Town of Glastonbury v. Sakon

184 Conn.App. 385

194 A.3d 1277

TOWN OF GLASTONBURY

v.John Alan SAKON et al.

AC 39907

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 17, 2018

Officially released August 28, 2018

John Sakon, self-represented, the appellant (named defendant).

Latonia C. Williams, with whom was Patrick M. Fahey, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, Moll and Sullivan, Js.

SULLIVAN, J.

In this tax lien foreclosure action,¹ the defendant John Alan Sakon² appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the defendant claims that the attorney's fees awarded by the court were excessive and unreasonable. We conclude that the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff did not constitute an abuse of discretion and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This court's recent decision in the same matter, Glastonbury v. Sakon , 172 Conn. App. 646, 161 A.3d 657 (2017) (per curiam), sets forth the following facts: "The defendant is the record owner of two properties [described in the complaint as the Griswold Street property and the Main Street property, respectively,] in Glastonbury. The defendant failed to pay the property taxes on his properties for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. As a result, the plaintiff, the town of Glastonbury, assessed tax liens against the defendant's properties for the unpaid real property taxes (tax liens).

"On November 6, 2012, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose on the 2009, 2010, and 2011 tax liens for the defendant's two properties by filing a two count complaint, in which each count pertained to one of the defendant's two properties. On August 27, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead, which was granted on September 4, 2013. On December 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale. On December 18, 2013, the defendant filed his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, which contained six special defenses and seven counterclaims (original special defenses and counterclaims). On January 29, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to open the default, which was granted on February 10, 2014. On March 12, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the original special defenses and counterclaims (first motion to strike).

"On August 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended two count complaint, in which it additionally sought to foreclose on the 2012 and 2013 tax liens for the defendant's two properties and clarified its description of the defendant's properties (operative complaint).

"On November 21, 2014, the court, Robaina, J. , granted the plaintiff's first motion to strike. On December 10, 2014, the defendant filed a revised motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting the plaintiff's first motion to strike. On December 11, 2014, the defendant filed an amended answer in response to the operative complaint, which contained special defenses and counterclaims that were substantially similar to those raised in his original answer (amended special defenses and counterclaims). On December 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's amended special defenses and counterclaims (second motion to strike).

"On December 29, 2014, the court denied the defendant's revised motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting the plaintiff's first motion to strike. On January 5 and 6, 2015, and February 4, 2015, the defendant filed motions for extension of time to file a substitute pleading pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. On February 11, 2015, the defendant filed a substitute answer, in which he raised four special defenses and two counterclaims (substitute special defenses and counterclaims). On March 16, 2015, the court concluded that the second motion to strike [filed on December 24, 2014] was moot because ‘[t]he operative substitute special defenses and counterclaims are those filed on February 11, 2015.’

"On March 31, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the substitute special defenses and counterclaims (third motion to strike) and a motion for judgment of nonsuit as to the counterclaims. On July 9, 2015, the court, Vacchelli, J. , applying the law of the case doctrine, granted the third motion to strike because the substitute special defenses and counterclaims ‘all attempt the exact same challenges previously ruled to be legally insufficient’ by the court on November 11, 2014. The court also entered default against the defendant as to his special defenses and a judgment of nonsuit against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the defendant's counterclaims.

"On July 24, 2015, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to liability on both counts of the operative complaint. On July 27, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting the plaintiff's third motion to strike, which was denied on August 12, 2015." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 648–50, 161 A.3d 657. The defendant subsequently filed an appeal from the court's ruling on the third motion to strike, and this court dismissed the appeal as to the special defenses and affirmed the trial court's ruling striking the counterclaims. See id., at 659, 161 A.3d 657.

On January 4, 2016, Judge Robaina granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only. On July 13, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale. The court, Dubay, J. , ordered a hearing for August 1, 2016, and, on that date, the defendant requested a continuance to allow him to subpoena the town's appraiser and the town's counsel, Latonia Williams, and additional time to hire an expert witness. The court continued the matter for one week to August 8, 2016.³

At the August 8, 2016 hearing, the court only heard argument on the motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale scheduled for that day. The plaintiff presented the most current appraisal of the subject properties and an updated affidavit of attorney's fees requesting an award of counsel fees and costs of $68,982.22 for the first property and $65,997.21 for the second property. On the basis of the fair market values of the subject properties, the amount of debt due, and subsequent encumbrances on the properties, the court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale and ordered attorney's fees in the amounts requested by the plaintiff. The defendant vigorously contested both the entry of the judgment of foreclosure by sale and the award of attorney's fees.

On August 26, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the judgment of foreclosure by sale. On September 9, 2016, the court granted the defendant's motion to reconsider only as to the issue of attorney's fees. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider on October 7, 2016, the defendant called Attorney Williams to testify regarding the reasonableness of the attorney's fees requested and, in response to the defendant's subpoena, Attorney Williams produced the billing records of the law firm of Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, related to the present case. The defendant then testified on his own behalf, and the court took the matter under consideration.⁴ On October 24, 2016, in a written memorandum of decision, the court entered an order finding the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff in the foreclosure action reasonable. The court made the following findings:

"1. The time records/billable hours were entered contemporaneously with the services rendered by counsel.

"2. [The] defendant produced no credible evidence to call into question the hours claimed.

"3. The attorney's fees, though unusually high for an action to foreclose tax liens, are reasonable given the number of nearly frivolous filings by the defendant, which caused this action to remain pending for years.

"4. [The] defendant had the opportunity to, but did not, file timely objection to the affidavit of attorney's fees submitted during the initial/underlying action.

"5. [The] defendant had a full opportunity to be heard and to examine and/or present witnesses.

"6. The court fully credits the testimony of Attorney Williams.

"Attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $68,982.22 are awarded in connection with the Griswold Street property and $65,997.21 for the Main Street property."

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion as to the amount of the attorney's fees that it awarded.⁵ Specifically, the defendant argues that the total award of $140,479.43 in attorney's fees is unreasonable when compared to the amount of the tax liens at issue in the present case and to attorney's fees awarded in similar tax lien foreclosure cases. The plaintiff counters that the award of attorney's fees was reasonable because the trial court record is replete with motions and pleadings filed by the defendant to delay the instant proceedings. We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees it awarded.

We set forth the standard of review and applicable legal principles. "We review the reasonableness of the court's award of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion standard.... Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.... [Thus, our] review of [the amount of attorney's fees awarded] is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion it did.... A court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees. The issue grows even more delicate on appeal ... for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) East Windsor v. East Windsor Housing, Ltd., LLC , 150 Conn. App. 268, 275, 92 A.3d 955 (2014).

"Connecticut adheres to the American rule regarding...