Total Petroleum Puerto Rico Corp. v. Colon

819 F.Supp.2d 55

TOTAL PETROLEUM PUERTO RICO CORPORATION, Plaintiff,

v.Marisely Colon COLON, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 08–1629 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Sept. 30, 2011.

Ivan Aponte–Figueroa, Lopez Mulero & Carrion Tavarez, Lee Sepulvado–Ramos, Jenyfer Garcia–Soto, Maite D. Oronoz–Rodriguez, Sepulvado & Maldonado, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Lemuel Negron–Colon, Ponce, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are the parties' motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 114, 120, 122, & 125.) Having considered the arguments contained in those motions and the respective oppositions, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART plaintiff's first and second motions for summary judgment, (Docket Nos. 120, 122, & 125), DENIES plaintiff's third motion for summary judgment and DENIES defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 114). Although plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment is granted with regard to its substantive claims, the Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE its ruling on plaintiff's request for permanent injunctive relief until a final judgment is issued following a bench trial on February 6, 2012 at 9:00 a.m.

DISCUSSION

I. BackgroundA. Procedural Background

On June 6, 2008, Total Petroleum Puerto Rico Corporation (“Total/GPR”) filed a complaint against Marisely Colon Colon (“M. Colon”), Luis F. Colon (“L. Colon”), and their conjugal partnership (collectively “defendants”), alleging claims pursuant to the Lanham Act, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, and Puerto Rico law revolving around the lease and possession of a gasoline service station in Coamo, Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 99.) On the same date, Total/GPR filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court order defendants “to immediately surrender the station, the Underground Storage Tanks, and all other equipment therein to [Total/GPR], to immediately comply with all other post-termination covenants of the Lease, Dealer and Commodatum Agreements, and to refrain from using the GPR MARKS.” (Docket No. 2 at 34.) On June 9, 2008, the Court denied the request for a TRO and referred the motion for a preliminary injunction to then Chief Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas. (Docket No. 5.)

On June 24, 2008, the magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues presented in the motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 30, 2008, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that the Court should grant a preliminary injunction directing defendants to “(1) immediately surrender the gasoline station ...; (2) immediately comply with all post-termination covenants of the Lease, Supply and Commodatum Agreements to which the defendants are signatories; [and] (3) immediately cease using the well-known GPR marks.” (Docket No. 32 at 32.) On August 29, 2008, the Court adopted the report and recommendation as its opinion and granted the preliminary injunction. (Docket No. 45.)

Approximately a month and half later, the parties filed informative motions which indicated a dispute over defendants' compliance with the preliminary injunction issued by the Court. (Docket Nos. 46 & 48.) On October 16, 2008, the Court referred the informative motions to a magistrate judge to hold a hearing to determine whether the defendants had not fully complied with the preliminary injunction. (Docket No. 49.) After resolving several scheduling matters, the magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on August 13, 2009. (Docket No. 77.) On December 3, 2009, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that defendants were not in violation of the order granting a preliminary injunction. (Docket No. 83.) On March 1, 2010, the Court adopted the report and recommendation as its own opinion, and referred the case once again to a magistrate judge for all remaining pretrial matters. (Docket No. 87.)

On June 22, 2011, the parties indicated during a pretrial conference that the majority of the issues in this case could be resolved summarily by the Court. (Docket No. 109.) In an effort to conserve judicial resources, the Court vacated the trial date and ordered the parties to file cross motions for summary judgment on the issues discussed at the pretrial conference no later than July 15, 2011. Id. The Court subsequently extended that deadline to July 20, 2011. (Docket No. 113.) On July 20, 2011, the parties filed several motions for summary judgment. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiffs claims are meritless and requesting that the Court grant the relief requested in their counterclaim. (Docket No. 114.) Plaintiff filed a timely opposition to that motion on August 5, 2011. (Docket No. 139.)

Plaintiff filed three separate motions for summary judgment, each addressing different sets of claims in this case. (Docket Nos. 120, 122, & 125.) Plaintiff argues in its first motion for summary judgment: (1) that its termination of the franchise relationship with defendants was valid under the PMPA; and (2) that a permanent injunction should issue to prevent defendant from further diluting or infringing plaintiff's trademarks. (Docket No. 120.) In its second motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that defendants breached their contractual obligations to plaintiff and, as a result, still owe plaintiff $83,605.50 under the terms of the franchise and lease agreements. (Docket No. 122.) Plaintiff's final motion for summary judgment requests that the Court find that plaintiff is the owner of a concrete structure, currently used as a cafeteria, adjacent to the gas station at issue in this case, along with the premises of the concrete structure. (Docket No. 125.) Defendants filed an opposition only with regard to plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 138.)

B. Failure to Comply with Local Rule 56

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly ... emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico].” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007). Rules such as Local Rule 56 “are designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted.’ ” Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006)). Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, “litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril.” Id. Plaintiff argues that defendants have run afoul of Local Rule 56's scheme for submission of factual material in two respects. (Docket Nos. 139 & 140.) The Court will address each argument in turn.

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff argues that defendants' motion for summary judgment fails to comply with Local Rule 56(b) or Local Rule 56(e). (Docket No. 139.) Local Rule 56(b) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit factual assertions in “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs,” which must be in compliance with Local Rule 56(e). D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(b). Local Rule 56(e) states that:

Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted. An assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material facts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion. The court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment. The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts.

D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e) (emphasis added); (Docket No. 139.)

Plaintiff claims that defendants did not submit their factual assertions in a separate document, or support those assertions with specific references to pages or paragraphs of exhibits. (Docket No. 139.) Plaintiff argues that, due to this failure, the Court should deny defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 139.) Indeed, defendants did not file a separate statement of uncontested facts, choosing instead to include all factual material in the body of their summary judgment motion. ( See Docket No. 114.) Even within that motion, defendants fail in many instances to cite to any exhibit to support factual assertions. See id. In cases where defendants do include a record citation, they decline to provide a specific reference to page or paragraph number as required by Local Rule 56(e). ( See Docket No. 33–1.)

As previously explained, the purpose of Local Rule 56 is to create an organized and clear representation of issues of fact which are truly contested between the parties. See Caban Hernandez, 486 at 7–8. By failing to provide such a representation, defendants are effectively asking the Court to ferret through their exhibits in order to rule on their motion for summary judgment. The Court declines to do so and reminds defendants that it has “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts.” See Local Rule 56(e). Based on the absence of a properly presented factual record, the Court cannot determine the existence, or absence, of genuine issues of material fact and DENIES defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000); Vargas–Ruiz v. Golden Arch Development, Inc., 283 F.Supp.2d 450, 458–59 (D.P.R.2003).

2. Defendants' Opposition

As recounted in the procedural background, defendants only filed a response in opposition to plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment, leaving plaintiff's other two ...