Torres v. Cnty. of Madera

LUIS FERNANDO TORRES, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00670 LJO SKO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: December 9, 2011

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 47)

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

ON THE PLEADINGS

(Doc. 45)

In this case, Plaintiffs Luis Torres, Alejandro Torres, Aurora Torres, and Armando Hernandez seek damages against Defendant Sylvia Rodriguez for violations of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for assault, battery, false arrest and trespass in connection with a parole search of Plaintiffs' residence on January 21, 2009. Two matters are now pending: (1) Defendant Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment; and (2) Defendant Rodriguez's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs have opposed both motions, and Defendant Rodriguez has replied. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the entire record in this case, the Court (1) GRANTS IN PART the motion for summary judgment, and (2) DENIES AS MOOT the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Defendant Rodriguez is a parole agent employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Adult Paroles. On January 21, 2009, Defendant Rodriguez and the Madera GangEnforcement Task Force conducted a parole search of Plaintiff Luis Torres' residence. The search was part of a wider parole sweep initiated by parole officials. Each parole agent was asked to identify five active parolees to be searched for the purpose of ensuring parole compliance. Defendant Rodriguez identified Plaintiff Luis Torres as an active parolee subject to search and supervision after a review of his case file and two state parolee databases on January 13, 2009.

Plaintiffs Luis Torres, Alejandro Torres, Aurora Torres, and Armando Hernandez were present at the residence at the time of the parole search. The officers escorted most of the plaintiffs into the common area of the house by holding and directing them by the upper arm. The only time Defendant Rodriguez drew her gun was when she and two other officers entered the room of Plaintiff Armando Hernandez, who was laying in bed at the time. The officers ordered Plaintiff Armando Hernandez to wake up, get out of bed, and walk over to the common area. Plaintiff Armando Hernandez complied without any incident.

The search of the residence ultimately unearthed a BB gun, a sword, and several knives. As a result, the officers placed Plaintiff Luis Torres under arrest for violating the conditions of his parole. Plaintiff Luis Torres was subsequently transported to a holding cell in county jail, where he remained until the next day. The Madera Parole Unit released Plaintiff Luis Torres from custody on January 22, 2009, after they learned that Plaintiff Luis Torres had been discharged from parole back in December and was no longer subject to search or supervision.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Madera County Superior Court. Plaintiffs claimed in their original complaint that the State of California, the County of Madera, the City of Madera, and Does 1-100 violated the Fourth Amendment and committed several state law torts by conducting the parole search of Plaintiffs' residence on January 21, 2009. The County of Madera subsequently removed the action to this Court on April 15, 2010, based on this Court's jurisdiction over federal questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

On April 27, 2010, the County of Madera filed a motion to dismiss, as did the City of Madera on May 3, 2010. The Court granted both motions. In doing so, the Court instructed Plaintiffs to either file an amended complaint or file notice that Plaintiffs no longer intended to pursue their claims againstthe County of Madera and the City of Madera. On June 30, 2010, Plaintiffs elected to file an amended complaint naming Sylvia Rodriguez, Jesus Hernandez, Nick Rojas, Brian Esteves, and Felix Gonzales as defendants to this action. Plaintiffs claimed that these defendants violated the Fourth Amendment and committed assault, battery, false arrest, and trespass.

Most of the defendants have since been dismissed. On April 19, 2011, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court dismissed Brian Esteves and Felix Gonzales with prejudice. Also, on November 17, 2011, Plaintiffs notified the Court that Jesus Hernandez and Nick Rojas have not been served with process and voluntarily dismissed the two defendants. Defendant Rodriguez therefore remains as the sole defendant in this action.

On October 7, 2011, Defendant Rodriguez filed the now pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs' state law claims should be dismissed for failure to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Also, on October 28, 2011, Defendant Rodriguez filed the now pending motion for summary judgment. Therein, Defendant Rodriguez contends that she (1) did not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, (2) is entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) is immune from Plaintiffs' state law claims. Plaintiffs filed oppositions to both motions on November 14, 2011, and Defendant Rodriguez filed replies on November 21, 2011.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed, so long as there is no delay to trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When used to raise the defense of failure to state a claim, "[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings faces the same test as a motion under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]12(b)(6)." McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e have said that Rule 12(c) is functionally identical to Rule 12(b)(6) and that the same standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The allegations of the plaintiff are accepted as true, and the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 810. Dismissal is then warranted if there is a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or an "absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v.Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the disclosure materials, the discovery, and the affidavits provided establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the movant will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must "affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). "On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

If the movant has sustained its burden, the nonmoving party must "show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor." FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in the original). The nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations set forth in its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence" will not suffice. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 929. Indeed, the mere presence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Wherethe record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (citation omitted).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, "the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, "[t]he evidence of the [nonmoving party] is to believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor." Id. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must provide a factual predicate from which the inference may justifiably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment

The Court turns first to Plaintiffs' claims under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Rodriguez violated the Fourth Amendment by (1) searching Plaintiffs' residence without a warrant, (2) detaining Plaintiffs while law enforcement officers conducted the search, and (3) arresting Plaintiff Luis Torres for a parole violation despite the fact that he was no longer on...