Trent v. Trent

321 A.3d 454

226 Conn.App. 791

David L. TRENT

v.Katia R. TRENT

(AC 46247)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 4, 2024

Officially Released July 23, 2024

Richard W. Callahan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Clark and Seeley, Js.

CLARK, J.

₇₉₂In this postdissolution matter, the plaintiff, David L. Trent, appeals from certain judgments of the trial court stemming from two postdissolution motions filed by him and one postdissolution motion filed by the defendant, Katia R. Trent.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion for contempt, which alleged that the plaintiff failed to pay his share of child care expenses, (2) denied his motion for contempt, which claimed that the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order, and (3) denied his motion to modify alimony and child ₇₉₃support. We agree with the plaintiff on his first and third claims but disagree with him on his second claim. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment of contempt and the judgment denying the plaintiff's motion for modification as to alimony and child support. We affirm the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for contempt.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff's claims. The parties were married on July 31, 2004. They have twin children who were born in October, 2013. On March 24, 2017, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably.

On May 4, 2018, the parties filed an agreement with the court indicating their desire to settle the matter through binding arbitration. Specifically, they agreed to have an arbitrator "decide any and all financial matters submitted to the arbitrator by either party." The same day, the court, Wenzel, J., approved the parties’ stipulation, indicating that "[t]he only matter reserved is that of child support" and that "[t]he pendente lite orders of the court will remain in effect until the parties return after arbitration."

On June 19, 2018, the arbitrator issued her decision requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant $800 per week in periodic alimony "for a period of eight years, to sooner terminate on the death of either party or the defendant’s remarriage." Upon the request of the parties to provide a recommendation as to child support, the arbitrator found "the presumptive child support under the [child support] guidelines to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to be $545 per week based on [the plaintiff's] base salary." Furthermore, the arbitrator stated: "The plaintiff should pay the defendant 77 percent of all health expenditures not paid by insurance ₇₉₄and day care necessary for the defendant’s work."² On June 22, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award, requesting the court to "enter a dissolution of marriage in accordance with the arbitration decision."

On July 5, 2018, the defendant filed with the court a child support guidelines worksheet. The worksheet provided, inter alia, for a presumptive child support order of $545 per week to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. It further provided that the plaintiff would be responsible for 76 percent of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses and child care expenses, and the defendant would be responsible for 24 percent of those expenses. The plaintiff did not object to the calculations in the worksheet. On the same date, the parties filed with the court an agreement, which provided in part: "The parties agree [that] in addition to the weekly child support of $545 per week per the child support guidelines, the plaintiff shall [pay] 22.66 percent of the ₇₉₅net [of] all bonuses received." The same day, the court, Grossman, J., rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, incorporating into its judgment of dissolution the arbitration award, the parties’ July 5, 2018 agreement, and the parties’ parenting plan.³ Although neither the judgment nor the parties’ July 5, 2018 agreement expressly required the plaintiff to contribute to qualifying child care expenses, the parties agree that the judgment incorporated the arbitrator’s recommendation with respect to qualifying child care expenses but modified the plaintiff's obligation from 77 percent to 76 percent of such expenses in accordance with the defendant’s child support worksheet.

On March 15, 2021, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion to modify alimony, child support, and parenting time. As to the modification of child support and alimony, the plaintiff alleged that there had been a substantial change in circumstances, namely, that the defendant had obtained employment since the date of the dissolution judgment.⁴ The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion.

On September 16, 2022, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff was wilfully violating the court’s order requiring him to pay 76 percent of qualifying child care costs. On December 6, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt on the ground that the defendant had failed to comply with the trial court’s November 8, 2022 order to respond to all outstanding discovery requests on or before November 22, 2022.

On January 19, 2023, the trial court, Moses, J., issued its order on the plaintiff's March 15, 2021 postjudgment ₇₉₆motion to modify alimony, child support and visitation. The court denied the plaintiff's request to modify child support, stating: "[T]his court denies the plaintiff's request to modify only the child support order to reduce his contributions to child care expenses and health care expenses, as it is improper given the fact that the plaintiff is not seeking to amend the child support award in its entirety." Further, the court denied the plaintiff's request to modify alimony, ruling that it "does not find a substantial change in circumstances given the fact that the defendant is earning well under $30,000 a year."

In separate orders also issued on January 19, 2023, the court granted the defendant’s September 16, 2022 motion for contempt and denied the plaintiff's December 6, 2022 motion for contempt. As to the defendant’s motion for contempt, the court found that the plaintiff wilfully failed to comply with the court’s order requiring him to pay 76 percent of the child care expenses. The court ordered the plaintiff to "reimburse the defendant for 76 percent [of] all child care expenses incurred during the time of his noncompliance." The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees. As to the plaintiff's motion for contempt, the court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant’s noncompliance with the court’s order to respond to the plaintiff's discovery requests was not wilful. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff's first and second claims of error concern the court’s rulings on two motions for contempt, one filed by him and one filed by the defendant. First, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant’s September 16, 2022 motion for contempt because the defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he wilfully violated the court order that required him to pay 76 percent of qualifying child care expenses. Second, he claims that the court ₇₉₇erred in denying his December 5, 2022 motion for contempt because, among other things, he established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s failure to comply with the discovery order was wilful. We address each claim in turn.

[1–3] We begin with the relevant legal principles and our standard of review. "Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense. … [C]ivil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of acts. … In part because the contempt remedy is particularly harsh … such punishment should not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order] declaring … rights should be clear, or imposing burdens [should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the parties may not be misled thereby." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855, 866, 307 A.3d 923 (2023).

[4–8] "To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party has merely violated a court order; the violation must be wilful. … It is the burden of the party seeking an order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance with that directive. … The question of whether the underlying order is clear and unambiguous is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mitchell v. Bogonos, 218 Conn. App. 59, 68–69, 290 A.3d 825 (2023). "[I]f we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good ₇₉₈faith dispute or misunderstanding." In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693-94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). "Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. … [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn. App. 34, 59, 925 A.2d 334 (2007).

A

The plaintiff claims that the court erred when it granted the defendant’s motion for contempt because the defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff...