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DAMIAN R. TRAPANI, Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, et al., Defendants.
No. 9:21-CV-0681 (LEK/ML)
United States District Court, N.D. New York
November 19, 2021
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
LAWRENCE E. KAHN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Damian Trapani commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), together with an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”); Dkt. No. 3 (“IFP Application”).[1] By Decision and Order entered on July 27, 2021, this Court granted Plaintiff's IFP Application, and following review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissed the claims asserted in the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 7 (“July 2021 Order”). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, he was afforded an opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Id. at 13-15.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's amended complaint. Dkt. No. 11 (“Amended Complaint”).
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II.DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint and July 2021 Order
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims based on alleged wrongdoing that occurred during his incarceration within the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) in 2018. See generally Compl.
The Complaint was construed to assert Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility Cunningham, Superintendent of Five Points Correctional Facility Colvin, and DOCCS Commissioner Annucci based on allegations that Plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation and wrongfully incarcerated after his 2016 criminal conviction was overturned. See July 2021 Order at 4-6.
After reviewing the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. at 6-15.
B. Overview of the Amended Complaint
The Amended Complaint asserts Section 1983 claims based on alleged wrongdoing that occurred after Plaintiff's 2016 criminal conviction was overturned. See generally Am. Compl. The following facts are set forth as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
“On July 22, 2016, plaintiff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 - 4 years in state prison after he entered a plea to attempted burglary in the third degree, in open court, at the Schenectady County Superior Court.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24. On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred into DOCCS' custody pursuant to a commitment order signed by Schenectady County Superior Court Judge Matthew Spyneiwski. Id. ¶ 25.
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On June 7, 2018, “the judgment entered by the Schenectady County Superior Court was reversed, on the law, and the indictment underlying plaintiff's 2016 sentence and conviction for attempted burglary was dismissed by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department, Appellate Division[.]” Id. ¶ 26. The Appellate Division granted the People “leave to resubmit any appropriate charges to another grand jury[.]” Id. ¶ 27. At the time of the Appellate Division's decision, Plaintiff was “confined in punitive segregation” at Five Points Correctional Facility (“Five Points C.F.”). Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
On June 12, 2018, Plaintiff was released from DOCCS' custody and transported by the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department to Schenectady County Correctional Facility (“Schenectady County C.F.”). Id. ¶ 30. Immediately before Plaintiff was released from DOCCS' custody, he was told to pack up his personal belongings because he was being released, and given “state issued release clothes, ” “a receipt of the funds released from his inmate account, along with a check for the stated amount[, ]” and “a Property Receipt[.]” Id. ¶ 31.
Following Plaintiff's arrival at Schenectady County C.F. on June 12, 2018, he was placed in punitive segregation over his objection. Id. ¶ 36. Defendant Corrections Sergeant Timothy Bruce supervised Plaintiff's admission into punitive segregation, and informed Plaintiff that he was being placed there because that is where he was housed at Five Points C.F. Id. ¶ 37. Defendant Schenectady County Sheriff Dominic D'Agostino authorized Plaintiff's placement in punitive segregation. Id. ¶ 77.
The next day, Plaintiff was transported to the County Courthouse for proceedings before the Superior Court of Schenectady County. Id. ¶ 38. Prior to appearing before the judge, Plaintiff was advised by his assigned counsel that the People had “elected to present the matter before
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another grand jury panel and . . . were extending a plea deal of 1.5 - 3 years incarceration as a predicate felon [sic] instead of the 2 - 4 years he was initially sentenced to[.]” Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff advised his attorney that he would take the deal “because he already had enough time in to qualify for conditional release.” Id.
After Plaintiff visited with his attorney, he was brought before Judge Spyneiwski, the sentencing judge who presided over his 2016 conviction. Id. ¶ 42. Judge Spyneiwski “arraigned plaintiff on felony informations charging him with burglary in the third degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree” and Plaintiff then “pled guilty to a Superior Court Information charging him with attempted burglary in the third degree in full satisfaction of the entire docket[, ] and was sentenced to 1.5 - 3 years incarceration in state prison.” Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff was given credit for the time he already served for the 2016 burglary conviction and sentence that was reversed, and advised by Judge Spyneiwski that his sentence would “be treated as a new and separate commitment[, ]” which was also noted in his new commitment papers. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
Following the court proceeding, Plaintiff encountered a detainee named Armando Henry, who told Plaintiff that he would be placed back in punitive segregation and denied early release once he re-entered DOCCS custody, as this previously happened to Henry. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
On June 14, 2018, Plaintiff was transported by the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department to Downstate Correctional Facility (“Downstate C.F.”). Am. Compl., ¶ 49. Although Plaintiff arrived at Downstate C.F. with “a new set of sentencing minutes and a new commitment order[, ]” he was “classified . . . as a routine court return pursuant to the 2016 commitment order that was no longer valid[.]” Id. ¶ 52. As a result of Plaintiff's classification, and despite his objection, he was placed back in punitive segregation. Id. ¶ 53.
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One of the corrections sergeants at the facility “disagreed with the decision made by the other staff to place plaintiff back in punitive segregation for disciplinary sanctions imposed on him prior to him being released and committed again to the custody of DOCCS.” Id. ¶ 54. This official later advised Plaintiff that the issue of whether Plaintiff should be housed in punitive segregation “was taken all the way up to the Superintendent[, ]” defendant Robert Morton, Jr., “to no avail.” Id. ¶ 55. This official also advised Plaintiff that “it was essentially up to [defendant Morton] whether to place an inmate, upon returning from a court-ordered discharge, back in punitive segregation.” Id.
At some point, Plaintiff was “interview[ed]” by “parole staff.” Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff was not “released within the 10-day time period following his interview with parole staff.” Id. “Instead, shortly after the 10-day period expired, plaintiff was transferred back to [Five Points C.F.]” and placed in punitive segregation over his objection. Id. The same sergeant who supervised Plaintiff's release on June 12, 2018, “supervised the escort of plaintiff back in punitive segregation” at Five Points C.F. Id. ¶ 57.
Following Plaintiff's arrival at Five Points C.F., “a few of [his] books and hygiene items” that he acquired prior to the reversal of his 2016 conviction were returned to him, but “the bulk of his personal belongings” were not. Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff also received a “time computation sheet” shortly after arriving at Five Points C.F., which indicated his parole hearing date, his conditional release date, and his maximum expiration date, which was December 10, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 66-67. By the time Plaintiff received this document, his parole and conditional release dates had already lapsed. Id. ¶ 67.
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Thereafter, Plaintiff “was made to go before the Time Allowance Committee[.]” Id. ¶ 68. The Time Allowance Committee (“TAC”) recommended that “all good behavior allowances be withheld from plaintiff . . . based on his poor behavior and lack of progress and achievement in the treatment programs he was assigned” before his 2016 conviction was reversed. Id. ¶ 71. The TAC's decision was “adopted and upheld” by the Superintendent of Five Points C.F., defendant Colvin, and the Commissioner of DOCCS, defendant Annucci. Id. ¶ 72.
“Despite the loss of good behavior allowances, plaintiff was released on December 2, 2018, ” eight days before his maximum expiration date. Id. ¶ 74. Between June 12 and December 2, 2018, Plaintiff continuously remained in punitive segregation. Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff was housed in punitive segregation during this time, despite his status as a “new commitment[, ]” because defendants Annucci, Colvin, and Morton, authorized and enforced “a policy or procedure of not releasing on paper state prison inmates [assigned to] punitive segregation” after their underlying criminal convictions and sentences are “annulled and expunged[, ]” “failed to exercise adequate supervision over subordinates[, ]” and “failed to provide or enforce lawful and proper guidelines and procedures[.]” Id. ¶¶ 77, 83.
The conditions of confinement that Plaintiff endured in punitive segregation “were disproportionately different from the conditions of confinement [he]...
