Trevillion v. Owen

1

(1) JEFF TREVILLION, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales, deceased, Plaintiff, v. (2) SCOTT OWEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff Washington County, Okla.; and (3) JAMES WATHEN, III, (4) SONIA BRETON, (5) JOSHUA DURHAM, (6) ANDREW GALANIS, (7) DAVID KERR, (8) ETHAN DONOVAN, (9) JORDAN INMAN, (10) MICHAEL HOPPER, (11) MICHAEL KITCHENS, (12) RANDY MORGAN, (13) SETH O'NEAL, (14) AARON WITT, (15) BRANDI UNDERWOOD, (16) COLTON TATTERSHALL, (17) JOSEPH RAMERIZ, and (18) REED BLACKARD, all in their individual capacities Defendants.

No. 22-cv-00473-JAR-MTS

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma

May 25, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

Jane A. Restani, Judge ^[*] Jeff Trevillion, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales, deceased, (“the Estate”) filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Perales's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Estate brings this claim against the arresting officer, the jail staff, and Sheriff Scott Owen in his official capacity. Compl. at 1. Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss filed by Sheriff Owen and Washington County Jail's nurse, Sonia Breton. See Owen's Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15 (Dec. 30, 2022) (“Owen's Br.”); Breton's Mot. Dismiss ECF No. 19 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“Breton's Br.”).

The court denies the former and grants the latter motion dismissing the claims against Sonia Breton without prejudice. In addition, limited pre-answer discovery is permitted.

I. Factual Background

As this is a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Estate alleges as follows:

Louis Perales suffered from hyperlipidemia, hypertension, diabetes, degenerative disc disease, GERD, bipolar disorder, ADHD, and anxiety. Compl. at ¶ 39. The Estate asserts that he also suffered from a substance use disorder. Id. at ¶ 38.

In the afternoon of November 3, police officer James Wathen responded to a report of a naked adult male “having a mental episode.” Compl. at ¶ 24. Wathen arrived to find Louis Perales naked and covered in urine in a bathroom that was covered in human feces. Id. at ¶ 25. Perales was waving his arms and talking incoherently, only occasionally making sense, and was unable to keep still. Id. at ¶ 28. Wathen believed that Perales was suffering from acute methamphetamine intoxication. Id. at ¶ 29. Wathen also noticed blood pressure medication in Perales's room. Id. at ¶ 27. Wathen then waited with Perales for Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) to arrive. Id. at ¶ 32. Emergency medical technicians performed an on-scene medical assessment and determined that Perales was “clear of any immediate medical issues.” Id. at ¶ 33.^[1] Wathen then placed Perales under arrest and brought him to the Washington County Jail. Id.

According to the complaint, “upon information and belief,” Washington County Jail diverts intoxicated persons from the booking process, denying them medical assessment and treatment until they “sober up.” Id. at ¶ 14. The municipality has not clearly stated that this is not the practice. See Owen's Br. at 9.

The Estate alleges that Washington County Jail has had at least two incidents of death in the past four years related to intoxication. In 2018, a man was put in a holding cell until he was “sober enough for booking,” receiving no medical clearance or assessment by medical personnel. Compl. at ¶ 21. He was found dead a few hours later. Id. In 2019, the jail again admitted a person without medical clearance or assessment and placed him in a holding cell until “sober enough for booking.” Id. at ¶ 22. The jail staff left him to languish and convulse in the cell without intervention for more than 24 hours, and after eventually being transferred to a hospital, the inmate died. Id.

At the Washington County Jail, Perales demonstrated obvious and observable physical manifestations consistent with withdrawal and immediate risk of serious harm, including being physically unable to sign his bond sheet “because of hi[s] f[l]ailing arms.” Id. at ¶ 40. Upon the Estate's information and belief, Wathen communicated his on-scene observations to jailers and Nurse Breton, regarding Perales's mental and physical condition and behavior, including his belief that Perales was suffering from acute methamphetamine intoxication. Id. at ¶ 41. The Estate alleges that Wathen may have also included information about Perales's hypertension. Id. at ¶ 42. Prior to his November 3, 2020, arrest, Perales had been held at the Washington County Jail twelve times, spanning from August 3, 2013, to May 17, 2020. Id. at ¶ 37. His April 25, 2016, detention lasted 92 days. Id. at ¶ 60. The Estate alleges that the Washington County Jail had knowledge of Perales's hypertension and possible other diseases based on his prior detentions, noting that his 2016 stay occurred two years after Perales was diagnosed with hypertension. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61.

Perales was denied a medical assessment and placed in a holding cell. Id. at ¶ 46. Perales continued experiencing symptoms associated with withdrawal and exhibited signs of cardiac distress. Id. at ¶ 49. The next morning at 10:52 am, Joshua Durham, a jailer, id. at ¶ 4, observed that Perales was “no longer making any noises after approximately 1 min 45 seconds,” id. at ¶ 51. By the time Durham responded, Perales was found “with a liquid substance around his head.” Id. at ¶ 56. When Breton responded, she assessed Perales and attempted life saving measures. Id. at ¶ 57. EMS was called at 10:59 am. Id. at ¶ 58.

Perales was brought to Jane Phillips Hospital and was pronounced dead. Id. at ¶ 62. The medical examiner determined that Perales's death was caused by atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, exacerbated by methamphetamine. Id. at ¶ 62.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 663, “specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (quotation marks omitted)). When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc., 45 F.4th 1236, 1247 (10th Cir. 2022).

III. Discussion

“Failure to provide adequate medical care is a violation of the Eighth Amendment if it is a result of deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.” Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). “The Fourteenth Amendment's due-process clause provides pretrial detainees the same protection for medical attention as convicted inmates receive under the Eighth Amendment.” George ex rel. Bradshaw v. Beaver Cnty., by & through Beaver Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 32 F.4th 1246, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

A. Sheriff Owen's Motion to Dismiss

The complaint sets forth three separate theories of constitutional liability against Owen in his official capacity as Sheriff of Washington County. The Estate claims that Owen, as final policymaker, instituted a policy of medical deliberate indifference, and that he was responsible for training and supervision at Washington County Jail that resulted in deliberate indifference to harm. Compl. at ¶¶ 65-67, 72-79.

By suing an individual in his or her official capacity, the Estate brings a claim for municipal liability. See Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show the existence of a municipal custom or policy that caused the plaintiff to suffer a constitutional violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “[T]he combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or custom may violate an individual's constitutional rights.” Crowson v. Washington Cnty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Garcia, 768 F.2d at 310).

A municipal policy or custom can take many forms, such as formal regulations or policy statements, informal custom “amounting to a widespread practice. . . so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,” or the ratification by such final policymakers of decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to such policymakers' review and approval. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010)).

Municipal liability can also be established by municipal policies or customs that result in failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused. Id. Deliberate indifference in the municipal liability context requires that the violation of a person's constitutional rights be “the plainly obvious consequence” of a given policy, see Brown, 520 U.S. at 411, or that the violation be ...