Trent-Kettlekamp v. Adams

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BAILEY TRENT-KETTLEKAMP, PETITIONER, v. RICHARD ADAMS,^[1]RESPONDENT.

No. 22-cv-4096-NKL

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division

May 2, 2023

ORDER

NANETTE K. LAUGHREY United States District Judge

Petitioner Trent Bailey-Kettlekamp was incarcerated in Algoa Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri. On December 17, 2015, Petitioner punched another inmate, Harley Holt in the side of the head. When Holt fell to the ground Petitioner kicked him in the head. Holt was taken into protective custody and received medical attention. Holt eventually declined additional medical care and was placed in another cell. However, Holt's mental condition quickly deteriorated, until he eventually became unresponsive. Paramedics transported Holt to the nearest trauma center in Columbia, Missouri. Holt had suffered brain injuries, and while medical professionals performed surgery, they were unable to restore brain function. Holt developed pneumonia because of his condition and died; Holt's cause of death was ruled blunt force trauma with the contributing factor of early pneumonia.

Petitioner was charged, and later convicted, of second-degree felony murder and committing violence against a prisoner. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder and ten years for committing violence against an offender of the Department of Corrections. The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Western Division of Missouri's Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”). After his conviction was affirmed, Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion in the state court. The state court denied relief, and that denial was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.^[2]

Before the Court is Petitioner's Amended Petitioner for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Doc. 15. In it, Petitioner makes nine claims for federal habeas relief.

I. STANDARD

A federal court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on a claim adjudicated in state court if the state proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law when the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law when the state court identifies the correct legal standard or rule, but nevertheless applies it unreasonably. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. Under this standard, “[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes habeas relief so long as fair minded jurists could disagree.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011); see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (“The critical point is that relief is available under § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fair-minded disagreement' on the question.”). The state court's decision must have been objectively unreasonable; it is not enough that a federal habeas court simply believes that the state court got it wrong. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11.

A federal court may also grant habeas relief if a state court's decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). While a state court's fact finding is presumed to be correct, a “state court decision that rests upon a determination of fact that lies against the clear weight of the evidence is, by definition, a decision ‘so inadequately supported by the record' as to be arbitrary and therefore objectively unreasonable.” Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 703-704 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Simmons v. Luebbers, 299 F.3d 929, 937938 (8th Cir. 2002).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claim One: Whether the Denial of Petitioner's Batson Challenge Justifies Relief

Petitioner first argues that the state court prosecutor used a racially motivated preemptory strike in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Peremptory strikes have long been a part of our jury trial system; in a criminal trial, they permit both the prosecutor and the defense counsel to remove a potential juror from the jury pool “based entirely on his or her instinct or gut feeling that an individual would not be a favorable juror.” Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2008). However, an attorney's discretion is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor's racially motivated decision to strike a juror from the jury pool. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (“The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race.”). When a criminal defendant claims that a prosecutor has used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based on her race, courts use a three-step process to determine whether the claim has merit.

First, the defendant must make prima facie showing of racial discrimination, namely, that the prospective juror is a member of an identifiable racial minority, and that the individual was stricken because of his or her race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show that a racially neutral reason exists for striking the potential juror. Id. at 97. Third, the court must determine whether the prosecutor proffered a race neutral explanation or whether the reason given was pretextual. Id. at 98.

Petitioner raised his Batson challenge with the trial court, and then during his direct appeal. The trial court denied the challenge, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner does not argue that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard. The Court of Appeals properly relied on the three-step test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson. The Court of Appeals concluded that while Petitioner claimed that a potential juror was excluded because of his race, the prosecutor successfully identified a non-pretextual race neutral motivation for the strike. Specifically, the prosecutor struck venireperson 29, a Black man, because he, multiple times, indicated that inmates were “State property” that the state therefore has the obligation to care for them. Doc. 5-13, at 5-6. The prosecutor was concerned that venireperson 29 would rely on his beliefs about Holt's relationship with the Department of Corrections, rather than what the law requires of the DOC. Id. Petitioner argues that the state court's decision at step 2 and 3 - its findings that the prosecutor offered a nondiscriminatory motivation for the strike and that it was not pretextual - resulted from an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and was based on unreasonable fact finding.

First, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals to credit the prosecutor's explanation. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338, 126 S.Ct. 969 (noting that a federal habeas court can grant a § 2254 petition based on Batson only if it was unreasonable for the state court to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations). The relationship between the DOC and Holt-specifically what that relationship required of the DOC-was at the core of Petitioner's defense, given he contended that it was the state's failure to provide appropriate medical care, not Petitioner's violence, that caused Holt's death. Petitioner countered that venireperson 29 did not misstate the law by claiming inmates were State property, but rather he relied on a colloquial way of saying that the Holt was in State custody, and the State therefore had an obligation to provide care. Regardless of whether venireperson 29 misstated the law, what matters is that the prosecutor struck him because venireperson 29 had a strong pre-conceived legal belief about which venireperson 29 “boast[ed]” several times. Doc. 5-3, at 96:2-8. Whether venireperson 29 was relying on a colloquialism or not, he several times stated pre-conceived beliefs about the DOC's obligations, and it was therefore not unreasonable to credit the prosecutor's subjective belief that venireperson 29 would bring his beliefs into the jury room, regardless of what the ultimate jury instructions said.

Of course, the prosecutor's race neutral explanation is not the end of the analysis. The “decisive question [is] whether [the prosecutor's] race-neutral explanation for [the] peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991). In attempting to show that the prosecutor's explanation was mere pretext, the Petitioner may rely upon “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity” to show purposeful discrimination. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).

To show pretext, Petitioner argues that (1) all Back jurors were stricken form the jury and (2) the Prosecutor has a pattern of improperly striking Black jurors. The Court of Appeals did not unreasonably reject Petitioner's first argument. As that court explained, while it is true that all Black veniremembers were stricken, the venire contained only two Black members, and Petitioner conceded to the trial court that the Prosecutor struck the second Black venireperson for a valid, race-neutral reason. Doc. 5-13, at 8; Doc. 5-3, at 98:3-5. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals noted that the prosecutor struck all potential jurors that agreed with venireperson 29's statement that inmates were state property, including those who were...