Town of Halfmoon & Cnty. of Saratoga v. Gen. Elec. Co.

TOWN OF HALFMOON and COUNTY OF SARATOGA, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant.

SARATOGA COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant.

1:09-CV-228 (LEAD)

1:11-CV-6 (MEMBER)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 3, 2016

APPEARANCES:

NOLAN & HELLER, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff Town of Halfmoon

39 North Pearl Street

Albany, NY 12203

DREYER BOYAJIAN LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Saratoga County and

Saratoga County Water Authority

75 Columbia Street

Albany, NY 12210

MACKENZIE HUGHES LLP

Attorneys for Defendant

101 South Salina Street

Syracuse, NY 13221

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

Attorneys for Defendant

725 12th Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

OF COUNSEL:

DAVID A. ENGEL, ESQ.

CRAIG M. CRIST, ESQ.

DONALD W. BOYAJIAN, ESQ.

JAMES R. PELUSO, JR., ESQ.

BENJAMIN W. HILL, ESQ.

WILLIAM J. DREYER, ESQ.

SAMANTHA L. MILLIER, ESQ.

NEELUM J. WADHWANI, ESQ.

ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, ESQ.

STEVEN R. KUNEY, ESQ.

CONSTANCE T. FORKNER, ESQ.

JOSEPH G. PETROSINELLI, ESQ.

DAVID N. HURD United States District Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 3

II. LEGAL STANDARD ................................................... 3

III. DISCUSSION ........................................................ 6

A. Halfmoon's Notice ............................................... 8

1. Mark P. Millspaugh ......................................... 8

2. Robert Michaels .......................................... 15

B. Saratoga's Notice .............................................. 16

1. Kirk Brown .............................................. 16

2. David O. Carpenter ........................................ 24

C. GE's Notice ................................................... 31

1. Stephen A. Johnson ....................................... 31

i. Saratoga .......................................... 31

ii. Halfmoon .......................................... 36

2. Gregg W. Jones .......................................... 39

3. Theodore C. Schlette ...................................... 42

4. Neil S. Shifrin ............................................ 47

D. GE's Supplemental Notice ....................................... 50

1. John Connolly ............................................ 50

i. Opinion No. 2 ....................................... 52

ii. Opinion No. 3 ....................................... 53

iii. Opinion No. 4 ....................................... 54

iv. Opinion No. 7 ....................................... 57

v. Opinion No. 8 ....................................... 57

vi. Opinion No. 9 ....................................... 58

2. Brent Kerger ............................................. 59

IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................... 63

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This is the final installment in a trilogy of decisions necessitated by the flurry of motion practice that occurred at the completion of discovery in this case, which pits remaining plaintiffs Town of Halfmoon ("Halfmoon"), County of Saratoga ("Saratoga"), and Saratoga County Water Authority ("SCWA") (collectively "plaintiffs") against defendant General Electric Company ("GE") in their bid to recover damages pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and related state law.

The first of these decisions resolved the bulk of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs a summary victory on the issue of GE's liability and concluding that all of plaintiffs' state law claims, save for one based on New York's Navigation Law, were pre-empted. Town of Halfmoon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 202 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Halfmoon I").

The second of these decisions denied GE's motion for partial reconsideration of that latter conclusion, rejecting GE's assertion that proper application of the doctrine of conflict pre-emption required dismissal of plaintiffs' New York Navigation Law claims as well. Town of Halfmoon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2015 WL 6872308 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2015) ("Halfmoon II").

The instant decision aims to resolve the parties' still-pending motions to exclude, in whole or in part, the testimony of a litany of experts, thereby clearing the final major hurdle left standing before the liability phase of a trial can be scheduled in this matter.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 702 permits a witness "who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to "testify in the form of an opinion orotherwise" provided that: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702.

"The law assigns district courts a 'gatekeeping' role in ensuring that expert testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule 702." United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 158 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 833 (2011). This role as gatekeeper requires a court to make three, related findings before permitting a person to testify as an expert: "(1) the witness is qualified to be an expert; (2) the opinion is based upon reliable data and methodology; and (3) the expert's testimony on a particular issue will 'assist the trier of fact.'" Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005)).

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that bear on the reliability aspect of this inquiry: "(1) whether a theory or technique has been or can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the technique's known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007). "These factors do not constitute, however, a definitive checklist ortest. Rather, [t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one." Davis v. Carroll, 937 F. Supp. 2d 390, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted).¹

The flexibility contemplated by Rule 702 is particularly helpful when an expert's testimony does not rest on traditional scientific methods. "In such cases, where a proposed expert witness bases her testimony on practical experience rather than scientific analysis, courts recognize that '[e]xperts of all kinds tie observations to conclusion through the use of what Judge Learned Hand called 'general truths derived from . . . specialized experience.'" Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999)). "Thus, the Daubert factors do not necessarily apply even in every instance in which reliability of scientific testimony is challenged, and in many cases, the reliability inquiry may instead focus upon personal knowledge and experience of the expert." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Whether based on traditional science or specialized experience, Rule 702 further mandates that an expert "stay within the reasonable confines of [their] subject area, and [thus] cannot render expert opinion on an entirely different field or discipline." Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd sub nom., Lappe v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd. of Japan, 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996). In other words, "where an expert is admitted under Rule 702 and then purports to offer opinions beyond the scope of their expertise, courts strike the extraneous testimony, as the admission of an expert does not provide that individual with carte blanche to opine on every issue in the case." Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 413.

As always, "[t]he proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of 'establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.'" Valente, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting Williams, 506 F.3d at 160). Importantly, however, "[t]he Second Circuit has held that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is a general presumption of admissibility of evidence." Hilaire v. DeWalt Indus. Tool Co., 54 F. Supp. 3d 223, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.

Ultimately, "a trial judge should exclude expert testimony if it is speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are "so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith" or to be in essence "an apples and oranges comparison." Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2009). However, "[t]o the extent that a party questions the weight of the evidence upon which the other party's expert relied or the conclusions generated from the expert's assessment of that evidence, it may present those challenges through cross-examination of the expert." R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So, 748 F. Supp. 2d 244, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Simply put, "our adversary system provides the necessary tools for challenging reliable, albeit debatable, expert testimony." Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION²

The prior decisions delineated five principal issues for the liability phase of trial on plaintiffs' remaining claims. With regard to Saratoga and SCWA (collectively "Saratoga"),Halfmoon I held that a fact-finder must first determine whether: (1) the decision to locate the intake at Moreau was part of an effort to avoid the...