Townsend v. City of Boca Raton

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RICHARD J. TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BOCA RATON, FLORIDA, a Florida municipal corporation, and ADAM KENISTON, individually, Defendants.

No. 23-CV-80637-AMC

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 14, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 6]

BRUCE E. REINHART, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants City of Boca Raton, Florida (the “City”), and Adam Keniston (collectively, “Defendants”) seek dismissal of Plaintiff Richard Townsend's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Motion”). ECF No. 6. I have reviewed the Motion, Mr. Townsend's Response (ECF No. 8), and Defendants' Reply (ECF No. 9). I also conducted oral argument on July 24, 2023. ECF No. 17. I am fully advised and this matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons stated below, the Motion should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr Townsend filed his initial two-count complaint in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, on October 21, 2021, alleging false arrest against the City and malicious prosecution against Officer Keniston. ECF No. 1-4 at 4-10. On March 13, 2023, Mr. Townsend filed an Amended Complaint in state court alleging, under Florida law false arrest against the City (Count I), and malicious prosecution (Count II), and trespass (Count III) against Officer Keniston; as well as, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), false arrest (Count IV) and malicious prosecution (Count VI) against Officer Keniston, and false arrest against the City for lack of supervision and training (Count V). (“Amended Complaint”). ECF Nos. 1-2 at 4-24; 1-3. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on April 11, 2023. ECF No. 1. Thereafter, Defendants filed the instant Motion asking to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 6.

LEGAL STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must view the well-pled factual allegations in a claim in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). Viewed in that manner, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the claim are true (even if doubtful in fact). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The scope of the court's review on a motion to dismiss is limited to the four corners of the complaint and the documents attached to the complaint or directly referred to in the complaint. Jordan v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 439 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1240 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (J. King).

FACTS ALLEGED IN AMENDED COMPLAINT

According to the Amended Complaint, numerous vehicle and other thefts occurred near Mr. Townsend's residence prior to May 16, 2020. ¶ 12.^[1] On May 16, 2020, the City's tactical team learned that a vehicle known to commit auto burglaries and auto thefts was in the area of Mr. Townsend's home; Officer Keniston was part of that team. ¶¶ 31, 32. That night, Mr. Townsend and his wife were awakened and alerted to movements in their front yard and driveway via their RING surveillance camera system. ¶ 14. An individual wearing all black was walking around the driveway and shining a flashlight into Mr. Townsend's pickup truck. ¶ 15. While Mr. Townsend's wife called 911 to report a suspicious incident, Mr. Townsend grabbed his firearm and exited his residence. ¶¶ 16-17. The individual wearing all black then began to walk away from Mr. Townsend's residence toward a black unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe parked near the residence. ¶ 18. After Mr. Townsend shouted at the individual, the individual drove away from the residence in the unmarked vehicle while Mr. Townsend was standing on the side of his street. ¶ 19. The individual, who Mr. Townsend alleges was Officer Keniston, did not identify himself as a police officer during these events. ¶ 20.

Shortly thereafter, the unmarked vehicle returned to Mr. Townsend's residence with its blue lights activated. ¶ 21. Officer Keniston ordered Mr. Townsend to place his firearm on the street. Id. Mr. Townsend complied with the officer's orders. ¶ 22.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Townsend did not point his firearm at Officer Keniston at any time and that Officer Keniston did not claim a firearm was pointed at him the night of the incident. ¶¶ 23, 25, 46. Officer Keniston allegedly reported that “an intoxicated individual was carrying a firearm” and that Mr. Townsend “raised his arm at him while [Officer] Keniston was in the neighborhood.” ¶¶ 37, 38. At a later date, Officer Keniston stated in a probable cause affidavit that he saw Mr. Townsend raise a dark object in his hands toward Officer Keniston's vehicle, which appeared to be a handgun. ¶ 47.

Officer Keniston ultimately arrested Mr. Townsend for felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. ¶ 40. Mr. Townsend alleges that the arrest was without probable cause and that Officer Keniston lied in his probable cause affidavit about seeing Mr. Townsend raise a dark object toward his vehicle. ¶¶ 45, 47. Mr. Townsend suggests that Officer Keniston's statement related to seeing the dark object raised toward his vehicle is unbelievable because it was late at night and Officer Keniston's vehicle had darkly tinted windows. ¶ 49. Additionally, Mr. Townsend alleges that Officer Keniston knew that Mr. Townsend mistakenly believed that Officer Keniston was a thief trespassing on his private residence at the time of the arrest. ¶¶ 40, 48.

Mr. Townsend was held without bond for two days until he could appear before a judge. ¶ 54. On June 9, 2020, prior to arraignment, the State Attorney's Office entered a “no file” and dismissed the criminal charges. ¶ 59.

PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

1. Motion

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 6 at 2. Defendants argue that Mr. Townsend's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims should be dismissed because the relevant allegations in the Amended Complaint show that Officer Keniston had probable cause to arrest Mr. Townsend. Id. at 3-7. Specifically, Defendants allege that Officer Keniston “could have reasonably believed” that Mr. Townsend pointed a gun at his vehicle while he drove away from Mr. Townsend's residence. Id. at 6. Separately, Defendants argue that the Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Officer Keniston should be dismissed because Mr. Townsend's arrest cannot serve as the predicate deprivation of liberty required for a federal malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 7-8.

Next, Defendants argue that the trespass claim against Officer Keniston, in his individual capacity, must be dismissed pursuant to Florida's sovereign immunity statute because the Amended Complaint does not allege that Officer Keniston acted with bad faith or malicious purpose. Id. at 8-10. In the alternative, Defendants argue that the trespass claim should be dismissed because Officer Keniston's entry onto Mr. Townsend's property was justified because he was either making a general inquiry or was responding to an emergency situation in the lawful performance of his duty. Id. at 10-12. Further, Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege appropriate damages for Mr. Townsend's trespass claim. Id. at 12.

Defendants argue Mr. Townsend's Section 1983 claim against the City fails because the Amended Complaint fails to allege a City custom or policy that caused a violation of Mr. Townsend's constitutional rights. Id. at 12-14. Specifically, Defendants argue that even if the City had a policy of encouraging its tactical team officers to enter private property, Mr. Townsend's Section 1983 claim fails because the conduct related to the alleged policy or custom is not unconstitutional. Id. at 14. Finally, the City argues that the Amended Complaint fails to point to any occurrence, other than Mr. Townsend's arrest, in which the City's conduct resulted in a violation of rights. Id. at 15.

2. Response

Mr. Townsend responds that the Motion is untimely because the state court issued an order requiring Defendants to file their responsive pleading by April 12, 2023, and the Motion was not filed until April 18, 2023 (after Defendants filed the notice of removal). ECF No. 8 at 1 n.1. In addition, Mr. Townsend argues that he has pled sufficient facts to establish a false arrest claim under Florida law and Section 1983, including allegations related to Officer Keniston's lack of probable cause for the arrest; he cites to specific allegations in the Amended Complaint that support his claims. Id. at 3-5. Similarly, Mr. Townsend cites to specific facts in the Amended Complaint that he argues are sufficient to support his malicious prosecution and trespass claims. Id. at 5-8.

Mr Townsend further contends he has alleged sufficient facts to...