Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thigpen

THE TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD THIGPEN, DALTON DAY, RAYMOND R. MURPHY, JR., FRANK R. MURPHY,and WILLIAM E. MURPHY, Individually and as Personal Representative ofthe ESTATE OF AGATHA LOUISE MURPHY, Defendants.

CV 114-121

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION

February 11, 2015

ORDER

Plaintiff, The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company ("Travelers"), filed the instant action seeking declaration from this Court that it has no obligation to defend Defendants Richard Thigpen ("Thigpen") and Dalton Day ("Day") in an underlying tort suit filed after Agatha Murphy ("Ms. Murphy") died in a fire at Thigpen's home. Now before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by Day and Travelers. (Docs. 23 & 29.) These motions present a narrow issue for the Court's determination: whether Ms. Murphy was Thigpen's"relative" at the time of the fire. Because the Court finds she was, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Travelers' favor.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2012, a fire occurred at Thigpen's home located at 8113 Sir Galahad Drive, Evans, Georgia, 30809. (Doc. 29, Ex. A at ¶ 3; Docs. 1, 9, 11, & 15 at ¶ 10.) The fire damaged Thigpen's home and, according to a lawsuit filed by Ms. Murphy's children, caused Ms. Murphy's death. (Docs. 29-2, 32, 35-1 at ¶ 7; Doc. 41; Doc. 1, Ex. A.) At all times relevant to the fire, Thigpen maintained a homeowner's insurance policy through Travelers. (Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. B.) ("the Travelers policy".) The Travelers policy set forth certain exclusions for personal liability, the terms of which are not in dispute. (Id. at 22.) In particular, the Travelers policy expressly excluded the following from coverage:

6. "Bodily injury" to you or an "insured" as defined in Definitions 7.a or b.

This exclusion also applies to any claim or suit brought against you or an "insured":

a. To repay; or

b. Share damages with;

Another person who may be obligated to pay damages because of "bodily injury" to an "insured[.]"

(Id.) Both "bodily injury" and "insured" are defined in the policy as follows:

2. "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that results.

7. "Insured" means:

a. You and residents of your household who are:

(1) Your relatives; or

(2) Other persons under the age of 21 and in the care any person named above.

b. A student enrolled in school full-time, defined by the school, who was a resident of your household before moving out to attend school, provided the student is under the age of:

(1) 24 and your relative; or

(2) 21 and in your care or the care of a person described in a.(1) above[.]

(Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).) The Travelers policy does not define "relative." As is relevant to the instant case, for Travelers to properly avoid coverage, Ms. Murphy would have to both be a resident of the home and Thigpen's relative at the time of the fire.

At the time of the fire, it is undisputed that Thigpen, Day, and Ms. Murphy were all residents of the home. (Docs. 29-2, 32, 35-1 at ¶¶ 2, 6 (hereinafter "SMF"); Doc. 41) The true controversy in this matter centers on the second question: whether Ms. Murphy was Thigpen's relative. Thigpen was married to Ms. Murphy's daughter, Barbara Thigpen, until Barbara passedaway in 2002. (SMF at ¶ 4; Doc. 41.) Ms. Murphy lived in the home for approximately thirty years and Thigpen for approximately eighteen years.¹ (Doc. 29, Ex. A at 5.) Thigpen and Barbara had three children together before her passing. (SMF at ¶ 5; Doc. 41.) Day is Thigpen's nephew. (SMF at ¶ 6; Doc. 41.)

As alluded to above, following Ms. Murphy's death, her children and estate filed suit in the Superior Court of Columbia County, Georgia against Thigpen, Day, and Blake Redd. (Doc. 1, Ex. A.) With the underlying tort suit, the plaintiffs allege that the fire was caused by the negligent disposal of lit cigarettes smoked by Day and Redd. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Both Thigpen and Day have requested coverage under the Travelers policy for the claims asserted against them in the Columbia County action. (SMF at ¶ 15; Doc. 41.) On May 1, 2014, Travelers sent Thigpen and Day reservation of rights notices, wherein Travelers agreed to provide them each with a defense subject to "a full and complete reservation of its rights."² (Doc. 37, Ex. A.) Then, on May 22, 2014, Travelers brought the instant complaint for declaratory judgment, asserting, inter alia, that because Ms. Murphy was Thigpen's relative, any injuries to her are notcovered under the policy and thus Travelers is not obligated to provide coverage or a defense to Thigpen or Day.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences in [its] favor." U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). When the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways — by negating an essential element of the non-movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Before the Court can evaluate the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.

If — and only if — the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Id. When the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. If the movant shows an absence of evidence on amaterial fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117. The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

That this matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment does not alter the Court's standard of review, "but simply requires a determination of whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed." United States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. V. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, each motion must be considered "on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Id. As the Eleventh Circuit has held:

Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed . . . . Nonetheless, cross-motionsmay be probative of the non-existence of a factual dispute when [] they demonstrate a basic agreement concerning what legal theories and material facts are dispositive.

United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bricklayers Int'l Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1975)).

In this action, the Clerk of the Court gave all parties notice of the motions for summary judgment and informed them of the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Docs. 24 & 30.) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motions are now ripe for consideration.

III. DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that the Travelers policy expressly excludes from coverage any bodily injury to an insured and that a resident relative is an "insured" for the purposes of that exclusion. Travelers argues that Ms. Murphy was, as Thigpen's mother-in-law, a relative and thus qualifies as an "insured" so that any injury suffered by her would be excluded from...