Trade Links, LLC v. Bi-Qem SA De CV

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TRADE LINKS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. BI-QEM SA de CV, ET AL., Defendant(s).

No. 3:19-CV-00308 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES (ECF NO. 266)

KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Trade Links, LLC's motion for attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $1,750,054.79 incurred in connection with this litigation which resulted in a jury trial against the Defendants, Bi-Qem SA de CV and Bi-Qem, Inc. (together “Defendants”). For the reasons that follow Plaintiff is awarded $712,303.27 in attorneys' fees and $63,541.02 in costs.

Facts and Procedural History

For purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and repeats only those necessary for disposing of the instant motions.

In March of 2019, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendants. Over the course of the litigation leading up to trial, Plaintiff asserted or attempted to assert twelve separate causes of action arising out of the breakdown in the parties' business relationship: (1) breach of contract (2) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq., (3) violation of the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133e, et seq., (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) interference with business expectancy, (6) violation of the Connecticut sales representatives commissions statute (“Commissions Statute”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-481, et seq., (7) violation of the Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A, § 1, et seq., (“Chapter 93A”), (8) vexatious litigation in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-568, (9) unjust enrichment, (10) breach of implied contract, (11) fraudulent misrepresentation, and (12) fraud in the inducement.

Some of these claims were disallowed. Some were dismissed by the Court and others withdrawn voluntarily by Plaintiff. By the time the case was submitted to the jury, only four claims remained: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) CUTPA, and (4) Chapter 93A. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on the first two claims, and in favor of Defendants on the latter two. Judgment accordingly entered in favor of Plaintiff on June 13, 2022.

After the trial, both parties moved for attorneys' fees and costs. The Court denied Defendants' request and simultaneously ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to recover fees under the parties' governing contract, the Sales Representative Agreement (“SRA”). See ECF No. 309. Because Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees did not address the amount to be awarded to be Plaintiff, Defendants sought and were permitted to file supplemental briefing rebutting Plaintiff's request as to the propriety of the amount sought. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lengthy submission in response to Defendants' supplemental objection, of which the Court considers only the memorandum of law and not the attached affidavits and exhibits. See ECF No. 334 at 6.

Standard of Review

“In diversity cases, attorney's fees are considered substantive and are controlled by state law.” U.S. v. One Parcel of Property Located at 414 Kings Highway, No. 5:91-CV-158 (EBB), 1999 WL 301704, at *4 (D.Conn. May 11, 1999) (citations omitted). “Where a contract provides for the payment of attorney's fees ... those fees are recoverable solely as a contract right.... Therefore, the language of the [contract] governs the award of fees.”^[1]Watson Real Est., LLC v. Woodland Ridge, LLC, 208 Conn.App. 115, 125, 264 A.3d 96, 102-03, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 577 (2021). Recovery is therefore permissible so long as the request for fees “is not unreasonable upon its face and has not been shown to be unreasonable by countervailing evidence or by the exercise of the court's own expert judgment.” Id.

Several factors govern a court's determination of an appropriate award of attorneys' fees. These factors, summarized in Rule 1.5(a) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, include: “the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; the amount involved and the results obtained; the time limitations imposed by the client; the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” WiFiLand, LLP v. Hudson, 153 Conn.App. 87, 103, 100 A.3d 450, 459 (2014). Additionally, courts “may rely on their general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorney's fees.” Total Recycling Servs. of Ct., Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Servs., LLC, 308 Conn. 312, 327, 63 A.3d 896, 905 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“[A] party may recover attorney's fees for unsuccessful claims, but those claims must be inextricably intertwined and involve a common basis in fact or legal theory with the successful claims.” Francini v. Riggione, 193 Conn.App. 321, 336, 219 A.3d 452, 462 (2019). A further “key consideration in evaluating a claim for litigation expenses is the overall extent of the success achieved. Where a party succeeds on one claim, but fails on other claims brought in the same suit, the size of his attorneys fee award should reflect his success, as determined by the trial court in securing redress for the injuries that prompted his successful claim and reasonable legal cost incurred in pursuing this success.” Rice v. Ryders Health Mgmt., Inc., No. KNL136016915S, 2016 WL 3769093, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Discussion

Plaintiff buckets its fees request into the following categories: the parties' prior arbitration and state court proceedings (totaling $325,448.26)^[2]; commencement of the underlying civil action and its initial discovery and motion practice (totaling $435,975.83); “heavy” discovery international depositions by remote protocol, and summary judgment (totaling $510,488.67); initial motions in limine following the Court's ruling on summary judgment (totaling $59,398.80); and preparation of the joint trial memorandum, jury selection, and trial (totaling $418,743.23). See Pl.'s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 267. In total, Plaintiff seeks a fee award of $1,750,054.79.

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's submission is deficient because it lacks affidavits from some of Plaintiff's attorneys and because Plaintiff did not submit contemporaneous time records of its attorneys. Defs. Mem. in Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 313. Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff seeks fees for “excessive and duplicative time,” including time spent “conferencing and strategizing”; that its submission is riddled with vague descriptions and compensation for time spent on matters not within the purview of the underlying civil action; and that Plaintiff has block billed and seeks fees for work that established a right to indemnification. Id. at 3-6. Defendants further claim that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover fees for any claims other than breach of contract under the language of the SRA. Id. at 7, 12. Finally, Defendants urge the Court to apply an overall “downward modification” of at least 75% of the requested fees, pointing to Plaintiff's “very limited success” in pressing most of its original claims. Id. at 13, 17.

Having considered the parties' arguments, the Court has determined that Plaintiff is not entitled to the full amount of fees sought and is instead entitled to $712,303.27.

First, the Court subtracts from the starting point of the analysis the $325,448.26 sought in connection with the prior arbitration and state court litigation, which results in a total possible award of $1,424,606.53. Next, in determining the amount of the award, the Court does not question counsel's hourly rates and finds them to be reasonable. However, considering the various factors outlined above, there are significant reasons to further reduce the award sought by Plaintiff.

This litigation has been marred by excessive and unreasonable litigation strategies by all parties, plaintiff included. See, e.g., ECF No. 112, Order (“Although the parties in this litigation have evinced a reluctance to agree on anything, have chosen a wasteful and contentious litigation strategy, and their experienced counsel do not appear inclined to suggest a different path, nothing in this Order precludes the parties from agreeing to an alternative arrangement for taking Mr. Coppari's deposition.”) Plaintiff commenced this action with the filing of an eight count Complaint, which contained claims that were not, and could not be, plausibly alleged based upon the facts contained therein. After much time and briefing, the Court dismissed with prejudice count three, purportedly brought under the Connecticut Franchise Act and count eight, a statutory vexatious litigation claim. Particularly unfounded, and arguably frivolous, was Plaintiff's effort to bring the allegations within the parameters of the Connecticut Franchise Act. Plaintiff also sought to amend the complaint to add four new causes of action. Again, after significant briefing, the Court denied the request to add two fraud-based claims because they were inadequately pled. The Court permitted two additional contract-based claims unjust enrichment and breach of implied contract but only as against one defendant. See ECF No. 121.

In addition, through summary judgment briefing, Plaintiff was...