Toppin v. Williams (In re Toppin)

637 B.R. 88

IN RE: Lyndel TOPPIN, Debtor.

Lyndel Toppin, Plaintiff,

v.Jewell Williams, Sheriff of the City of Philadelphia and Abdeldayem Hassan aka Abdeldyem Hassan, Defendants.

Bankruptcy No. 18-13098-MDC

Adversary No. 18-00137-MDC

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed November 8, 2021

Stephen Matthew Dunne, Dunne Law Offices, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Meghan Annette Byrnes, Megan N. Harper, City of Philadelphia - Law/Revenue Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Sheriff of the City of Philadelphia, Jewell Williams.

David M. Offen, The Curtis Center, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant Abdeldayem Hassan.

Joshua Domer, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant Jewell Williams.

MEMORANDUM

Magdeline D. Coleman, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Lyndel Toppin (the "Debtor") filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on May 8, 2018, and approximately one month later, on June 11, 2018, initiated this adversary proceeding (the "Adversary Proceeding") by filing a Complaint¹ against Jewell Williams, in his capacity as Sheriff of the City of Philadelphia (the "Sheriff's Office," and together with the Debtor, the "Parties"). The Complaint alleges that the Sheriff's Office violated the automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. , by taking certain post-petition actions to enforce a writ of possession obtained by Abdeldayem Hassan ("Mr. Hassan") with respect to the Debtor's home, which Mr. Hassan acquired at a tax foreclosure sale.² The Court held a trial ("Trial") on August 21, 2020. Pending before the Court for decision are (i) the motion for summary judgment (the "Summary Judgment Motion")³ filed by the Sheriff's Office, (ii) the motion for a directed verdict (the "Directed Verdict Motion")⁴ filed by the Sheriff's Office, and (iii) the Debtor's request for relief under § 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will (i) grant the Summary Judgment Motion in part and deny it in part, (ii) grant the Directed Verdict Motion, and (iii) deny the Debtor's request for damages under § 362(k).

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND⁵

The Debtor resides at 146 S. 62nd Street in Philadelphia (the "Property"). The Debtor is both deaf and mute, and lives at the Property with his nephew, Barrington Whyte ("Mr. Whyte"). On October 5, 2017, the Property was sold at a sheriff's sale for delinquent taxes.⁶ Mr. Hassan was the winning bidder at the sheriff's sale. In January 2018, Mr. Hassan filed a complaint in ejectment in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia (the "CCP Court") against "unknown occupants" of the Property. Mr. Hassan then obtained a judgment by default against "unknown occupants," entered on April 5, 2018, for possession of the Property. On May 7, 2018, Mr. Hassan procured a writ of possession from the CCP Court against "unknown occupants" of the Property. The following day, on May 8, 2018, the Debtor filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy petition (the "Petition").

The Real Estate Unit of the Sheriff's Office received notice of the Petition on May 8, 2018.⁷ On May 10, 2018, Jetaria Taylor ("Officer Taylor"), then an officer with the Civil Enforcement Unit of the Sheriff's Office, went to the Property to serve a Notice to Vacate, giving the occupants of the Property 21 days to vacate the Property before an eviction notice would be issued. After knocking on the door of the Property and receiving no response, Officer Taylor taped the Notice to Vacate on the front door and left another copy either in the mail slot or inside the front door. Another copy of the Notice to Vacate was mailed to the Property.

Officer Taylor returned to the Property on June 1, 2018, to serve an Eviction Notice ordering the occupants of the Property to vacate it by June 25, 2018. After knocking on the door of the Property and receiving no response, Officer Taylor again taped the Eviction Notice on the front door and left another copy either in the mail slot or inside the front door. Another copy of the Eviction Notice was mailed to the Property.

On June 7, 2018, the Civil Enforcement Unit of the Sheriff's Office received a fax from the Debtor's counsel attaching a Notice of Bankruptcy with respect to the Debtor's case. Thereafter, the Civil Enforcement Unit ceased all efforts to enforce the CCP Court's writ of possession.

III. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Second Amended Complaint

As noted supra , on June 11, 2018, the Debtor filed the Complaint against the Sheriff's Office, alleging that the post-petition service of the Notice to Vacate and Eviction Notice violated the automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.⁸ The Debtor sought actual damages, attorneys’ fees and expenses, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages. On November 21, 2018, the Sheriff's Office answered the Second Amended Complaint.⁹

B. The Summary Judgment Motion

On December 26, 2019, the Sheriff's Office filed the Summary Judgment Motion. The Sheriff's Office argues that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate because: (i) the Sheriff's Office is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for conduct in execution of an order of court (the "Quasi-Judicial Immunity Argument"); and (ii) executing the writ of possession issued by the CCP Court was a ministerial act that is not subject to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay (the "Ministerial Act Argument").

The Sheriff's Office further argues that to the extent the Court denies summary judgment on both of these grounds, partial summary judgment is warranted with respect to damages because (i) emotional distress damages cannot be awarded against the Sheriff's Office pursuant to § 106(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 8541, et seq. (the "Tort Claims Act"), nor do the alleged acts by the Sheriff's Office warrant emotional distress damages (the "Emotional Distress Damages Argument"), and (ii) punitive damages are not available against the Sheriff's Office pursuant to § 106(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On February 5, 2020, the Debtor filed a response to the Summary Judgment Motion (the "Summary Judgment Response"),¹⁰ arguing that (i) the actions by the Sheriff's Office are subject to the automatic stay; (ii) the Sheriff's Office does not enjoy sovereign immunity with respect to acts that are in violation of the automatic stay; (iii) the actions by the Sheriff's Office caused compensable emotional distress damages to the Debtor; and (iv) summary judgment should be denied with respect to whether punitive damages are warranted because genuine issues of material fact exist. On February 14, 2020, the Sheriff's Office filed a reply (the "Summary Judgment Reply Brief") to the Debtor's Summary Judgment Response,¹¹ responding that (i) the Debtor seeks to hold the Sheriff's Office accountable for Mr. Hassan's failure to notify it of the Petition in order to halt any enforcement actions; (ii) the Sheriff's Office's arguments related to quasi-judicial immunity and the ministerial acts exception are not grounded in sovereign immunity; (iii) the Tort Claims Act precludes the recovery of emotional distress damages against a governmental unit; and (iv) the plain language of § 106(a)(3) provides that a court cannot award punitive damages against a governmental unit.

On February 18, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the Summary Judgment Motion (the "Summary Judgment Hearing"). At the Summary Judgment Hearing, the Debtor withdrew his request for punitive damages,¹² and therefore on February 20, 2020, the Court entered an Order¹³ granting the Summary Judgment Motion in part, finding that the Debtor is not entitled to recover punitive damages. The Court held the rest of the issues raised by the Summary Judgment Motion in suspension, pending the receipt of supplemental briefing (each, a "Supplemental Brief") from the Parties on the issue of whether, by ratifying the United States Constitution and the Bankruptcy Clause contained therein, the States agreed to waive their sovereign immunity with respect to claims for violation of the automatic stay for enforcement of a writ of possession (the "Sovereign Immunity Issue"). On April 6, 2020, the Sheriff's Office submitted a Supplemental Brief arguing that, in enforcing the CCP Court's writ of possession, it was acting as an arm of the Pennsylvania judiciary, and therefore is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity. The Sheriff's Office argues that it was not acting as a creditor nor on behalf of a government creditor, and therefore an action asserting violation of the automatic stay does not effectuate this Court's in rem jurisdiction as required to find a waiver of sovereign immunity under Central Va. Community College v. Katz , 546 U.S. 356, 126 S. Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed. 2d 945 (2006). The Debtor, by contrast, argues that a proceeding to enforce the automatic stay is an exercise of the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction, and therefore sovereign immunity with respect to such a proceeding has been waived under Katz .

C. The Trial

On August 21, 2020, the Court held the Trial in this Adversary Proceeding. At the outset of the Trial the Court advised the Parties that it would hold the Summary Judgment Motion in abeyance and would proceed with Trial, but in resolving the dispute would still rule on the Summary Judgment Motion first as a threshold matter.

The Debtor called three witnesses for its case in chief: (i) Mr. Whyte, (ii) Captain Sean Thorton ("Captain Thornton"), a captain in the Civil Enforcement Unit, and (iii) Officer Taylor. During the course of the testimony, the Debtor also submitted certain documents into evidence.

Mr. Whyte testified that he found three copies each of the Notice to Vacate and the Eviction Notice in the residence at the Property and testified to the various dates in May and June 2018 that each were received. On direct examination Mr. Whyte testified that the Debtor brought...