Townsend v. Town of Brusly

421 F.Supp.3d 352

Kasey TOWNSEND

v.TOWN OF BRUSLY, et al.

CIVIL ACTION 18-554-SDD-EWD

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed November 8, 2019

J. Arthur Smith, III, Joseph Arthur Smith, IV, Smith Law Firm, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff.

John Scott Thomas, Louisiana Municipal Association, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant.

RULING

SHELLY D. DICK, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment¹ by Defendant, Town of Brusly ("Defendant").² Plaintiff, Kasey Townsend ("Plaintiff") has filed an Opposition³ to this motion. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's motion should be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff became employed as a patrolman with the Brusly Police Department on November 13 2013.⁴ On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff informed Chief Jonathan Lefeaux ("Chief Lefeaux") and Assistant Chief Tom Southon ("Southon") of her pregnancy.⁵ Plaintiff advised her superiors that, during her last pregnancy while employed by the Plaquemine Police Department, she was able to obtain a light duty position until her delivery.⁶ In response to this notification, Chief Lefeaux requested Plaintiff provide conformation from her physician of both her pregnancy and what patrolman duties she would be capable of performing during her pregnancy.⁷ Although Plaintiff had not seen her physician yet, Plaintiff informed Chief Lefeaux that, during her last pregnancy, she was restricted from carrying a firearm, but she also stated that she felt capable of performing her duties in the meantime.⁸ On March 30, 2015, Defendant received a letter from Plaintiff's doctor requesting that Plaintiff obtain a light duty position during her pregnancy.⁹ On March 31, Southon advised Plaintiff to take the next two days off with pay.¹⁰

Plaintiff received a letter from Chief Lefeaux advising that she was scheduled to work the night shift on April 6, 2015.¹¹ This letter also informed Plaintiff that if she had not been able to contact a doctor or had not been removed from light duty status by April 6, she would need to complete a request for leave.¹² Thus, on April 6, Plaintiff requested copies of the following documents from Chief Lefeaux: the letter received via fax from Plaintiff's obstetrician, Dr. Ryan Dickerson, at Woman's Hospital; a list of dates Plaintiff had taken off since the beginning of her employment with Defendant; the date Plaintiff began part-time work; the amount of time off available to Plaintiff, including sick leave and comp time; the date of council meetings in reference to employment/leave of Plaintiff; and the names of council members involved in the decision-making relating to Plaintiff's employment.¹³

On April 14, a letter was sent from the Town Clerk to Plaintiff indicating her available leave time and information regarding council meetings wherein her employment was addressed.¹⁴ On April 16, Plaintiff received a letter from Chief Lefeaux indicating that, because she refused to execute a release for Defendant to speak to her doctor, Defendant could not consider possible accommodations for her pregnancy.¹⁵

Plaintiff's counsel responded to Chief Lefeaux on April 21 in a letter indicating that Plaintiff was not refusing to provide information from her doctor for reasonable accommodations but advising that Plaintiff's first appointment with the doctor was not until April 28, 2015.¹⁶ Chief Lefeaux responded to Plaintiff by letter which notified Plaintiff that, as of April 24, Plaintiff's sick and regular leave time would be exhausted, and unpaid administrative leave would begin April 25.¹⁷ This letter also stated that there were no light duty positions available in the department at that time.¹⁸

On approximately May 5, 2015, a meeting was held at the Smith Law Firm wherein Plaintiff, Southon, former Brusly Mayor Joey Normand ("Mayor Normand"), and Plaintiff's former counsel Adrienne Rachel ("Rachel") were present. Rachel made various accommodation requests and/or reassignment/light-duty requests that would accommodate Plaintiff's pregnancy, but all requests were rebuffed by Defendant's representatives.¹⁹ Rachel attested that Defendant's representatives refused to discuss her inquiry regarding any available positions in Brusly city government.²⁰ Defendant's representatives also appeared uninterested in having any discussions with Plaintiff's obstetrician to arrive at a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff.²¹ In fact, Rachel attested that, during this meeting, Mayor Normand stated that if Plaintiff wanted to keep her job, she should not stay pregnant, at which point Rachel ended the meeting.²²

Plaintiff's POST certification²³ lapsed in May of 2015.²⁴ Officer Anthony Dupre was hired on November 11, 2015 to work full-time in Plaintiff's position.²⁵ At some point in early January, Plaintiff's counsel contacted Defendant and advised that she was able to return to full-duty.²⁶ A meeting was held on January 11, 2016 to discuss Plaintiff's future with Defendant. Chief Lefeaux testified that Defendant's attorney advised Plaintiff that if she dropped her EEOC complaint and lawsuit, Defendant would consider reinstating her to her previous position; when Plaintiff declined to do so, she was terminated in that very meeting.²⁷ Thus, on January 11, 2016, Plaintiff was formally terminated because, according to Defendant, she was no longer qualified for her patrolman position, and her POST certification had lapsed.²⁸

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendant on May 16, 2018 after receiving her Right to Sue Letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Plaintiff asserts claims of sex discrimination in violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,²⁹ pregnancy discrimination in violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") of 1978,³⁰ as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,³¹ and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").³² Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all Plaintiff's claims.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."³³ "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."³⁴ A party moving for summary judgment "must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."³⁵ If the moving party satisfies its burden, "the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’ "³⁶ However, the non-moving party's burden "is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence."³⁷

Notably, "[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ "³⁸ All reasonable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.³⁹ However, "[t]he Court has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim."⁴⁰ "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts ... will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations ... to get to a jury without any "significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint." ’ "⁴¹

B. Discrimination under the PDA

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids a covered employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex."⁴² Enacted in 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") added two clauses to Title VII. The first specifies that "[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in Title VII] include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."⁴³ The second provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."⁴⁴ A plaintiff may prove disparate treatment claims "either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. "⁴⁵

The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for disparate-treatment claims under the PDA in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ,⁴⁶ wherein the plaintiff claimed that the United Parcel Service ("UPS") violated Title VII and the PDA "in refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related lifting restriction."⁴⁷ The evidence in Young showed that "UPS had a light-duty-for-injury policy with respect to numerous other persons, but not with respect to pregnant workers," and that it "accommodated several individuals when they suffered disabilities that created work restrictions similar to [the plaintiff's]," but not all injured workers.⁴⁸ The plaintiff and UPS drew dramatically different conclusions from this evidence. The plaintiff read the second clause of the PDA literally, believing that she only needed to show that UPS accommodated "one or two workers" who were similarly situated in their ability or inability to work, regardless of their specific circumstances.⁴⁹ In contrast, UPS argued that the second clause merely clarified the first clause defining sex discrimination...