Travers v. FedEx Corporation

584 F.Supp.3d 1

Gerard TRAVERS

v.FEDEX CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-6106

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed February 10, 2022

Adam Harrison Garner, The Garner Firm Ltd., Philadelphia, PA, Colin M. Downes, R. Joseph Barton, Block & Leviton LLP, Robert D. Friedman, Institute For Constitutional Advocacy & Protection, Peter Romer-Friedman, Gupta Wessler, Washington, DC, Matthew Z. Crotty, Crotty & Son Law Firm, PLLC, Thomas G. Jarrard, Spokane, WA, Michael J. Scimone, Outten & Golden LLP, New York, NY, for Gerard Travers.

Colleen Hitch Wilson, Michael C. McLaren, Federal Express Corporation Legal Department-Litigation, Memphis, TN, Mark W. Robertson, Anton Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York, NY, Jason Zarrow, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, CA, M. Tristan Morales, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, DC, Melissa McCoy Gormly, Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., Moon Township, PA, Ryan Thomas Becker, Fox Rothschild LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Federal Express Corporation.

MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, District Judge

An Indiana member of the Indiana Air National Guard works for FedEx Corporation in Indiana. He now seeks to sue FedEx in Pennsylvania for not paying him short-term military leave. His claims arise entirely from his Indiana employment. We lack personal jurisdiction over FedEx for his claims under either specific or general jurisdiction. The Indiana citizen argues we can assert personal jurisdiction by applying a novel theory of pendent personal jurisdiction. He argues we can exercise personal jurisdiction over his claim against FedEx because a Pennsylvanian is bringing the same claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act arising from the Pennsylvanian's employment by FedEx in our District. No court in our Circuit has adopted this judge-made concept as expanding Pennsylvania's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents when Congress has not authorized nationwide service of process. We find no basis to adopt this theory. We lack personal jurisdiction over the Indiana citizen's claim. We decline to transfer his claim to another District.

I. Alleged facts

Former military reservist Gerard Travers of Pennsylvania alleges his employer FedEx Corporation violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA") by failing to pay him for short-term military leave while paying other leave benefits to non-military employees while he worked in Pennsylvania.¹ Mr. Travers may seek to certify a class of military reservists whom FedEx employs in a few weeks.² FedEx previously moved to dismiss Mr. Travers's amended Complaint, arguing laches applied.³ We denied FedEx's motion without prejudice recognizing potential fact issues subject to discovery and potential dispositive motions.⁴

Mr. Travers then filed a second amended Complaint with our leave.⁵ Mr. Travers's counsel joined Darren Beanland of Indiana as a named plaintiff and class representative.⁶ Mr. Beanland alleges FedEx employed him as an aircraft maintenance technician in Indiana since 2019.⁷ Mr. Beanland is also a flight line expediter for the Indiana Air National Guard.⁸ He took military leave for which FedEx did not pay him.⁹ Mr. Beanland asserts the same claim under USERRA as Mr. Travers.¹⁰

II. Analysis

FedEx moves to dismiss Mr. Beanland's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction over FedEx. FedEx argues we lack personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim because Mr. Beanland does not allege FedEx's purposeful availment of Pennsylvania relates to Mr. Beanland's Indiana-centric claim.¹¹ Mr. Beanland responds we only must ensure FedEx's contacts with the United States regardless of FedEx's contacts with him in this Commonwealth.¹² He alternatively argues we should exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over his claim.¹³

We disagree with Mr. Beanland. We lack personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim because Mr. Beanland does not plead his claims arise out of or relate to FedEx's contacts with Pennsylvania. We decline to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim. We dismiss Mr. Beanland's claim and require FedEx to answer the remaining allegations in the amended Complaint.

A. We lack personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim.

"Because USERRA does not provide for nationwide service of process," we "may exercise personal jurisdiction" over FedEx only if a Pennsylvania court could do so under Pennsylvania's long-arm statute.¹⁴ "Pennsylvania's long-arm statute gives its courts jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the maximum extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution."¹⁵

The Constitution recognizes two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific.¹⁶ "General jurisdiction extends to all claims against a defendant and exists where a company is ‘essentially at home.’ "¹⁷ Mr. Beanland does not plead FedEx—a Delaware corporation—is at home in Pennsylvania. So Mr. Beanland must show our specific jurisdiction.

Specific jurisdiction "covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims."¹⁸ We apply the familiar "minimum contacts" test to determine specific jurisdiction.¹⁹ The minimum contacts test entails three steps.²⁰ First, we must determine whether FedEx "purposefully avail[ed] itself" of Pennsylvania.²¹ Second, we must determine whether Mr. Beanland's claim " ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’ at least one of those activities."²² Third, we should ensure asserting personal jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice.²³

The first step of our inquiry requires us to determine whether FedEx took "some act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within" Pennsylvania.²⁴ We have no difficulty determining FedEx purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania by employing Pennsylvania residents like Mr. Travers. FedEx does not challenge this step of the inquiry.

FedEx does challenge the second step of our inquiry. The second step requires us to determine whether Mr. Beanland's claim " ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts’ with" Pennsylvania.²⁵ "[T]here must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.’ "²⁶ Mr. Beanland must demonstrate "a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ "²⁷

Mr. Beanland does not allege the faintest of relationships, let alone a strong relationship, between FedEx's Pennsylvania contacts and his claim. He alleges he worked for FedEx in Indiana and took military leave to serve for the Indiana Air National Guard. His claims have nothing to do with Pennsylvania. He simply alleges no connection between FedEx's Pennsylvania conduct and his claims. We lack personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim.

Mr. Beanland argues "[b]ecause this case is in federal court, [Mr.] Beanland need only establish minimum contacts with the country as a whole."²⁸ Not so. We analyze a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole "when the plaintiff's claim rests on a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process."²⁹ Judges constrain this analysis to federal question cases under statutes authorizing nationwide service of process.³⁰ But judges analyze personal jurisdiction for federal question claims under state long-arm statutes when Congress does not authorize nationwide service of process for the federal claims.³¹ Congress does not authorize nationwide service of process in USERRA.³² Congress in USERRA did not expand our personal jurisdiction. We must analyze personal jurisdiction under Pennsylvania's long-arm statute.³³

B. We decline to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over Mr. Beanland's claim.

Mr. Beanland urges us to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over his claim.³⁴ He argues we should exercise pendent personal jurisdiction because his claim so resembles Mr. Travers's claim, over which we indisputably have personal jurisdiction. We decline to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction.

The pendent personal jurisdiction doctrine allows judges to exercise their discretion "to hear claims as to which personal jurisdiction may otherwise be lacking if those claims arise out of a common nucleus of facts with claims as to which personal jurisdiction exists."³⁵ Courts and commentators address two types of pendent personal jurisdiction: pendent claim personal jurisdiction and pendent party personal jurisdiction.³⁶ "Pendent claim personal jurisdiction says that a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over one defendant as to one claim allows it to exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to related claims that it could not adjudicate in the anchor claim's absence."³⁷ "Pendent party personal jurisdiction recognizes that a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over one defendant as to a particular claim by one plaintiff allows it to exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to similar claims brought by other plaintiffs."³⁸

Mr. Beanland asks us to exercise pendent party personal jurisdiction over his claim.³⁹ But Mr. Beanland cites—and we find—no judge in our Circuit applying pendent party personal jurisdiction. Our Court of Appeals "has not recognized a pendent party doctrine beyond the limited circumstances of the nationwide service of process and pendent claim personal jurisdiction context."⁴⁰ Judges in our Circuit only exercise pendent "personal jurisdiction over additional claims , not necessarily over additional parties "⁴¹ —in other words, pendent claim personal jurisdiction.⁴²

The pendent party personal jurisdiction doctrine has endured heavy criticism in other circuits. Pendent party personal jurisdiction is a "judge made" doctrine supported by "no federal statute or rule."⁴³ The doctrine has a "dubious origin"; "[f]ederal courts embraced it without paying careful attention to their...