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Request for Judicial Notice

As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). "[A] court may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record,'" Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (citing Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading" without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully . . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Petition for Order to Confirm. "Judicial notice of the Probate Court documents is appropriate, as documents publicly available and not subject to reasonable dispute." United States v. Paulson, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2016); see also In re Tower Park Properties, LLC, 803 F.3d 450, 452 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (taking judicial notice of documents filed in the California probate court). Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant's request for judicial notice. The Court GRANTS judicial notice of the Petition for Order to Confirm.

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the operative complaint. (Dkt. No. 24-1.) The Court need not take judicial notice of its own docket. As there is no opposition, however, the Court GRANTS judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint.

B. Motion to Dismiss

i. First Cause of Action: "Money"

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's first cause of action for "money" under California Civil Code § 3302 should be dismissed because § 3302 does not create a cause of action. (Def.'s Opp'n at 3.) The Court agrees.

Section 3302 states: "The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money only, is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon." California cases, including those cited by Plaintiff, make clear that § 3302 is a measure of damages. See Dini v. Dini, 188 Cal. App. 2d 506, 511 (1961) ("The measure of damages is that provided in section 3302, Civil Code"); Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 2d 822, 852 (1968) (Peters, J., dissenting) ("section 3302 of the Civil Code should not be construed as establishing the exclusive measure of damages for breach of an obligation to pay money or to limit the damages recoverable under section 3300 of that code") (emphasis added); Budget Finance Plan v. Sav-On Food Club, Inc., 44 cal. 2d 565, 572, n. 6 (1955) (explaining that per § 3302, "[w]here there is no express contract covering the matter, the law awards interest on money from the time it becomes due and payable if such time is certain or can be made certain by calculation"). Plaintiff cites no authority - and the Court could not find any - that suggests § 3302 creates a cause of action, rather than limiting the amount of damages available for certain types of claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 3302 claim is DISMISSED...