Torres v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

SABATO TORRES, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

18-CV-2156 (NGG) (RER)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 14, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Sabato Torres, a teacher at a New York City Department of Education ("DOE") school, brings this action against the NYC DOE pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (the "ADA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq. ("NYSHRL"); and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq. ("NYCHRL"). (Am. Compl. (Dkt. 14).) Plaintiff claims that he was denied a medical hardship transfer and denied permission to return to work from a leave of absence because of his alleged disability, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination. (Id.)

Before the court is Defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (See Def. Mot. for a Judgment on the Pleadings ("Mot.") (Dkt. 17).) For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Caucasian male, began working for Defendant around April 2002. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.) In August 2014, he was hired to work at P.S./I.S. 295Q as a seventh-and-eighth grade math teacher. (Id. ¶ 9.) The school's principal, Deon-Lavigne Jones was African- American. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff alleges that, during his employment at this school, he was subjected to "severe and pervasive harassment and discrimination" because of his race. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff does not, however, provide any further factual details about the alleged harassment. Plaintiff contends that he tried complaining to Lenon Murray, the Superintendent of District 29, about the discrimination in the fall of 2015, but Murray "attempted to suppress [Plaintiff's] complaint." (Id. ¶ 14.)

Allegedly, the discrimination Plaintiff suffered was so intolerable that he was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") in May 2016. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff then applied and was approved for a leave of absence due to the anxiety and depression he was experiencing. (Id. ¶ 15.) Around August 1, 2016, Plaintiff applied for a "Hardship Transfer," which is a transfer that an employee may seek "in situations where [the] continued employment within their current assignment presents a medical or financial hardship." (Id. ¶ 16.) Around August 15, 2016, he was advised that his transfer was granted. (Id. ¶ 17.) However, Plaintiff alleges that he was told shortly afterward that, because he would not be returning to work by September 2016 due to his leave of absence, his transfer request would not be approved. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that around August 17, 2016, he filed a claim with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") wherein he complained about the discrimination and harassment to which he was subjected. (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant received notice of this claim shortly thereafter. (Id.) Around April 6, 2017, after Plaintiff had informed Defendant that he would return to work that fall, he submitted a new Hardship Transfer request, based on the same facts as his previous request. (Id. ¶ 19.) Defendant denied his request claiming that the transfer was not medically warranted. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's denial was retaliation for his filing a claim with the EEOC. (Id.) As a result ofDefendant's denial of his transfer application, Plaintiff remained assigned to P.S./I.S. 295Q. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff continued his medical leave. (Id. ¶ 22.)

On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, "complaining about the [] discrimination and retaliation." (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that following the filing of his complaint, he was subjected to further retaliation. (Id. ¶ 25.) For instance, Plaintiff contends that in January 2018, Plaintiff asked to return to work, but Defendant allegedly refused to allow him to do so, pointing to the medical documentation he had submitted as evidence for why he should not be allowed to return. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.)

Plaintiff alleges that although he sought to return January 15, 2018, he was not permitted to return to work until February 8, 2018. (Id. ¶ 28.) Upon Plaintiff's return, he was placed in the Absent Teacher Reserve ("ATR") and was assigned to PS118Q, teaching elementary school. (Id.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint with this court on April 11, 2018. (Compl. (Dkt. 1).) On November 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Am. Compl.) Defendant answered Plaintiff's amended complaint on December 17, 2018. (Answer (Dkt 16).) On January 24, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. (Mot.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court applies the same standard to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as that used for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See In Re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2015), as amended (Dec. 17, 2015).

When considering either, a court should "draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff['s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)). A claim should survive if the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claim

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he has been (1) deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that (2) this deprivation was done under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). It is well established that the "under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). The Supreme Court has held that an individual acts under the color of law when he or she exercises power "made possible only because [he or she] is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); see also United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the color of law requirement, concluding that misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and madepossible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state law." (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Defendant seek to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for two independent reasons: (1) "Plaintiff has failed to allege any underlying constitutional violation"; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged constitutional deprivation "is the direct result of an official municipal policy or custom." (Mot. at 7-8). For the reasons provided below, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish municipal liability and therefore dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

A municipality can only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the manner set forth in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny, and may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2011). In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Plaintiff must therefore establish that an identified municipal policy or practice was the "moving force [behind] the constitutional violation." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, in order to state a Monell claim, "[t]he plaintiff must first prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused his injuries. . . . Second, the plaintiff must establish a casual connection—an 'affirmative link'—between the policy and deprivation of his constitutional rights." Vippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n. 8 (1985)).

A municipal policy or custom for purposes of Monell liability can be established by alleging:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipalpolicies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom or usage sufficient to impute constructive knowledge of the practice to policymaking officials; or (4) a failure by policymakers to train or supervise subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.

Bennerson v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-10182, 2004 WL 9021667241, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2004) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff claims...