Trees v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 503

574 F.Supp.3d 856

Staci TREES, Plaintiff,

v.SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 503, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 6:21-cv-468-SI

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed December 8, 2021

Rebekah C. Millard, James G. Abernathy, and Shella S. Alcabes, Freedom Foundation, PO Box 552, Olympia, WA 98507. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff Staci Trees.

Scott A. Kronland, Stacey M. Leyton, and Zoe L. Palitz, Altshuler Berzon llp, 177 Post Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94108; and James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, 820 SW Second Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 503.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Oregon Attorney General; and Sadie Forzley, Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice, 100 SW Market Street, Portland, OR 97201. Of Attorneys for Defendants Oregon Department of Administrative Services and Katy Coba.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

Plaintiff Staci Trees, a state employee, brings this lawsuit against three defendants. First, Plaintiff brings claims against Service Employees International Union Local 503 (SEIU), the union she joined in October 2009 and from which she resigned in December 2020. Second, Plaintiff asserts claims against both the Oregon Department of Administrative Services (DAS) and Katy Coba, the Director of DAS (collectively, the State Defendants). DAS is the state agency that processes the union membership rolls and instructs state agency employers to deduct union dues from state employee paychecks. DAS instructed Plaintiff's state agency employer to deduct union dues from Plaintiff's paychecks through February 2021. Against all Defendants, Plaintiff asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Against only SEIU, Plaintiff also asserts a federal racketeering claim and state claims of fraud and racketeering. One of the key factual disputes is Plaintiff's allegation that SEIU "forged" Plaintiff's signature in 2016 on a new union membership agreement and dues authorization form solicited by a union organizer during a campaign asking members to reaffirm their union membership. SEIU denies any forgery.

After Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, SEIU filed an unfair labor practices (ULP) complaint against Plaintiff with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), a different state agency.¹ In SEIU's ULP complaint before the ERB, SEIU alleges that, by filing her state claims in this federal lawsuit, rather than with the ERB, Plaintiff violated state law. SEIU also alleges that under ORS § 243.806(10)(1), the ERB must determine the validity of the disputed 2016 union agreement. An ERB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard the dispute in a three-day state administrative proceeding but has not yet issued a decision. Any party may appeal the ALJ's decision to the ERB.

Now before the Court are two motions. First, the State Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to request the prospective equitable relief she seeks against them. Second, SEIU has moved to stay all claims against SEIU until after the ERB issues a final decision in the pending agency action. For the following reasons, the Court grants both motions.

STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

The U.S. Constitution confers limited authority on federal courts to hear only active cases or controversies brought by persons who demonstrate standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ; Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 568 U.S. 85, 89-90, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013). Standing "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547. A plaintiff's standing under Article III of the United States Constitution is a component of subject matter jurisdiction properly challenged under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 598 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it is the burden of the party asserting jurisdiction to establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1122 ; see also Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States , 541 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either "facial" or "factual." See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer , 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction is based on the assertion that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. "A jurisdictional challenge is factual where ‘the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.’ " Pride v. Correa , 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039 ). When a defendant factually challenges the plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction, a court does not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations and may consider evidence extrinsic to the complaint. See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq , 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039. A factual challenge "can attack the substance of a complaint's jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency." Dreier v. United States , 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

B. Standing

Standing "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To have standing, a plaintiff must have "personal interest ... at the commencement of the litigation." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The required personal interest must satisfy three elements throughout the litigation: (1) an injury in fact, i.e. , an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury-in-fact and the defendant's challenged behavior; and (3) likelihood that the injury-in-fact will be redressed by a favorable ruling. Id. at 180-81, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693 ; see also Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (reiterating that the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing consists of "an injury in fact ... fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and ... likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision").

An injury is "particularized" if it "affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). An injury is "concrete" if it is " ‘de facto ’; that is it must actually exist," meaning that it is " ‘real’ and not ‘abstract.’ " Id. " ‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, [the Supreme Court has] confirmed in many ... previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete." Id. at 1549.

A plaintiff "must show standing with respect to each form of relief sought." Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 657 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). To establish Article III standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must "allege either ‘continuing, present adverse effects’ " of a defendant's past illegal conduct, "or ‘a sufficient likelihood that [he] will again be wronged in a similar way.’ " Villa v. Maricopa Cnty. , 865 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), and City of L.A. v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). Additionally, standing to seek equitable relief requires "a showing of an inadequate remedy at law and ... a serious risk of irreparable harm." Pulliam v. Allen , 466 U.S. 522, 537, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) ; see also O'Shea , 414 U.S. at 499, 94 S.Ct. 669.

When a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, threat of repeated future injury may suffice to provide standing. See Nordstrom v. Ryan , 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief "must demonstrate ‘that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of [the violation].’ " Armstrong v. Davis , 275 F.3d 849, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California , 543 U.S. 499, 504-05, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005). The threat of repeated future injury, however, may not be "conjectural or hypothetical." O'Shea , 414 U.S. at 494, 94 S.Ct. 669 (quotation marks omitted).

C. Motion to Stay

"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). "A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case." Lockyer v. Mirant Corp. , 398 F.3d 1098, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd. , 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) ). The trial court's authority to stay "applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court." Id. (quoting Leyva , 593 F.2d at 863-64 ). In exercising this discretion, the Ninth Circuit has...