Torres v. MMS Grp.

1

ELEWOOD TORRES, Plaintiff, v. MMS GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 22 Civ. 6142 (DEH)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 2, 2024

OPINION & ORDER

DALE E. HO, United States District Judge:

On November 7, 2023, Defendant HPD filed a motion to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 86. On November 10 2023, Plaintiff moved for preliminary injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See Prelim. Mot., ECF No. 90. On November 14, 2023, the Court held a conference, after which it denied Plaintiff's request for a TRO. See ECF No. 91.

For the reasons below, Defendant HPD's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Plaintiff Elewood Torres is a legally deaf individual who uses a wheelchair for mobility, and brings various claims against Defendants New York City Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD”), MMS Group LLC, New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Housing Development Fund Corporation, NYSD Forsyth Housing Development Fund Company Inc., and the New York Society for the Deaf. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.; the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.; the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the Complaint, and are assumed to be true solely for purposes of adjudicating Defendant HPD's motion to dismiss, see Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 69 n.1 (2d Cir. 2023),^[1] except where otherwise noted. To the extent that resolution of Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction requires preliminary factual determinations, they are so noted below.

This case arises from Plaintiff's claims related to two buildings, located at 174-182 Forsyth Street, New York, NY 10002 and 184-186 Forsyth Street, New York, NY 10002 (collectively “the Premises” or “the Buildings”). Plaintiff Torres is a hearing-impaired and legally deaf person who alleges that he has been the subject of discrimination in his housing based on his disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendants are NYSD Forsyth Housing Development Fund Company, Inc., New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD”), (collectively the “Housing Defendants”), and Defendant T.U.C. Management Company, Inc. (“TUC”). Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are owners of the Premises. Id. ¶¶ 18-26. But in its motion to dismiss, Defendant HPD asserts that “HPD and the City do not own, or manage the Subject Premises.” HPD Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Br.”), ECF No. 86-8.

In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to “design, construct, maintain, operate and manage buildings to be fully accessible to and independently usable” by Plaintiff. Prelim. Mot. 11. Plaintiff states that “the elevators are not designed for deaf and hearing-impaired persons to receive assistance in emergency situations; the fire alarm system is not designed to effectively alert deaf and hearing-impaired persons in the event of a fire, and the security personnel who are employed by the Defendants are incapable of communicating with the deaf and hearing-impaired residents.” Id. at 1-2.

On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff agreed to withdraw his requested preliminary relief relating to elevators, pursuant to a Stipulation and Order. See ECF No. 104. The Court thus addresses Plaintiff's remaining two requests for preliminary relief: (1) implementing high-intensity strobe lights and bed shakers to alert people of a fire hazard; and (2) hiring 24/7 security staff who are either (a) fluent in American Sign Language (“ASL”) or (b) equipped with devices that allow them to communicate effectively with deaf or hearing-impaired individuals. See Pl.'s Reply 2, ECF No. 115. The Court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction on February 9, 2024.^[2] See ECF No. 116.

II. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Legal Standards

Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)); see Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”).

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate:

(1) “a likelihood of success on the merits or . . . sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiff's favor”;

(2) a likelihood of “irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction”;

(3) that “the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff's favor”; and

(4) that the “public interest would not be disserved” by the issuance of an injunction.” Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010)).^[3]

The Second Circuit “review[s] ... denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2019). A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or makes an error of law. Id (quoting N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2018)). The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief. Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2005).

B. Discussion

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff must show that he is more likely than not to prevail on his claims, or, in other words, that the “probability of prevailing is better than fifty percent.'” BigStar Ent., Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 185, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits.

a. Disability Discrimination - Failure to Accommodate Claims.

A plaintiff can prove disability discrimination under the ADA, RA, and FHA under one of three theories: (1) intentional discrimination; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Town & Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Vill./Town of Mount Kisco, No. 17 Civ. 8586, 2019 WL 1368560, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019). Here, Plaintiff invokes the third theory, which makes it unlawful for defendants to fail “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. at *16; see also Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008); McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009). A reasonable accommodation “gives the otherwise qualified plaintiff with disabilities meaningful access to the program or services sought.” HenriettaD. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).

The elements necessary to state such a claim under Title II of the ADA, the FHA, RA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL are substantially the same. See, e.g., Skorupska v. 525 W. 52 Prop. Owner LLC, 625 F.Supp.3d 90, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (applying the same legal standards to housing discrimination claims under the FHA, ADA, the RA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL).^[4] To state a claim for failure to accommodate a disability, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to the Acts they are alleged to have violated; and (3) that he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendants' services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendants because of his disability.” Demirayak v. City of N.Y., 746 Fed.Appx. 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); accordShomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2009).

The first two elements are not in dispute. Defendants concede that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with disabilities. See TUC Opp'n 12, ECF No. 109. Defendants do not contest that they receive federal funding, id., Housing Defs.' Opp'n 9, ECF No. 106; nor do Defendants dispute that they are subject to the relevant statutes (with the exception of Defendant HPD, as addressed below in the context of its motion to dismiss). See generally ECF Nos. 105-109.

But Defendants do dispute the third element, i.e., whether Plaintiff has been denied the “opportunity to participate in or benefit from” of some “services, programs, or activities,” because of his disability. Demirayak, 746 Fed.Appx. 49 at 52. With respect to physical premises, a defendant can discriminate within the meaning of the ADA against a plaintiff in various ways including by failing to remove architectural barriers “where such removal is readily achievable.” Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 369 (2d Cir. 2008). In his motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to remove barriers to access in the form of the Premises' current fire alarm and security guard systems. In particular, Plaintiff contends that: (1) “the fire alarm system is not designed to effectively alert deaf and hearing-impaired persons in the event of a fire” and (2) “the security personnel who are employed by the Defendants are...