Traylor v. Gambrell

Sylvester Traylor v. Cathy Gambrell et al

No. X08FSTCV145015414S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

September 2, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS GAMBRELL AND CONNECTICUT INTERLOCAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY (#369), THE TOWN OF WATERFORD (#374) AND THE DEFENDANTS RYAN RYAN & DELUCA AND THE DEFENDANT PIATKOWKI (#376)

Robert L. Genuario, J.

I. Background

The plaintiff, who is self-represented, brings this action in two counts. The first count of the amended complaint (Docket #221 dated November 2, 2015) is entitled " Intentional Spoliation of Evidence" and is directed against all defendants. The second count entitled " Violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act" is directed only against two defendants, the defendant Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agencies (CIRMA) and the defendant law firm Ryan Ryan & Deluca (RRD). The second count has previously been stricken by the court insofar as it is addressed against RRD. See Memorandum of Decision dated December 14, 2015 (#232, Dooley, J.). All defendants have moved for summary judgment. While all defendants assert the doctrine of res judicata as grounds for summary judgment each of the defendants assert alternative grounds as well.

This is the third case brought by the plaintiff arising out of, at least in part, his allegations that " on and about March 15, 2004, during his wife's funeral service the Town of Waterford police broke into his home and removed some of his and his wife's property . . . [T]he defendants destroyed Mr. Traylor's original documents without providing him the opportunity to inspect them." See amended complaint (Docket #221 paragraph 9). The particular items that the plaintiff alleges were taken from his home on or about March 15, 2004 were a " trust document" and " attorney-client correspondence." (Collectively referred to as the trust document.) The plaintiff alleges that the trust document was taken from his home in 2004 and that the defendants conspired to destroy the original trust document depriving him of essential evidence that he needed to prosecute certain lawsuits. The plaintiff in this action seeks either replevin of the original trust document or damages for spoliation of evidence, specifically the trust document. All of the defendants have moved for summary judgment and have filed memorandum of law in support thereof. The plaintiff has filed an objection and memorandum of law in opposition thereto and the defendants have filed reply briefs. Oral argument was held on August 23, 2016.

II. Summary Judgment Standards

" Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proofs submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . ." Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 389, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). " Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits and any proof submitted show that there is not a genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).

Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized " that, in complex cases, it may be more difficult to determine in advance of trial whether there exists any disputes regarding material facts, the opinions do not stand for the proposition that summary judgment is inappropriate in complex cases where the absence of a dispute regarding material facts can be established. Succinctly stated, as a matter of law, no case is too complex for summary judgment." Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 263 Conn. 140, 141, 819 A.2d 216 (2003). (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) " Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiffs' claim and involves no triable issues of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).

" In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact . . . The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment failed to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under [the Connecticut] Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).

" Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the " material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute . . ." Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). Moreover, " summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata . . ." (Citations omitted.) Joe's Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n.8, 675 A.2d 441 (1996). " Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).

III. Discussion

A. The Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants Gambrell and CIRMA

The defendants Gambrell and CIRMA move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff cannot make out a case against these defendants for spoliation of evidence or under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff cannot prove the essential elements of a claim for spoliation of evidence or a claim under CUTPA against the defendants Gambrell and CIRMA.

In Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006) the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that " the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following essential elements: (1) the defendants' knowledge of a pending or impending civil action involving the plaintiff; (2) the defendants' destruction of evidence; (3) in bad faith, that is, with intent to deprive the plaintiff of his cause of action; (4) the plaintiffs' inability to establish a prima facie case without the spoliated evidence; and (5) damages." Rizzuto at 244-45. Thus, to support his claim, the plaintiff must prove that Gambrell and/or other agents of CIRMA participated in the destruction of the trust document and that they did so in bad faith.

In support of their motion for summary judgment the defendants submit the affidavit of the defendant Gambrell who asserts that she was a claims manager for the defendant CIRMA and is familiar with the business practices of CIRMA. The affidavit clarifies that CIRMA began insuring the defendant Town of Waterford (Waterford) in 2006. Notably the plaintiff alleges that the trust document was taken from his house in March 2004, some two years before CIRMA even began insuring and providing counsel to Waterford. The affidavit proceeds to state that neither Gambrell or other CIRMA personnel have ever seen or handled the original trust document or materials which the plaintiff claims were stolen from his home by the Waterford police, that neither she nor any other CIRMA have ever suggested, encouraged, aided or abetted the taking retention or destruction of any of the plaintiff's documents nor does she or CIRMA have any knowledge whatsoever of the whereabouts of the plaintiff's trust document. The plaintiff has not even alleged, let alone provided affidavits or other evidence which would provide a basis for claiming that the original trust document was transmitted to CIRMA or Gambrell. In the face of the Gambrell affidavit and particularly the affirmation that the defendant CIRMA didn't even insure Waterford at the time that the documents were allegedly taken, the plaintiff must provide the court with some basis to support his otherwise conclusory allegation that the defendant Gambrell and CIRMA conspired to destroy the document. Not only has the plaintiff not provided any basis or substantiation for his claim that the defendant Gambrell and/or CIRMA participated and/or conspired to destroy the trust document but in his deposition he acknowledges that he has no such evidence. At one point in his...